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ABSTRACT
International tax regimes (e.g., the “double taxation regime”) are created by states with competing
tax jurisdiction to coordinate their tax rules and, specifically, to address common efficiency
problems like international double taxation. In developing such regimes, states attempt to balance
competing tax policy priorities: efficiency, administrability, and equity. This work engages with
equity, as a policy norm of international tax (inter-national tax equity). It is my thesis that the
framing/articulation of inter-national tax equity suffers from a narrative problem that, perhaps,
stems from its apparent conceptual unclarity and multifarious usage. This narrative problem is
most evident in the articulation of inter-national tax equity with regard to the taxing rights claims
of low-income/developing countries (LIDCs), where there is a tendency to conflate equity with
tax aid. I illuminate the potential implications of the narrative problem and then – drawing on
subsisting theories of tax jurisdiction, international relations, and reasonableness, respectively –
propound the concept of “reasonable impairment compromise” (RIC) as a suitable
normative/evaluative framework for inter-national tax equity. RIC claims that: (1) a state’s right
to tax is an inherent attribute of its sovereignty; (2) international tax regimes are not strictly
technical regimes but are, instead, products of political compromise that overlay/impair the
exercise of inherent tax jurisdiction; and (3) the question of whether a particular
regime/compromise is equitable (fair) is really a question of reasonableness. Therefore, to measure
the fairness of a given compromise/regime, it is apposite to focus on the degree (severity) of
impairment. Only a compromise that impairs the exercise of tax jurisdiction to a “reasonable”
extent can be deemed equitable. To determine reasonableness, we must weigh the practical
implications of the compromise for individual states (or class of states), considering a totality of
objective factors. The thesis develops a 5-factor reasonableness test, which I then use to evaluate
the fairness of various components of the double taxation regime, as well as the emerging
multilateral regime for taxation of the digital economy. For LIDCs, “reasonable” (equitable) would
typically – but not always – describe a compromise that does not severely restrict a state’s scope
for domestic revenue mobilization.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Case for Inter-national Tax Equity
One day two women came to King Solomon, and one of them said: Your Majesty, this
woman and I live in the same house. Not long ago my baby was born at home, and
three days later her baby was born. Nobody else was there with us. One night while
we were all asleep, she rolled over on her baby, and he died. Then while I was still
asleep, she got up and took my son out of my bed. She put him in her bed, then she
put her dead baby next to me. In the morning when I got up to feed my son, I saw that
he was dead. But when I looked at him in the light, I knew he wasn’t my son. “No!”
the other woman shouted. “He was your son. My baby is alive!” “The dead baby is
yours,” the first woman yelled. “Mine is alive!” They argued back and forth in front
of Solomon, until finally he said, “Both of you say this live baby is yours. Someone
bring me a sword.” A sword was brought, and Solomon ordered, “Cut the baby in
half! That way each of you can have part of him.” “Please don’t kill my son,” the
baby’s mother screamed. “Your Majesty, I love him very much, but give him to her.
Just don’t kill him.” The other woman shouted, “Go ahead and cut him in half. Then
neither of us will have the baby.” Solomon said, “Don’t kill the baby.” Then he
pointed to the first woman, “She is his real mother. Give the baby to her.” Everyone
in Israel was amazed when they heard how Solomon had made his decision. They
realized that God had given him wisdom to judge fairly.1
1.1

Background, Research Questions and Thesis Roadmap

The international tax regime2 is an enormous regulatory orbit that largely consists of
“compromises” agreed or adopted by sovereign states to govern or coordinate how they exercise

1

The Holy Bible (Contemporary English Version), 1 Kings 3:16-28.
The phrase “international tax regime” is a common feature of international tax scholarship and it is often used
alternatively with “international tax system”. See, for instance, Richard M Bird, “Are Global Taxes Feasible?” (2018)
25 Int’l Tax Pub Fin 1372; Ana Paula Dorado, “The OECD Unified Approach and the New International Tax System:
A Half-Way Solution” (2020) 48:1 Intertax 3. Also, Reuven S Avi-Yonah, International Tax as international Law:
An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 1 [“This book has a
thesis: that a coherent international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty network and in domestic laws,
and that it forms a significant part of international law (both treaty-based and customary). The practical implication is
that countries are not free to adopt any international tax rules they please, but rather operate in the context of the
regime, which changes in the same ways international law changes over time”]. Avi-Yonah (at 8–130) further contends
that the “international tax regime comprises” two elements: the single tax principle and the benefits principle. The
single tax principle suggests that income should be tax once, and just once (either at residence or source), while the
benefits principle suggests that passive income should be taxed in the country of residence while active income should
be taxed in the country of source. In terms of terminology, Diane Ring takes a more pluralistic view of international
tax governance. She opines that there is not one “international tax regime”, but rather various regimes, one of which
is the double taxation regime. See Diane Ring, “International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications" (2007) 60:2
Tax L Rev 83. It is also common for scholars to state “international tax order”, with the concept of a system or regime
seemingly implicit. See, for instance, Allison Christians, “What’s Up: BEPS and the New International Tax Order”
(2016) 2016:6 BYU L Rev 1603; Adam S Michel, “The Treasury Should Disengage from the OECD Digital Tax
Process” (Grover, Hermann Centre for Federal Budget Backgrounder No. 3445, 2019). My preference for the term
2
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their respective rights to tax international economic activities that penetrate their sovereign
borders.3 The recently concretizing OECD BEPS Pillar One tax deal (discussed in chapter 3) is
such a compromise – a monumental one – fashioned through a multilateral framework to address
tax issues arising from the digitalization of the global economy and to apportion (by imposing
limits on) taxing rights between states that are entitled to tax. As with domestic tax regimes,
countries are mainly concerned with three core policy factors when fashioning the international
tax regime (or any component of it): efficiency (neutrality), administrability, and equity.4 The
scholarship on these three key tax policy objectives is vast. However, this thesis focuses on the
third policy objective: equity,5 and only references efficiency and administrability as they become
relevant.6 The thesis deals with the fundamental and protracted question: “how can countries
“regime” over “system” is mainly informed by acknowledgment of a political overlay over the rules that govern
international tax.
3
I use the term “compromise” in two senses. As a noun, the term refers to an international tax deal or arrangement
that limits, restricts, fetters, or impairs the exercise of tax jurisdiction. To compromise – the verb form – is to enter
into or adopt an international tax deal or arrangement that limits, etc., tax jurisdiction. Tax compromises take the form
of tax treaty stipulations, domestic tax rules or some agreed/adopted framework or “norm” earmarking limits or
thresholds for the exercise of taxing rights over income arising from cross-border activities.
4
These objectives collide. The pursuit of one objective may undermine the effective pursuit of another, which is why
trade-offs are inevitable. See Ring supra note 2. [pinpoint?] Whatever trade-offs are made impact how much tax
revenue countries can derive from cross-border factor movement.
5
Basically, equity means that people should be treated fairly. In a domestic context, inter-individual equity implies
that each person should bear a fair share of the tax burden. One aspect of this theory – benefits theory – holds that
people should be taxed in relation to the benefits that they receive from society. Another side of the equity coin –
ability-to-pay theory – holds that people should pay taxes in relation to their respective capacities or means. Abilityto-pay theory further comprises horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity mandates that taxpayers with similar
earnings should bear similar tax burdens. On the other hand, vertical equity mandates that taxpayers who earn higher
or are better off should bear a higher tax burden. For a detailed discussion of equity in tax policy see Tim Edgar &
Daniel Sandler, Materials on Canadian Income Tax (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd, 2005) at 66; David Elkin,
“Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory” (2006) 24:1 Yale L & Policy Rev 43; Brian Galle, "Tax Fairness"
(2008) 65:4 Wash & Lee L Rev 1323; Allison Christians, “Introduction to Tax Policy Theory”, SSRN (2018), online:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186791. For examination of the relevance of ability-to-pay
theory to international tax, particularly residence-based taxation, see Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation
of Income - A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part III)” (1988) 11 Intertax 393 and Nancy H Kaufman,
“Fairness and the Taxation of International Income,” (1997) 29:2 L & Pol Intl Bus 152 at 172–182 [both offering
reasons why inter-individual equity does not necessarily justify a residence countries’ taxation of worldwide income].
6
Administrability means that countries should be able to enforce the tax systems that they create. It is pointless to
enact a tax law that defies enforcement. See Christians ibid at 23. Neutrality, on the other hand, means that the tax
system should not distort choices and behaviour in otherwise efficient markets. See Loraine Eden, “Equity and
Neutrality in the International Taxation of Capital” (1988) 26:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 367 at 370. In other words, taxpayers
in similar situations and carrying out similar activities should be subject to similar patterns of tax treatment. This
would “neutralize” the incentive to change their behavior to minimize their potential tax liabilities. According to Chen,
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equitably – or fairly – allocate the common tax base between them”? More centrally, what does
“inter-nation equity” mean for the category of countries that are often labelled “low-income”,
“developing”, or “(net) capital importing” countries?7
Again, as I articulate in the contemporaneous footnotes, the discussion on inter-national tax equity
is not new. There is a substantial collection of literature on the subject. 8 So, why does it make

the neutrality of a tax system can be tested by comparing it with a situation where there is no tax. Shu-Chien Jennifer
Chen, “Neutrality as Tax Justice: The Case of Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base under the EU law” (2018)
5 European Studies 33 at 36. A non-neutral tax system creates incentives to reduce tax payments by changing behavior.
Economists generally agree that tax policy should raise revenues without unduly distorting the decisions of firms. This
is how to ensure the efficient deployment of resources for productivity. See Alex Easson & Eric M Zolt, Tax Incentives
(Washington DC: World bank, 2002); Richard M Bird & Scott Wilkie, “Designing Tax Policy: Constraints and
Objectives in Open Economy” (2012) Georgia State University Int’l Center for Public Policy Working Paper 12-24.
In international tax, there are two principal forms of neutrality: capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import
neutrality (CIN). CEN embodies the idea that taxes should not influence investment decisions; and the way to ensure
this is to subject capital to the same tax burden whether it is invested at home or overseas. See Ruth Mason & Michael
S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination?” (2012) 121 Yale LJ 1014 at 1043 (2012). CIN reflects the idea that all capital
invested in a particular jurisdiction should be subjected to the same tax burden, regardless of their origin. See David
Elkins, “A Critical Reassessment of the Role of Neutrality in International Taxation” (2019) 40:1 Northwestern J Int’l
L & Bus 1. Knoll observes that “[t]he central idea in the literature is that an income tax cannot simultaneously satisfy
both CEN and CIN unless tax rates on capital are harmonized across countries”. See Michael Knoll, “Reconsidering
International Tax Neutrality” (2011) 64:2 Tax L Rev 99.
7
Similar appellations include “poor”, “Global South”, “least developed”, “less developed”, “lower-income”, “low-to
middle-income”, etc. The United Nations (UN) classifies countries into three categories, based on metrics of
development: developed economies, economies in transition, and developing economies. See UN, “World Economic
Situation and Prospects” (2020) online: https://perma.cc/U5GF-N6LX; The UN previously adopted a four-tier
classification of countries, based the level of income: low-income, lower middle income, middle income and highincome”. See UN, “World Economic Situation and Prospects” (2014) online: https://perma.cc/B8FD-YD2S. I have
settled here for the phrase “low-income developing countries” (LIDCs) as a sort of operative umbrella term. I also
adopt the phrase “high-income developed countries” (HIDCs) as a parallel phrase for non-LIDC countries.
8
At least since the seminal works of Richard and Peggy Musgrave, equity considerations have been a mainstay of
international tax and tax scholars have broadly drawn on the concept of “inter-nation equity” to address issues of
fairness in bilateral or multilateral tax dealings (of many kinds). See Richard A Musgrave & Peggy B Musgrave,
“Inter-nation Equity”, in R Bird and J Head, eds, Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup (University
of Toronto Press 1972) 68. For uses of inter-nation equity in international tax discourse, see Vogel supra note 5
[disputing the appropriateness – on equity and efficiency grounds – of residence-based worldwide taxation]; Joel P
Trachtman, “International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction” (1993) 34 Harv Intl LJ 47.
[examining the regulation of tax competition]; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy,
Action 1—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD, 2015) [for the allocation of taxing rights to the country where economic
activities occur and where value is created]; Justus Eisenbeiss, “BEPS Action 7: Evaluation of the Agency Permanent
Establishment,” (2016) 44 Intertax 481 and Sven Hentschel, The Taxation of Permanent Establishments A Critical
Analysis of the Authorised OECD Approach and Its Implementation in German Tax Law under Specific Consideration
of the Challenges Imposed to the PE Concept by the Digitalisation of the Economy (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2021) at
381 [supporting the expansion of the existing concept of permanent establishment to include sales jurisdictions];
Duncan Bentley, “Taxpayer Rights and Protections in a Digital Global Environment”, in RF van Brederode, ed, Ethics
and Taxation (Singapore: Springer, 2020) 251 [buttressing a jurisdiction’s responsibility to protect the rights of its
taxpayers in a global digital environment]; Alexander Ezenagu, “Unitary Taxation of Multinational Enterprises for a
Just Allocation of Income: Nigeria as a Case Study of Africa’s Largest Economies” (McGill University Doctoral
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sense to do an entire thesis on a subject that, admittedly, has been vastly explored? There are three
(interconnected) reasons. The first has to do with timing. As we live in a world of expanding tax
compromises that eat ever so deeply into the sovereignty of individual states, I find that there is
need to map out an operational test or yardstick for evaluating whether an international tax
compromise conforms with standards of equity or fairness from the perspective of low-income
developing countries (LIDCs). The current state of international tax literature does not
(sufficiently) fulfill this need, primarily because of the tendencies identified in my second reason.
As Burgers & Mosquera duly observe, while there is extensive reference to fairness in discussions
of tax systems, that reference is bereft of proper definition of fairness and how fairness can be
achieved.9
Second, the relevance of this contribution is underscored by what I identify as a narrative problem
in the international tax literature with regard to equity issues for LIDCs, especially the literature

Thesis, 2019) [arguing that a shift to a global unitary tax system based on profit allocation by formulary apportionment
approach will achieve fairer distribution of taxing rights]; Irene JJ Burgers, “Value Creation and Inter-Nation Equity”
in W Haslehner & M Lamensch, eds, Taxation and Value Creation, EATLP Tax Series vol 9 (Amsterdam: IBFD,
2021) [exploring whether the “value creation” method of profit attribution would result in a fairer distribution of taxing
rights, in the context of the OECD-led international tax reform efforts]; and Ariel Hakim P Lubis & Ning Rahayu,
“Emphasizing Inter-Nation Equity in the New Digital Economy's Taxing Rights Allocation Scheme” (2021) Int’l J Sc
and Res Pub 402 [examining the prospects of fairness in the evolving OECD/G20 Pillar One tax deal]. This very fluid
use of the concept has led some scholars to ponder on the precise meaning of “inter-nation equity” or the scope of its
application. See Kim Brooks, “Internation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated
International Tax Value” in J G Head & R Krever, eds, Tax Reform in the 21st Century: A Volume in Memory of
Richard Musgrave (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009) 471 at 473 [“Given that this 1972 essay forms
the starting place for the analysis that follows; has been frequently misunderstood and inadequately developed by
subsequent scholars; and constitutes the first major contribution to our understanding of inter nation equity, a relatively
detailed discussion of the argument made in the piece seems appropriate]; Ivan Ozai, “Inter-nation Equity Revisited”
(2020) 12:58 Columbia J Tax L 58 at 59 & 61 [“Inter-nation equity has become a vague enough term that it is used to
justify virtually any possible stance on how to distribute the international tax base while giving the impression that
such a stance, because it is purportedly aligned with the concept of inter-nation equity, is grounded in some sense of
fairness between nations”…“The concept of inter-nation equity is now ubiquitous in the tax literature. Commentators
have applied the concept to a wide array of subjects, frequently beyond the scenarios envisaged by the Musgraves
themselves”].
9
Irene JJ Burgers & Irma J Mosquera Valderrama, “Fairness: A Dire International Tax Standard with No Meaning?”
(2017) 45:12 Intertax 767. Compared to the broad and ambitious exploration of “fairness” that is contained in that
paper, my thesis undertakes a narrow exploration of “fairness” themed around LIDCs and the question of international
taxing rights allocation.

4

on taxation and development. The narrative that I consider to be troubling, often implicitly,
misjudges (or muddles) inter-nation equity as charitable redistribution of tax revenue, a form of
“tax aid”, from high-income developed countries (HIDCs) to LIDCs. There is need to draw
attention to this narrative because to do so can awaken scholarly consciousness about its potential
implications.
I am convinced that now is a “next best time” to disabuse the troubling charity narrative that
pervades some of the conversation on the taxing rights claims of LIDCs and to explore the potential
for a heuristic framework that more suitably streamlines scholarly conversation on international
taxation and LIDCs, considering that countries are in the intense process of concretizing a
multilateral compromise that could define the international tax regime for generations.10
Even as I seek to address the identified narrative problem and to muster a better framing of the
subject, I must point out early that it is not my intention to conduct an in-depth conceptual reexamination of inter-nation equity or to comprehensively address the fog around its scope of
application. The afore-referenced pieces by Brooks and Ozai are important reference points for
that purpose.11 I have opted, instead, to zero in on inter-nation equity as it concerns the allocation
of taxing rights where LIDCs are involved. The Musgraves address this issue, but, perhaps, not in
a way that pre-empts the narrative that has organically ensued about the interest of LIDCs in the
international tax regime.12
I must also acknowledge that this contribution does not make specific proposals for the equitable
allocation of taxing rights in any specific case. Rather, I outline a general framework that may be

10

A better time would have been earlier in the life of the OECD BEPS project when countries were in the initial stages
of figuring out what the place of developing countries was.
11
Brooks, “Inter-nation Equity” supra note 8; Ozai (2020) supra note 8.
12
Musgrave & Musgraves supra note 8.
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used to evaluate whether a compromise can be considered fair to the countries (LIDCs) who,
invariably, must “give up” taxing rights to make the intended regime work. I am, therefore, guided
throughout this exploration by the pivotal question: is this a fair (reasonable) surrender
(compromise) of tax jurisdiction for a country of limited means.?13
I should also iterate early that the allocation of taxing rights between countries is an inherently
complex matter.14 Any bilateral or multilateral framework (body of norms) that countries adopt
for the purpose is a hybrid of both economic and political influences, even as unilateral crossborder tax policies can also be both economically and politically consequential. It is this complex
intersection between the economic and political elements of international taxing rights allocation
that evokes pertinent equity concerns. How should countries be guided, from an equity perspective,
when making tax deals? What do considerations like “income inequality”, “redistribution”, “global
distributive justice”, and “sustainable development” have to do with it?
The view espoused in this work is that all taxing rights allocation claims must be founded, first,
on entitlement. Equity (as distinct from aid or charity) is relevant to moderate the extent to which
countries can be expected to compromise or concede those taxing rights when making tax deals.
Therefore, in my view, an ideal conversation on inter-nation equity should proceed from a
theoretical analysis of how countries “acquire” taxing rights; proceed to examine how they give

13

I am hopeful – optimistic – that the gamut of inter-nation equity, as used here, becomes patent as I traverse this
thesis to deal with the identified narrative problem.
14
See Eden supra note 6 at 367–368 [“the international taxation of capital is a complicated subject. It affects the
international allocation of capital, the distribution of gains from foreign investment between home and host countries,
the returns to residents and non-residents in the host country, and the relative treatment of residents in the home
country with domestic income and those with foreign-source income. In 1963, the OECD Fiscal Committee adopted
a Model Tax Treaty Convention on Income and Capital to clarify "good behaviour" in this area. The Convention
assigns the source or host country the primary right to tax business income earned within its borders. Where
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are involved, the tax base is allocated internationally according to the concept of a
permanent establishment. The various MNE affiliates are treated as separate legal entities and income is apportioned
between them assuming intra-firm transactions to take place at arm's-length prices. The Convention assigns the
residence or home country the right to tax remitted income, with the host country having the prior right to levy a
withholding tax, and recommends that the home country grant a foreign tax credit.”].
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up or compromise those taxing rights, and then form an opinion on whether a particular
compromise is “fair”, “reasonable”, “just”, or “equitable” to the countries involved, considering
their peculiar circumstances. That evaluative framework is what I term “reasonable impairment
compromise”. Approaching the equity discourse this way – with clear emphasis on the inherence
of taxing rights – provides better clarity on the normative foundations of the taxing rights claims
advanced by or on behalf of LIDCs, as opposed to the situation where such claims are framed as
appeals for handouts from HIDCs. The principal question that this thesis addresses, therefore, is:
1.

What does inter-national tax equity really mean for low-income/developing countries
(LIDCs and how should we (re)frame it?

The core objective of this work is to improve tax policy in the sphere of international tax. The
work attempts to do so by presenting a set of guiding principles for evaluating whether tax deals
fairly restrict or impair the tax jurisdiction of sovereign states, particularly states in the LIDC
category, who tend to have less bargaining power. The framework advanced in this work is
adaptable to different circumstances, in keeping with the fluid and complex nature of the subject
– international taxing rights allocation. Although the test is strongly founded on entitlement, it
offers a suitable alternative to those fairness perspectives of international taxing rights allocation
that draw on cosmopolitan redistribution.
The method of this work is inductive. Drawing from that reasoning pattern, I argue that internation equity is ultimately a manifestation of “reasonableness”. This implies that inter-nation
equity addresses the pivotal question: “to what extent is it ‘reasonable’ for a country to give up
taxing rights?” To break it down, I claim as follows: (1) the right to tax is inherent, and it is
attributable to an amalgam of economic and political demonstrations of sovereignty over the
taxable factor, whether person or thing; (2) the international tax regime is a product of political
7

compromise of tax jurisdiction; (3) a compromise impairs the exercise of inherent tax jurisdiction
by sovereign states, often so for the avoidance of the common problem of international double
taxation (4) a tax compromise is only just and equitable if it does not unreasonably impair the
exercise of inherent tax jurisdiction. This induction, in my view, is the basic sense of inter-nation
equity. The “reasonableness” factor can be ascertained by assessing a number of factors which
are examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
In propagating the “reasonable impairment compromise” concept, no claim is made that other
approaches are unsuitable to address inter-national tax equity issues. Rather, the goal of this
perspective is to isolate the aid narrative, to emphasize the vitality of an entitlement narrative
and, in between, to highlight the potential implications of conflating the two perspectives.
For the rest of chapter 1, I review scholarly perspectives on equity in international taxing rig hts
allocation. I consider only contributions that border on the allocation of taxing rights to LIDCs.
I contemporaneously consider the potential implications of the existing literature. In chapter 2,
I discuss the concept of “reasonable impairment compromise”, as a framework for evaluating
inter-nation equity. I utilize current issues arising from the restriction of source country taxation
of some categories of income, e.g., interest, dividends, royalties, and international shipping, as
useful case studies in the process of developing the “reasonableness test” of “reasonable
impairment compromise”. What follows this doctrinal analysis, in chapter 3, is a more in-depth
application of “reasonable impairment compromise” to evaluate a most significant international
tax subject of our time – taxation of the digital economy – and the emerging multilateral
compromise that allocates taxing rights in that regard. Chapter 4 concludes the conversation.
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1.2 The Normative Case for Inter-national Tax Equity and Its Implications for Taxing
Rights Allocation Discourse
The international tax literature is awash with material that advocates “fair”, “just”, or “equitable”
taxing rights allocation for LIDCs (inter-nation equity). There is a plurality of perspectives on
how we can make the international tax regime do a better job of allocating taxing rights between
countries, especially between LIDCs and HIDCs. These perspectives can, however, be subsumed
into two broad clusters. The first cluster leans on certain underlying factors – political, economic,
and administrative – to ascertain whether there is a legitimate basis or justification (normative
entitlement) for a state to exercise tax jurisdiction and, thereupon, focuses on preserving the
taxing rights of that state in the face of competing taxing rights claims from other states. This
perspective focuses on articulating whether an LIDC has normative entitlement to tax and then
emphasizes the importance of preserving that entitlement, within the framework of a
cohabitational and collaborative international tax system. It is this perspective that I elaborately
explore in chapter 2. But for the purposes of this preceding segment, I would highlight that the
entitlement narrative is reflected in an array of scholarship that focuses on how the international
tax regime (or tax treaties) unjustly, unreasonably, or disproportionately fetters the taxing rights
of LIDCs and, in some cases, transfers those taxing rights to HIDCs.15 An example is Julia Braun’s

15

See, e.g., Alex J. Easson, International Tax Reform and the Inter-Nation Allocation of Tax Revenue (Wellington,
NZ: Victoria University Press, 1991) at 20 [criticizing the lopsided structure of model tax treaties as a reflection of
the self-centered biases of the countries that formed the regime – predominantly capital exporters – for greater
residence-based taxation and arguing for some “redistribution” as a way to achieve some form of inter-nation equity].
Likewise, the respective works of Hearson and Mutava help to tackle international tax inequity by demonstrating some
of the treaty negotiating factors that surround the loss of taxing rights by developing countries. See Martin Hearson,
“When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away their Corporate Tax Base” (2018) 30:2 J Int’l Dev 233 and
Catherine Ngina Mutava “Review of Tax Treaty Practices and Policy Framework in Africa” (2019) ICTD Working
Paper 102. See also Diane Ring, “Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in
Shaping Tax Cooperation” (2009) 9:5 Fla Tax Rev 555 at 584 [“Bilateral double tax treaties face scrutiny as
inappropriately favoring capital exporting nations through their allocation of primary and residual taxing rights.
Developing countries reportedly have made "concessions" in tax treaties without a full awareness of their implications
because they believed the provisions were standard and because the provisions were formally reciprocal (enhancing
their appearance of mutuality and comparable impact)”.]; Patrik Emblad, “Power and Sovereignty. How Economic-
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analysis of 37 tax treaties between Austria and LIDCs, which shines the spotlight on how Austria’s
restrictive treaty practices rob LIDCs of source taxing rights in some cases “even below the
standards embodied in the OECD Model”.16 Another quintessential example is the often-cited
piece by Kim Brooks and Richard Krever which vigorously exposes the detrimental role that tax
treaties play in depriving LIDCs of source tax revenue and casts significant doubts on the prudence
of LIDCs entering into tax treaties with HIDCs.17 The authors emphasize the preeminent right of
LIDCs, as source countries, to tax income at origin and urges them to “fiercely guard their
jurisdiction to tax”.18 Yet another example, Vet, Cassimon, & de Vijver’s qualitative research
piece, exposes how HIDCs, together with powerful business interests, developed certain important
transfer pricing soft laws – the transactional profit split method – that would essentially undervalue
the contributions of LIDCs to the global value chains of MNEs. The piece highlights how some

Ideological Forces Constrain Sovereignty to Tax” (2021) 4:1 Nordic J L & Soc’y 1 at 8 [suggesting that inter-nation
equity is about stopping the redistribution of tax revenue from poor to rich countries].
16
Julia Braun, “The Effects of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries. A Case Study of Austria’s Double Tax
Treaty Network” (2016) 16:4 Pub Fin & Mgt 383 at 384 [“At the same time, there is a different discussion coming
from the perspective of developing countries, calling for a more fundamental ‘rethinking’ of the international tax
system. The question is raised as to how the international tax system generally and Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) in
particular impact developing countries. It is being discussed whether developing countries at all benefit from the
signature of DTTs under current internationally accepted standards”].
17
Kimberly Brooks & Richard Krever, “The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties” in Geerten Michielse and Victor
Thuronyi, eds, Tax Design Issues Worldwide, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2015), (chapter 6) 159 at
162. The authors contend that since the source country (LIDC) always has the “initial potential tax jurisdiction”, an
LIDC-HIDC tax treaty can only result in a surrender or redistribution of that right to the residence country (HIDC).
For similar views on the pre-eminence of source country taxation, see Eden supra note 6; Luzius U Cavelti, Christian
Jaag & Tobias F Rohner, “Why Corporate Taxation Should Mean Source Taxation: A Response to the OECD’s
Actions Against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (2017) 9:3 World Tax J 352. If a source country’s statutory tax rate
has been limited by a tax treaty, a return to or reflection of the original position should not be portrayed in terms that
connote charitable redistribution. But see also, Eric Zolt, “Tax Treaties and Developing Countries” (2018) 72 Tax L
Rev 111 [arguing that tax treaties are not likely to result in the redistribution of tax revenue from LIDCs to HIDCs,
but are instead a mechanism for easing the tax burdens of their TNCs]. The constant in these views is that a tax treaty
generally results in the loss of source tax revenue by LIDCs. It makes no revenue difference (to the LIDC) whether
the lost tax revenue is claimed by MNE or its residence country.
18
Ibid at 161.
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countries on the receiving end of these lopsided rules are pushing back by introducing things like
“location specific advantages” into their transfer pricing rules to preserve their taxing rights.19
The narrative in these pieces – and many alike – revolves around the resistance, amelioration or
eradication of overlaying international tax standards that hinder the capacity of LIDCs to exercise
their inherent taxing rights with respect to cross-border economic activities.20 As I demonstrate in
chapter 2, these overlaying standards are typically products of political compromise, where the
bargaining might of LIDCs is dwarfed by that of HIDCs. Thus, a proper understanding of international tax equity necessarily entails a robust appreciation of the role that economic and political
power distribution plays in the entrenchment of international tax norms and standards, and how
these norms and standards contribute to robbing LIDCs of the revenues that they should be entitled
to mobilize.21

19

Cassandra Vet, Danny Cassimon & Anne Van de Vijver, “Getting the Short End of the Stick: Power Relations
and Their Distributive Outcomes for Lower-Income Countries in Transfer Pricing Governance” in IJ Mosquera
Valderrama, D Lesage & W Lips, eds, Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development
Agenda, United Nations Series on Regionalism 19 (Cham: Springer, 2021) 3.
20
Examples are proposals to change profit allocation rules that are especially detrimental to domestic revenue
mobilization in LIDCs. See, for instance, Michael C Durst, “Developing Country Revenue Mobilisation: A Proposal
to Modify the ‘Transactional Net Margin’ Transfer Pricing Method” (2016) ICTD Working Paper 44; Tommaso
Faccio & Sol Picciotto, “Alternatives to the Separate Entity/Arm’s Length Principle for Taxation of Multinational
Enterprises” (2017) ICRICT Briefing Paper; David Quentin, “Corporate Tax Reform and “Value Creation”: Towards
Unfettered Diagonal Re-allocation across the Global Inequality Chain” (2017) 7:1 Acc Econ & L 1; Vet, Cassimon &
de Vijver supra note 19. Also, Deepal Kapoor, “The MFN Clause in Tax Treaties is Jeopardising Tax Revenue for
Lower-Income Countries”, ICTD (23 August 2021) online: https://www.ictd.ac/blog/mfn-clause-tax-treatiesjeopardising-tax-revenue-lower-income-countries/.
21
See Emblad supra note 15. The recent book by the political economist Martin Hearson has an excellent title that
aligns with this narrative. Martin Hearson, Imposing Standards: The North-South Dimension to Global Tax Politics
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2021). It may not have been as obvious in 1972 when the Musgraves published
their landmark paper, but we have become better apprised of the dire effects of ‘imposing standards’ that effectively
rob LIDCs of taxing rights. See Dirk Broekhuijsen & Henk Vording, “What May We Expect of a Theory of
International Tax Justice?”, in D de Cogan & P Harris, eds, Tax Justice and Tax Law: Understanding Unfairness in
Tax Systems (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020) 155 at 160 [“Nevertheless, the attractiveness of some international tax
equity norm that would support the taxing rights of (developing) source countries is evident. The Musgraves’ proposal
to found an ‘inter-nation tax equity’ norm was not taken up quickly, perhaps because it did not address a problem felt
to be urgent at the time. That only changed over the last two decades, and NGOs like Oxfam and Tax Justice deserve
credit for it”].
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However, there is a second cluster of literature that is more focused on advocating the use of the
international tax system as a tool for revenue transfer or redistribution between HIDCs and
LIDCs, with the aim of attaining various liberal, humanitarian, or developmental objectives. In
the analysis that follows, I argue that this cluster of literature, perhaps inadvertently, poses a
narrative problem for the overarching case for international tax justice that it purports to advance.
In sum, this narrative problem manifests as two sides of a coin. On the one hand, the literature
tends to channel the fairer taxing rights allocation claims of LIDCs through a prism of charitable
redistribution – denoting wealth or revenue transfers from rich to poor countries – even when
LIDCs have a normative entitlement to tax. In my view, this charity-laden narrative flows from
a wrong premise when the LIDC has a legitimate basis to tax in the first place. On the other
hand, the literature, when examining the subject of international taxation and development, fails
to adequately distinguish between the accrual of taxing rights to LIDCs and their preservation
thereof, as a matter of inter-nation equity, and the use of special tax schemes that transfer
developmental (tax) aid from rich to poor countries. Such comingling of unidentical policy goals
implicitly casts the entire scheme of taxing rights allocation in the likeness of charity and
overcomplicates the discourse around international taxing rights reform. It also undersells the
strength of the normative entitlement of LIDCs to tax economic activities that occur in their
territory.
In this part of the discussion, I highlight and discuss some scholarly perspectives that epitomize
the narrative problem identified above. I would like to begin with a two-decade old remark by a
prominent international tax justice scholar, Reuven S Avi-Yonah, made in support of a practical
advancement of inter-nation equity:
The concept of inter-nation equity can be given practical meaning in the design of
international tax rules if it is interpreted as embodying explicit redistributive goals. More
12

specifically, when a choice is presented between two otherwise comparable alternative rules,
one of which has progressive and the other regressive implications for the division of the
international tax base between poorer and richer countries, the progressive rule should be
explicitly preferred to the regressive one. In the absence of a world taxing authority that can
redistribute tax revenues directly, and given the paucity of foreign aid from developed to
developing countries, such a concept of inter-nation equity has the best chance of achieving
meaningful distributive goals.22
It is not obvious whether the intent here is to portray what appears to be a clamor for a more
equitable tax revenue allocation as a like-for-like substitute for foreign aid, but the comingling of
the two in this case creates an impression that measures that are designed to ensure greater retention
of source taxing rights by LIDCs can be as well regarded as development aid or assistance from
HIDCs.
A similar narrative can be found in another tax scholar, Ilan Benshalom’s proposal to use
international tax rules to advance an international redistributive agenda with respect to two issues:
taxing interest payments and corporate income tax.23 The author recommends that rich resident
countries wholly forgo their right to tax these incomes so that low-income source countries can
freely exercise their full rate taxing rights without having to worry about taxpayers moving their
investment elsewhere due to the burden of heavy double taxation. Benshalom opines that
“allocating more of the right to tax to poorer developing countries is a form of wealth transfer.”24
The two forms of “wealth transfer” envisaged in this waiver are revenue and development.25 The
author notes that “the redistributive effort can be either an independent enterprise to reduce

22

Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” (2000) 113:7
Harvard L Rev 1573 at 1650. The author supports this proposition with the assessment that “some of the current
practice of international taxation can be interpreted as reflecting concern for the relatively greater revenue needs of
poorer countries. In particular, the widespread acceptance of the source country's right to levy its tax first and of the
imposition of the burden of alleviating double taxation on the residence country partly reflects the position of the
poorer (capital-importing) countries in the 1920s” – at 1649.
23
Ilan Benshalom, “How to Redistribute Critical Examination Mechanisms Promote Global Wealth Redistribution”
(2014) 64:3 Uni Toronto LJ 317 at 320.
24
Ibid at 334.
25
Ibid at 334–335.
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inequality and poverty or part of a greater, international coordinative deal in which the
redistributive policy supplements other coordinative policies.”26
Likewise, Infanti argues that discussion of inter-nation equity has focused more than is necessary
on using on the benchmark of relative per capita income between countries as a basis for income
redistribution.27 The author contends that this approach is limited because per capita income does
not adequately demonstrate the state of a country’s needs for tax revenue. He advocates that human
development index (HDI), or human development report (HDR), should, instead, be leveraged to
make decisions about development policy. The author reckons that richer countries can then use
the HDI information to determine where and how to channel tax aid to poorer countries.
Infanti opines that tax expenditures such as foreign tax credits and exemptions granted by a
resident country and withholding tax concessions granted by a source country – through domestic
legislation or tax treaties – constitute tax aid to the other country (or treaty partner). Indeed, Infanti
asserts that this is something that countries already do, but not in the tailored manner that is
required to improve human development. The author proposes the use of a sliding scale by
countries to stipulate how recipient countries can benefit from tax expenditures. The sliding scale
ties tax aid to a country’s HDI profile. In the case of a sliding scale applied by a source country:
This would result in the source country ceding more of the national gain (i.e., providing more
foreign aid) to the residence country as it performs better in the HDR’s human development
measures. In this way, the source country would encourage all countries whose residents
invest capital there to work to advance human development.28 [emphasis added]

26

Ibid at 319.
Anthony Infanti, “Internation Equity and Human Development” in Y Brauner & M Stewart, eds, Tax Law and
Development (Edward Edgar Publishing, 2013) 209.
28
Ibid at 231-232.
27
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By ceding a greater share of the national gain, the source country allows the residence country to
claim a greater share of the gain through taxation for use in ongoing development efforts.29
However, the author suggests that:
The highest withholding tax rates could be applied to residents of countries that either (1)
appear in the HDI’s ‘low human development’ category and fare poorly in the ‘HDI
improvement rank’, or (2) experience losses in HDI due to inequality (as measured by the
IHDI) and in achievement due to gender inequality (as measured by the GII) above a
specified threshold. This would result in the source country retaining a greater share of the
residence country’s national gain as it performs more poorly in the HDR’s human
development measures.30
Likewise, residence countries can apply a sliding scale to cede taxing rights in favor of source
countries with low HDI, provided that those source countries continue to prudently utilize the “tax
aid” to deliver the requisite development.
A residence country could encourage investment in source countries doing well in terms of
human development by exempting income sourced in those countries from tax. It could
discourage investment in source countries doing poorly in terms of human development by
providing no more than a deduction for foreign taxes paid (or for the worst offenders, by
denying relief from double taxation)”.31
The author opines that “if a country is not significantly advancing human development, it is not
likely to be an appropriate target for (direct or indirect) development assistance given the strong
possibility that any assistance might not actually be used to advance development”.32 Therefore,
countries that fail to fulfill the development agenda to their populace may be denied further tax
aid. This would discourage taxpayers from investing in those countries.
In the case of “aid” provided by source countries, Infanti opines that investors who reside in
countries that fail to further domestic development would be denied benefits. This may entail

29

Ibid at 233
Ibid at 232
31
Ibid at 234.
32
Ibid at 235
30
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taxing the residents of such countries at a higher rate than they enjoy under this proposed tax
regime. These exclusionary measures would ensure that only the governments of low-HDI
countries that utilize the money to improve HDI will be able to claim the ‘tax aid’.
Labelling things like foreign tax credits and tax sparing as “tax aid” (or wealth transfers) to LIDCs
is demonstrative of the narrative problem that trails inter-nation equity discourse.33 In my
respectful dissent, Infanti’s conceptualization of “aid” can only mean “aiding” or “assisting”
another country to fulfill its tax policy objectives. In that sense, “aid” rides the same boat as one
country providing taxpayer information to another country to enable the latter ascertain the true
tax liabilities of certain taxpayers. It is difficult to conceive “aid” as wealth transfers from one
country to another, especially in the case of residence application. How can it be deemed a wealth
transfer when the other (“recipient”) country is already entitled to tax the income? Again, in the
case of residence application, I must ask, is it the residence country’s willingness to grant a foreign
tax credit that entitles the source country to tax national gains from investment in its territory?34 If

33

See Jinyan Li, “Improving Inter-Nation Equity through Territorial Taxation and Tax Sparing” in AJ Easson & AJ
Cockfield, eds, Globalization and its Tax Discontents: Tax Policy and International Investments: Essays in Honour
of Alex Easson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 117 at 128–129 [describing tax sparing as an
“international redistribution mechanism”]. See also, Kaufman supra note 5 at 153 [“it would be a mistake to think of
internation equity in taxation only in terms of entitlement theory. The number of capital-exporting countries now
granting tax-sparing credits in treaties with developing countries indicates an acceptance of a certain degree of
redistribution within the international tax system. Distributional considerations are more at home in a welfarist view
of economic justice”]. In the first place, most resident countries recognize the right of the source country to tax the
income and would normally grant a tax credit or exemption in recognition of that right. See Kim Brooks, “Tax Sparing:
A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice” (2009)
34:2 Queen's LJ 505. Does the fact that the source country, for some policy reason, opts to not tax make it the income
of the resident country to “redistribute”? Would that not be tantamount to being given what one was ab initio entitled
to tax? A situation where a residence country taxes spared revenue seems more like redistribution from the source
country to the residence country.
34
Conversely, not granting a tax credit, for instance, does not have any bearing on the source country’s normative
entitlement to tax the gain (the bedrock of inter-nation equity, according to the Musgraves). Instead, it may be regarded
as a tax policy choice which leaves the source country with the options of (double) taxing the gain or not taxing it, in
the latter case as a trade-off for other benefits of foreign capital. Ultimately, what the residence country’s policy can
achieve is to channel the flow of investment – not confer taxing rights – towards or away from the source country. It
is in this context of opening trade and investment opportunities that Christians uses the term “aid” to examine U.S.
tax policy – or the lack of – towards sub-Saharan Africa. See Allison D Christians, "Tax Treaties for Investment and
Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa – A Case Study" (2005) 71:2 Brook L Rev 639. See also Karen B Brown, “Missing Africa:
Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries?” (2002) 23:1 U Pa J Intl
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not, then can we accurately regard the tax expenditure35 as aid (wealth transfer) to the source
country or should we instead regard it as a measure that recognizes an overriding imperative to not
erode the source country’s tax base or frustrate its underlying tax policy? In that sense, the
“assisting country” is offering a “tax policy aid”, rather than “tax aid”.36 The same goes for the
proposals by Avi-Yonah and Benshalom.
Perhaps, what the unfiltered aid narrative also seems to ignore is the fact that commercial entities
that operate overseas (including in LIDCs) assume the principal objective of profiting from their
overseas exertions and that their profits constitute national gains for their home countries,
regardless of whether the home country chooses to tax.37 Note, for instance, the position expressed
by U.S. law professor, Robert Hellawell, in 1966, whence, while extoling the U.S. tax code's
“favoritism toward investment in less developed countries” as "an important part of our foreign

Econ L 45 [imploring the U.S. to use favorable multilateral tax treaties to direct investment towards sub-Saharan
African countries for a specified period to accelerate development in those countries]; Calvin J Allen, “United States
Should Expand Tax Treaty Network in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2004) 34 Tax Notes Int’l 57 [also urging the U.S. to
enter into tax treaties with African countries to facilitate trade and investment. The piece also adumbrates various
mutual benefits of entering into such tax treaties]. Also, residence taxation (with full foreign tax credit) serves a
different purpose of CEN, which means that investors can base their location decisions on before-tax returns as their
home state determines their tax burden. See Broekhuijsen & Vording supra note 21 at 159. In any case, as Brooks &
Krever observe, countries have long and strategically embraced a policy of granting these benefits to their residents
investing overseas. See Brooks & Krever supra note 17. This practice preceded the advent and proliferation of tax
treaties in the early-to-mid 20th century. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, “The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation (1997) 46 Duke L.J. 1021; Katja Pauwels, “The Benefits of Tax Treaties and Foreign Tax
Credits in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2008) Tax Notes Int’l 447.
35
“Better known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure "designed
to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons” They take the form of deductions, exemptions, exclusions,
deferrals, credits, or preferential rates” – David E Pozen, “Hidden Foreign Aid” (2007) 8:6 Fla Tax Rev 641 at 642,
quoting the originator of the concept Stanley S Surrey & Paul R McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (HUP, 1985) at 3.
36
The phrase “tax policy aid” (otherwise “tax policy ‘support’ or ‘assistance’”) describes a situation where one country
bends its tax rules in a certain way to accommodate the success of another country’s tax policy. The other country’s
policy may be geared towards a range of objectives, including, increased revenue (e.g., higher business profits tax
rates), investment attraction (tax incentives), or technology imports (lower withholding tax rates on royalties). The
residence country provides policy support through foreign tax credits, tax sparing and (again) tax sparing [do you
mean tax sparing twice?], respectively. Despite the policy support (which may entail a revenue loss), the residence
country benefits from the national gains (in capital) that accrue to its residents from their overseas trading and
investments.
37
Musgrave & Musgrave supra note 8 [arguing that yields from overseas business carried out by a country’s residents
constitute a national gain to that country regardless of whether the residence country chooses to impose a tax on the
gain; and if it does tax the gain, then the taxed portion becomes a revenue gain].
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aid program”, also acknowledged that the favorable tax treatment granted U.S. business had
another important purpose: to help develop new foreign markets for American exports,
investments, and other commercial interests.38 Indeed, during the post-war negotiations for the
formation of a global double tax regime, the U.S., despite being a major creditor/capital exporting
country, was willing to accept a more pro-source country taxation structure because of its
conviction that more overall net gains would accrue from the unhindered export of U.S. commerce;
and this would also empower the debtor countries to sort out their indebtedness to the U.S.39 This
not-so-charitable disposition, perhaps, underscores the Musgraves’ dismissal of residence
countries’ tax treatment as a relevant constituent of inter-nation equity.40
More recently – coinciding with the OECD BEPS project – the urgency of revenue mobilization
to further the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs)
in LIDCs has featured prominently as a justification for global tax revenue redistribution.41 While
programs like the SDGs do provide tax scholars something extra to strengthen the case for
international tax reform, it is equally important for scholars to make clear that these humanitarian
concepts are not the foundations upon which the taxing rights claims of LIDCs are based.

38

Robert Hellawell, “United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Appraisal” (1966) 66
Colum L Rev 1393).
39
See Ring supra note 2. To buttress this point, we can draw from the U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000 which
states in its introduction that it is an act “to authorize and new trade and investment policy for Sub-Saharan Africa”.
Section 102 of the Act states, inter alia, that (1) it is in the mutual interest of the United States and the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa”.
40
Musgrave & Musgrave supra note 8 at 69; Brooks, “Internation Equity” (2009) supra note 8 at 474.
41
See, for instance, Alex Cobham, Tommaso Faccio & Valpy Fitzgerald, “Global Inequalities in Taxing Rights: An
Early Evaluation of the OECD Tax Reform Proposals” (2019) SocArXiv Paper; Alexander Ezenagu, “Unitary
Taxation of Multinationals: Implications for Sustainable Development” (2019) CIGI Policy Brief No. 4; Martin
Hearson, Joy W Ndubai & Tovony Randriamanalina, “The Appropriateness of International Tax Norms to Developing
Country Contexts” (2020) FACTI Background Paper 3; Tarcísio Diniz Magalhães & Ivan Ozai, “A Different Unified
Approach to Global Tax Policy: Addressing the Challenges of Underdevelopment” (2021) 4:1 Nordic JL & Society 1
at 18; Sarah Ganter, “Digital Taxes for Sustainable Development?” (2021) 38:1 Digitalization & Sustainability 49.
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Regrettably, the framing of some of the taxation and development scholarship does not always
exert sufficient effort to illuminate this important conceptual distinction.
An example is Stewart’s identification of “concessional tax treaty rules” as one of the mechanisms
through which rich countries can discharge their obligation to help poor countries develop. 42 It
goes without saying that this characterization conveys the impression that “concessional tax treaty
rules”, such as higher source withholding tax rates on passive income for LIDCs, which essentially
enable LIDCs to retain a greater share of outbound payments, constitute financial aid from rich to
poor countries. Is this really the case?
Some prominent criticisms of the OECD BEPS project reference its failure to cater to the needs of
developing countries to raise resources to meet their commitment to the UN SDGs.43 The piece by
Christians & Magalhães does a crucial job of demonstrating how the “Unified Approach” proposal
released by the OECD Secretariat in late 2019 was skewed to reserve most tax gains arising from
the digital economy to major market jurisdictions (mostly HIDCs).44 The scholars then advocate
that the proposal should instead incorporate “other pressing international policy programs that are
simultaneously under development, most notably a global commitment to building institutions that
support sustainable economic development.”45 Standing on the premise that political calculations
largely determine the technicalities of tax rules, the authors implore countries to channel their
political will towards aligning the technical rules, under the current reform, with the need for
revenue mobilization in LIDCs, in order to “meet the targets for sustainable and inclusive growth
and development”.46 Such an approach, the authors reckon, would help to avoid the “distributional
42
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impacts of the flawed system that the tax policy architects of the early 20th century forged to satisfy
the political preferences of their day.”47
The authors express dismay that “given that the United Nations, the OECD, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other key policy-making bodies, in addition to taking notice
of the rise of digitalization as a global phenomenon, have simultaneously identified the need to
mobilize revenue in developing countries in order to meet targets for sustainable and inclusive
growth and development…” it is surprising that “these goals seem nowhere to be found among the
various discussions surrounding the urgent need for action in redefining taxing rights in the name
of fairly sharing the tax base among all members of the Inclusive Framework.”48
Mosquera, Lesage & Lips support the calls to align international tax reform – through the OECD
BEPS project – with the SDGs.49 However, their proposal bases reform of source-restrictive proresidence bilateral tax treaties on the SDGs resource mobilization rationale. They charge both
developed and developing countries to beware of the impact of these arrangements and reckon that
“[t]he BEPS follow-up discussion on digital economy, for example, is one where the OECD has
an explicit mandate to rebalance source and residence taxation in a new part of the economy.”50
Similarly, Eyitayo-Oyesode strongly contends that the restrictive source rules contained in the tax
treaty framework, generally, and in Nigeria’s tax treaties, specifically, infract on the inter-nation
equity principle and are, therefore, unjust to LIDCs, especially because these rules lead to
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significant revenue losses in LIDCs.51 The author expresses disillusionment with the fact that this
issue is not given the required attention in international fora. She advocates that the OECD BEPS
project, which is tackling the issue of “treaty abuse” should expand “treaty abuse” to include
“situations where profits which, otherwise would have become taxable in source countries, are
being shifted to resident countries based on the provisions of tax treaties.”52 The author proceeds
to contend that “although the UN is discussing the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development
Goals in developing countries, there has been no discussion around the reform of the allocation
rules which would secure more tax revenue for developing countries to aid, among others, their
efforts to achieve those development goals”.53
In the piece entitled “Linking Policies: Inter-Nation Equity, Overseas Development Assistance,
And Taxation”, Brazilian tax scholar, Falcão, highlights some correlation between inter-nation
equity and overseas development assistance (ODA).5455 She asserts that “bilateral tax treaties are
concerned with tax base allocation between states, splitting them into source and residence
countries”, but notes that “within the realm of ODA… the primary concern is redistribution and
assistance granted by rich countries to poor. However, redistribution is significantly affected by
tax considerations... If improperly attuned, the interaction between redistribution and taxation —
two seemingly distinct but parallel cash flow and transfer networks — can create a system that
first allocates most (or as many as possible) taxing rights to the resident state, and then requires
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the residence state to donate a part of the accumulated resources to the source state through direct
or indirect transfers in the form of ODA”.56
The author further observes that ODA does not allow low-income countries to claim “national
ownership” over projects and that a better way to effect redistribution is through the tax system.
The author proposes that both the OECD and the UN model tax treaties be revised to redistribute
taxing rights, to mobilize the tax revenue needed by LIDCs to self-develop. Citing already existing
examples, the author concludes that this objective can be implemented by a broader scale adoption
of bilateral tax treaty structures through which HIDCs “concede to an uneven allocation of source
taxing rights, particularly when entering into a treaty with a developing country.”57
I do not dispute the substance of these contributions, nor the good intentions of the authors. My
sole concern here is that when the conversation is framed in these (hybridized) terms, it may
become difficult to distill whether the contention is that international tax rules ought to be changed
because they unjustly restrict the taxing rights of LIDCs (inter-nation equity) or that the rules are
not unjust, but should be changed to channel developmental aid from HIDCs to LIDCs, perhaps,
because even the “fair share” being received by LIDCs is not sufficient to address their
developmental goals. The latter case implies that the rules are not unfair, despite their
restrictiveness, but they ought to be adjusted, nevertheless, to provide tax aid to LIDCs. I must,
therefore, stress that as well-intentioned and well-articulated as these pieces may be, their narrative
has an implicit potential to provoke the portrayal of equitable taxing rights allocation to LIDCs as
tax aid schemes between rich and poor countries or, otherwise obscures the entitlement claim of
LIDCs in the face of a “redistribution” objective. It potentially conveys the impression that LIDCs’
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engagement with the OECD BEPS project, for instance, is not about eradicating base erosion that
arises from the inequitable design of existing inter-nation tax norms (which tends to favour
HIDCs), but a cap-in-hand mission for developmental tax aid. The narrative might even be
considered counterintuitive given that it is implicit that the whole idea of a BEPS project is to
eradicate base erosion, of all forms, which would ultimately amount to greater profiles of retained
revenue. The narrative, therefore, undersells and, perhaps, displaces a more robust approach to the
equity problem: the view that fairer allocation of taxing rights is founded on entitlement thought
and is principally about eradicating or ameliorating structures in the international tax regime that
unjustly fetter the rights of LIDCs to tax income that originate from their territory.
Inter-nation equity, in this regard, should resonate as a guardrail to unreasonable surrender of tax
jurisdiction, detachable from the embellishment of welfare aspirations like the SDGs. A tax reform
claim that is normatively anchored on “sustainable development” may unintendedly weaken the
bargaining position of LIDCs because of the endemic theoretical bottlenecks of establishing
obligations of global distributive justice58, or even a less intrusive “duty of assistance” from rich
countries to poor countries.59 At best, such a duty is no more palpable than what may be expected
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in the context of ODA, which is entirely within the discretion of the assisting country; and for
which the recipient country has no standing on what, when and how to receive. It is represented in
the classic statement “beggars can’t be choosers”.
So, instead of overcentralizing the notion of redistributing tax revenue from HIDCs to LIDCs (to
assist the latter in achieving sustainable development), we can, perhaps, make the issue about
reforming international tax norms (e.g., the permanent establishment rule) that impair the rights of
LIDCs, as source countries, to tax revenue outflows.60 This way, the readjustments can be
instinctively – and rightly – viewed less as tax revenue transfers from rich to poor countries and
more as rectifications of the regressive tax norms that rob LIDCs of tax revenue and, consequently,
result in the need for things like the SDGs. Such reframing of narrative can help to defuse
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extraneous perceptions about the propriety of “wealth transfers” to poor but mismanaged states, as
depicted here in the grim observation of American author Adam Rosenzweig:
There has never been much support in the United States for a policy of significant transfers
of tax revenue to taxpayers in India or Bangladesh or Haiti. Part of the intuition underlying
this resistance is based on the fact that part of the reason for disparities in income around the
world has to do with differences in development, infrastructure, and especially government.
For example, it would be expected that a country governed by a corrupt government which
spends little on improving general welfare of its residents would have much lower GDP and
GDP per capita. Conversely, part of the reason for high U.S. incomes could be due to a
generally stable and effective government, including stable currency, legal systems, and
physical infrastructure. From this perspective, it might seem absurd for vertical equity to
demand transferring revenue from the United States to such a government when the money
would be expected to be lost to corruption.61
Rosenzweig’s assessment makes an important point that no state – however wealthy – can have an
easy time of transferring its tax wealth to another state where the wealth is likely to be squandered
by corrupt elements. In my view such assessment is defensible only in those situations –
demonstrated below – where international tax rules are streamlined to funnel tax revenue to a
foreign country (LIDCs) despite the transferee country not enjoying a normative entitlement to
tax, whether as a residence or source country. However, if it is the case that an LIDC is normatively
entitled to tax the base, even at a level more suitable to its fiscal aspirations, but for extrinsic
barriers erected by the international tax regime (e.g., the permanent establishment rule or
withholding tax rate caps), then the assessment falls out of place. Otherwise, it would be
tantamount to one sovereign depriving another access to its property because the former is of the
view that the latter would squander it, while considering itself better endowed with virtue to
prudently utilize the property. Metaphorically, any such reference to corruption or mismanagement
as a hinderance to equitable taxing rights allocation would be reminiscent of arguments that
artifacts looted during colonial occupation should not be returned to their countries of origin
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because those countries’ museums may lack the capacity to manage or display the items.62 For the
avoidance of doubt, the existence of “benevolent and capable government” cannot be a prerequisite
for the equitable allocation of taxing rights63; and this is not just because the right to tax inheres in
the sovereign – rather than the individual – but also because a state’s entitlement to tax income
from economic activities present in its territory is not qualified by how it ultimately utilizes the tax
revenue. A state can tax to build, to consume, to develop or even to fund unjust wars. In no case
is a state’s tax sovereignty or allocation of right to tax dictated – or upended – by its spending
choices. Therefore, the question of whether duties of distributive justice accrue to the individual
or the state has no bearing on the distribution of taxing rights.
The conclusion that I draw from the analysis thus far is that scholars approach “fairness” issues in
international tax from two angles. The first is entitlement. Here, the author is concerned with how
countries can structure their taxing rights allocation compromise without a country, especially the
LIDC, giving up more tax revenue than is defensible.64 The second is aid. Here, scholars analyze
the fairness issue through the underlying premise of income redistribution.65 This perspective
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focuses on how international tax can be used to channel developmental tax aid from HIDCs to
LIDCs.66 The difference between the two perspectives is essentially one of “give and take”. While
the former frames the message along the lines of “do not take taxing rights (or tax revenue) away
from LIDCs”, the latter appeals to HIDCs to “give more taxing rights or revenue to LIDCs”. One
perspective emphasizes the inherence of taxing rights in the LIDC, and seeks to preserve it. The
other undermines that entitlement factor by indistinctly portraying equitable taxing rights
allocation as a form of tax aid transfer from HIDCs to LIDCs, a potentially unpopular domestic
politics subject in HIDCs.67 So, although the revenue mobilization implication of both perspectives
may ultimately be similar, the narratives are not – and there could be consequences.68
The way the case is presented may diminish the strength of an entitlement claim. Can LIDCs
effectively assert fairer terms in international tax deals if the paramount notion in the negotiation
room is that such claims are anchored on charitable considerations? And this is not to state that
allocation that references the disparate economic positions of the states is equivalent to charity. As
I demonstrate shortly below, with respect to differentiation – more robustly in chapter 2 – it is
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possible to stress the economic disparities of respective states in taxing rights allocations without
conveying the impression of charity.
As a quasi-hypothesis, if the U.K. Parliament is poised to consider the fairness of a tax treaty
between the U.K. and Lesotho, “a landlocked poor African country of 2 million people”, before
ratifying that tax treaty, the U.K. Parliament may raise questions about whether the treaty unduly
limits the right of Lesotho to raise tax revenue by giving huge tax breaks to U.K. companies doing
business in Lesotho.69 Crucially, the concern of the U.K. Parliament here should not be construed
as a demonstration of its willingness to provide tax aid to Lesotho (perhaps, so that Lesotho can
tackle poverty). Instead, the U.K. Parliament’s intervention (in the sense of inter-nation equity)
should be construed as a reflection of concern over whether the U.K. has, perhaps, used its
dominant bargaining position (economic and political) to structure a treaty that unreasonably
impairs Lesotho’s source tax jurisdiction, thereby, effectively shifting Lesotho’s tax base to the
U.K.70
Again, this is not intended as a rebuke of “aid” or “redistribution” but an illuminating appraisal of
the potential implications of how these concepts are used in the context of international tax
compromise. Often, the messaging, more than the intent, is the problem. Even though there is
goodwill in the cultivation of international tax redistribution, the failure to distinguish between the
entitlement and redistributive perspectives undermines the vigour of the entitlement claim.
Wealthy countries can deflect from or resist agitations for equitable allocation of taxing rights to
LIDCs by asserting that this objective can be achieved, or is already being achieved, through ODA.
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As already demonstrated, an unfiltered fusion of redistribution and equity in the international tax
literature cultivates a “handout” mindset in the taxing rights allocation discourse. A reiteration of
entitlement thought, on the other hand, displaces or limits the erosive impact of such notions of
charitable redistribution by championing reforms that aim to preserve the inherent tax jurisdiction
of LIDCs. Such an approach can help to rectify global power abuses that, in any case, have been
instrumental in creating some of the global inequities that generated the need for curative policies
like the SDGs. Bearing that in mind, if scholars must anchor the allocation of taxing rights to
LIDCs to some form of liberal, developmental, or humanitarian objective, it is important to also
acknowledge the underlying entitlement of the LIDC to tax, even without such objectives in the
fore. This way it becomes self-evident that the appeal to other factors does not substitute or
displace the LIDC’s inherent tax jurisdiction, but to persuade the HIDC – as the more powerful
party – to roll back obstacles that hinder the LIDC from exercising that entitlement. We can take
some cue from the piece by Brooks which advocates the entrenchment of redistributive policies in
tax treaties between HIDCs and LIDCs for the purpose of advancing the rights and needs of women
in LIDCs. Crucially, the author highlights that:
Whether or not scholars characterize these kinds of arguments as promoting redistribution
or as a just allocation of tax revenue depends on their perspective about the normatively
correct allocation of income between two countries with differential trade flows. It might be
argued that since the residence state could tax the entire international income without
granting a credit, the resident state’s willingness to sacrifice some revenue to the source state
is a form of redistribution (to a low income state). On the other hand, one could argue that
the source state is entitled to tax all of the income, and therefore its sacrifice of some revenue
to the residence state is a form of redistribution (to the high-income state). Regardless,
traditional tax policy approaches to international tax leave room for debate about the
appropriate characterization of the allocation function served by tax treaties.71
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By expressly acknowledging these distinctive perspectives, the piece goes some way to douse
potential misconceptions that the more favorable allocation being contemplated equates or
displaces the idea of normative entitlement as the basis for any claim by the LIDC to better tax
relations with the HIDC. The point being made, therefore, is that it is not so much the objective
(more revenue for the LIDC) being sought that is problematic, but how it is framed. As afore
stated, the revenue mobilization consequences may be similar, but the messaging must also be
clear in order to distinguish between the two perspectives.
A similar helping hand is extended by another tax scholar, Ivan Ozai, who asserts that there are
two approaches to inter-nation equity in taxing rights allocation: entitlement and redistribution.
The author posits that the former is a reflection of tax sovereignty (i.e., origin based) while the
latter entails the use of the tax system to attain redistributive objectives. The author presents the
concept of differentiation as the way to approach the redistributive goals of international taxation.
He concludes that inter-nation equity should be construed to mean that “whenever a normative
approach based on tax sovereignty (entitlement approach) does not provide satisfactory guidance
for how to divide the international tax base, taxing rights should be allocated to the benefit of less
affluent countries so as to address global poverty and inequality (differential approach)”.72
The above contribution represents a rare but significant attempt to expatiate the theoretical scope
of the inter-nation doctrine, despite the pervasive deployment of the doctrine in international tax
scholarship. Importantly also, Ozai goes beyond mere doctrinal exposition to demonstrate how
differentiation can be used to solve real inter-nation equity problems. For instance, if we are to
establish a formula for apportioning the income of MNEs between different source countries, but
it is unclear which economic factor(s) (e.g., physical assets, sales, and employees) would best
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indicate the location of value creation for the MNE, the differential principle, according to Ozai,
requires that we jettison these inadequate economic metrics and instead apply some economic or
human development indicator (e.g., gross domestic product (GDP) or international inequality
index) that potentially ensures the best distributive outcomes for LIDCs.73 I concur with the author
to the extent that countries should be treated differentially in the apportionment of international
taxing rights.74 I only caution that such an approach, in the manner presented by Ozai, might imply
that the apportionment is predicated on a presumed inability to establish a normative entitlement
to tax which then necessitates resort to human development factors as a substitute for origin-based
entitlement. The approach seems to portray the non-existence of a formula to adequately or
satisfactorily allocate income between states as a displacement of the normative entitlement of a
state to tax. It seems to me that such an approach may be misconstrued to abdicate any entitlement
arguments that an LIDC may assert. Suffice it to state that absent an established normative
entitlement to tax, there can be no genuine basis on which to even begin to broker an inter-nation
allocation that accords with principles of distributive justice.
Perhaps, a more fitting way to frame the point is to regard inter-nation equity, in its distributive
sense, as operating at two co-linked layers of taxing rights apportionment. It is in the first layer
that the entitlement of competing states to tax is established (by the presence of some form of
economic allegiance of the taxable factor). Then there is the secondary layer where a state’s
obligation to give up taxing rights is more justly determined, not merely in accordance with some
arbitrary “technical” principles, susceptible to political manipulation and unjust outcomes, but with
due regard to that state’s actual capacity to compromise. It is this second layer that produces
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differentiated outcomes for different states. However, the differentiated levels of responsibility to
give up taxing rights does not exterminate the fact that the poor state that gives up less of its taxing
rights does have an underlying normative entitlement to tax. In other words, conformity with basic
requirements of distributive justice should not be adjudged a displacement of the LIDC’s inherent
entitlement. So, it seems a mistake to portray the differentiated allocation of taxing rights as a form
of redistribution (from rich to poor countries) that deviates from normative entitlement. It is only
if the first layer does not exist that we can properly conceive inter-nation equity in the manner
proposed by Ozai; and this would be the case in respect of special tax schemes that are designed
to channel revenue to LIDCs that otherwise have no normative entitlement (sovereignty) to tax the
particular base.
We may discern from the foregoing how the blurring between equity and charitable redistribution
has the potential to undermine the potential for a more focused and serious consideration of
bespoke tax policy initiatives that are deliberately designed to address “development goals”.75 It is
important, for the purpose of conceptual distinction, to expend the resources of this chapter to
explore the entailment of such initiatives.
As first example, albeit a somewhat obscure one, I reference U.S. author, David Pozen’s claim
about the existence in the U.S. tax system of collective measures that may be accurately
characterized as “tax aid”.76 Pozen observes that:
Since 1974, Congress has required the annual publication of a tax expenditure budget.
Although not immediately evident from the budget data, in recent years a growing amount
of expenditure has gone toward foreign aid. The reason lies in America's tax treatment of
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nonprofit organizations. Whenever U.S. charities and foundations spend money overseas as they have increasingly been doing - some portion of this spending can be attributed to the
support they receive from numerous state and federal tax privileges… Unlike traditional
ODA, these tax expenditure funds are privately organized and distributed, yet unlike
voluntary transfers they are paid for by the public fisc. This is not private aid; it is privatized
aid.77
I can agree with Pozen that these tax expenditures conceptually constitute subsidies for U.S. aid
agencies operating overseas and amount to indirect income transfers to recipients of aid in foreign
countries.78
A more profound example is contained in a piece by American health law and policy scholar, John
D Blum, which eminently experiments with the harmonization of taxation and global health
policy.79 Blum wrote at a time when the world was just emerging from a global health crisis, “the
avian flu”. Blum was conscious of the funding gaps for healthcare and development in LIDCs at
the time and called for the initiation of a special international tax scheme – a sort of “moderate
rate” “global corporate tax” on the world’s most profitable TNCs – to generate revenue to address
these gaps.80 Blum considers two possible design approaches to the “global corporate tax.” “One
approach is to levy an annual tax on WTO members based on annual GNP, or to craft an
assessment linked in some manner to the economic benefits derived from free trade.”81
Blum picked TNCs as a tax base because, according to him, TNCs were great beneficiaries of the
global trade system.82 Fittingly, he also considered the World Trade Organization (WTO) the most
suitable international organization to levy this tax, of course, with the consent of its members:
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The World Trade Organization which sits at the apex of global economic interchange
appears to be the most logical entity, outside the UN orbit, within which to explore the
creation of legally based financial obligations. Specifically the WTO could become an entity
charged not only with overseeing trade, but could take on the added task of channeling a
portion of profits from trade into the financing of global human needs.83
Blum reasoned that his proposal, which, instructively, would draw largely from the tax base of
non-beneficiary countries, had other benefits which include the fact that it would also enable the
WTO to coordinate global health policy with the World Health Organization (WHO):
Beyond opening up a new stream of funding for international health and development, a
global tax run under the auspices of the WTO would become a vehicle to engage this global
trading entity more directly in responding to the needs of poor nations and into coordination
of efforts with global health bodies, such as the WHO.84
Blum’s “global corporate tax” would be enforceable by the WTO under a special agreement that
legally binds its members to report on the foreign corporations doing business in respective
nations.85 Therefore, “an enforcement mechanism to collect corporate tax revenue would need to
be created most likely within the WTO nation in which a given corporation is doing business, and
a global oversight and centralized collection system would need to be devised.”86
For decades, scholars have discussed the prospects of introducing cross-border tax schemes that
would compensate LIDCs for their consistent loss of human capital to HIDCs.87 Building on this
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body of scholarship, Yariv Brauner examines the potential use of taxation to generate development
funds in connection with the immigration of skilled workers from LIDCs to HIDCs.88 Some of the
major obstacles to such a tax centre around who could impose it and how to administer it.89 The
original “Bhagwati tax proposal” contemplated a tax imposed by the host country while other
iterations contemplated imposition by the sending country.90 The idea of a host country imposed
tax did not seem particularly feasible for various jurisdictional and tax policy reasons.91 In contrast,
the idea of the sending country imposing seemed appealing partly because it could be juxtaposed
with a citizenship tax, which was already in existence at the time.92 Brauner welcomed this
similarity and sought to bridge the feasibility gap in the “Bhagwati tax proposal” by imposing the
tax as a citizenship tax that is administrable as part of the international tax regime: that is, via the
instrumentality of tax treaties. He quizzed rhetorically:
Why, then, could such treaty partners not use a similar rule and the United States, the most
important host country, allow it to happen (and even assist in collecting it, at least on behalf
of its developing tax treaty partners)?93
Brauner’s proposal requires the imposition of a new tax by sending/home countries who do not
already impose a worldwide citizenship tax like the U.S. does.94 However, the home country’s tax
system would continue to regard its overseas-based citizens as residents of the home country. In
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other words, the tax operates as a tax on “residents” of the home country. Treaty provisions (tiebreaking rules) could then be made for double taxation relief.95
Similar to Blum’s, Brauner’s proposal has all the makings of international ‘tax aid’. The distinctive
component of the proposal is that the tax is imposed on a tax base that the LIDC would ordinarily
not be entitled to tax, bearing in mind, especially, that administrative feasibility is integral to tax
jurisdiction. Although the proposal defines the subjects of the tax as “residents” as a proxy term
for citizens of the home country – to fit with conventional residence and source labelling patterns
– the reality is that the proposal extends tax ‘jurisdiction’ beyond its conventional
conceptualization by allowing an LIDC to tax income earned abroad by individuals that are also
resident abroad.
A more recent case in point is the piece by Chatel & Li which aims to repurpose the OECD BEPS
Pillar One Blueprint “from a taxing rights reallocation mechanism into an incremental global tax
for sustainability”. The authors pursue the ambitious project of linking taxation of TNCs to the
global fight in achieving sustainable development, climate control and post-pandemic economic
recovery. Their proposal would:
repurpose Pillar One as described in the Blueprint from a mechanism of reallocating tax base
under existing corporate income tax (CIT) to an incremental global tax on the largest and
most profitable MNEs’ market-based profit. As a new, standalone tax on MNEs – tentatively
referred to as “Tax for Sustainability” – this proposed tax will define taxpayers and tax base
in a way that is similar to those under the Blueprint, but will provide simpler computation
and administration methods and, like a DST, will be separate from the existing CIT.96
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Under the proposal, a designated portion of in-scope (largest) TNCs’ profits would be taxed by
market jurisdictions (jurisdiction of sale of goods or services) and applied to finance common
expenditures: the SDGs.
Because redistribution transfers revenue from HIDCs to LIDCs, a redistributive tax framework
may include some form of accountability modalities that enable donor countries or stakeholders to
track progress in the appropriation of the redistributed tax revenue by the recipient low-income
country.97 For instance, because of the spending imperatives contained in Chatel & Li’s “Tax for
Sustainability” proposal, there is an expectation that disposal of the tax revenue by governments
would be subject to accountability measures. As the authors observe, “[a]ccountability by
governments for public expenditure on SDGs and climate actions would thus be the counterbalance
for levying the Tax for Sustainability on MNEs.”98 This seems to imply that governments that
would not utilize the tax for the designated purpose have an obligation to not levy the tax. Such an
exclusionary position is acceptable in so far as the proposal, as a whole, does not purport to
displace the inherent rights that even a noncompliant country ordinarily enjoys to tax the same
economic activities (tax base) situated within its borders. In other words, the special vehicle tax –
or failure to comply with its accountability requirements – cannot purport to displace the
underlying rights of a country to tax the income of TNCs (for in-country activities).
An explicit carve out of redistribution thought from inter-national tax equity would, therefore, help
to eliminate ambiguities about whether countries can interfere with the fiscal appropriation policies
of other countries. It is not unusual for donor countries to be undesirous of funnelling aid through
state institutions in recipient countries but preferring instead to bypass them and invest in projects
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either directly or through humanitarian agencies.99 International tax redistribution, it must be said,
contemplates donor countries having a say in how recipient countries appropriate tax revenue. The
purpose may be to avoid “mismanagement” or “misappropriation” of “tax aid”. In contrast, international tax equity does not erode fiscal sovereignty, which means that if a country taxes income
that it is normatively entitled to tax, no other country can purport to impose or imply spending
imperatives or some duty to account. A presence – or lack – of responsible government to
administer tax revenue would not be a material consideration.100 Without a proper carveout of
international tax redistribution from equity thought we risk inducing a perception that HIDCs can
superintend how LIDCs appropriate their own tax revenue.
A telling attribute of Chatel & Li’s “Tax for Sustainability” proposal is that it does not ab initio
present itself as a device for equitable distribution of taxing rights between countries, but instead
reads as a bespoke tax scheme (separate from the corporate tax and withholding tax) to harness
resources for the specific purpose of confronting common global challenges like climate change
and sustainable development.101 Some bit of confusion does set in from the incorporation of
various attributes that one would expect to see in a regular tax compromise. Of specific attention
is the contention that the distributional scheme contemplated under the proposal would foster
equitable taxing rights distribution:
Furthermore, in order to address the issue of inter-nation inequalities in fiscal capacity, our
proposal could have a redistributive mechanism built in so that low-income countries could
tax their share of the global profit at a higher rate. Such mechanism is unprecedented and
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feasible only through a multilateral tax instrument such as our proposed tax. It would assist
developing countries in meeting their sustainable development goals.102
The broad policy reach of the Tax for Sustainability proposal raises questions as to whether it is
merely intended to be a special purpose tax scheme or a more formal mechanism for taxing rights
allocation between states that are, in principle, entitled to tax the base. The ambiguity is aggravated
by the fact that the proposal is primed to operate as a substitute to a formal taxing rights allocation
proposal being considered at the time by states. If the authors’ proposal is indeed to cover the same
tax base as the OECD project, then, in my view, it cannot presume to impose spending imperatives
on states exercising their inherent taxing rights.103
To elaborate on the base concern, I lean on Ross P Buckley’s classic redistributive piece,
“Introducing a 0.05% Financial Transactions Tax as an Instrument of Global Justice and Market
Efficiency”.104 As the title implies, the author advocates the imposition of a global financial
transactions tax on “wholesale capital market transactions” to raise revenues of up to $500 billion
per annum to help poor countries achieve various aspects of the now-superseded Millennium
Development Goals.105 The distinctive feature of this proposal is that the tax would be imposed on
a base that extends far beyond what LIDCs are themselves entitled to tax. Instead, the proposal
would require HIDCs to impose the tax on transactions that occur within their own borders, and,
therefore, entirely within their own base.106
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It can be no more straightforward. This is the true sense of redistribution (in so far as the term
connotes wealth transfers from HIDCs to LIDCs). It does not, in my view, amount to redistribution
to “allow” poorer countries to tax at a lower threshold or higher rate, for instance, a base that they
are ordinarily entitled to tax, based on the normative principles of tax jurisdiction (discussed in
chapter 2) especially when their extant inability to tax the base is the consequence of artificial
restrictions stipulated by the subsisting framework.
It is, therefore, an open question whether the Tax for Sustainability proposal can truly be regarded
as a special purpose tax scheme to mobilize revenue towards actualization of the SDGs or, on the
other hand, as a regular international tax compromise that aims to allocate taxing rights between
countries. The problem with the proposal being a hybrid of both perspectives is the blur that ensues
– the absence of foundational clarity between equity (entitlement) and redistribution (charity).
The failure to effectively distill international tax redistribution thought from equity thought fosters
superfluous debates about whether there is a cosmopolitan duty to change the distributional rules
in international tax.107 By focusing on entitlement theory, inter-national tax equity can provide a
more focused framework for critical diagnostics of inherent flaws in the tax norms. Findings from
such diagnostics then become the trigger for the pursuit of normative reform. Conversely, hinging
the reform of flawed international tax norms on humanitarian programs that are part of the SDGs
can obfuscate the fact that even without such programs there are inherent distributional flaws in
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the system that ought to be redressed.108 If a structure is innately flawed, we should not need an
external reason to fix it.
In any case, a distinction of redistribution from entitlement enables us to undertake a more explicit
consideration of whether the tax system is the more efficient mechanism to deliver subsidies to
LIDCs. It allows a careful and, perhaps, empirical consideration of the adequacy and efficiency of
the redistributive programs delivered through the tax system design vis-à-vis programs delivered
through more conventional ODA. We can assess whether tax policymakers are best equipped to
design redistributive schemes or whether such responsibility should be placed in different hands:
aid agencies, for instance.109
1.3

Chapter Conclusion

The idea of equity in international tax discourse has been deployed broadly. This broad deployment
makes it difficult to tell, in some cases, whether what is being discussed is equitable allocation of
taxing rights between countries whose tax jurisdiction intersect or some charitable redistribution
of tax aid from rich to poor countries. There is need for some reimagination of the scope of the
equity factor in international tax, in my view from a perspective that places tax sovereignty or
fiscal self-determination at the centre of the discourse. Such a reimagined perspective would
displace the notion that greater allocation of taxing rights to LIDCs is a gesture of charity (or tax
aid) and render more distinct those situations where countries do utilize their tax systems – or the
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international tax regime – as a vehicle for revenue transfer to LIDCs. The core focus of such a
perspective is the relaxation or eradication of artificial barriers in the international tax regime that
get in the way of origin-based revenue mobilization for LIDCs. It is this thought that I discuss as
“reasonable impairment compromise” in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2: Reasonable Impairment Compromise (RIC)
“Asking you to give me equal rights implies that they are yours to give. Instead, I
must demand that you stop trying to deny me the rights all people deserve” –
Elizabeth Peratrovich.
2.1

Overview

This chapter develops a framework for the evaluation of fairness in the allocation of taxing rights
between states, with particular regard to compromises involving LIDCs. In a nutshell, the idea of
reasonable impairment compromise (RIC) is that sovereign states have an inherent entitlement
(jurisdiction) to tax income that emanates from their territory and that only an international tax
compromise that does not unreasonably impair that inherent jurisdiction can be adjudged fair. The
need for states to coordinate their tax rules to facilitate international trade and wealth creation lies
at the heart of international tax compromise. However, regardless of this justification, the
impairment that derives from tax compromise must be reasonable. On the standard of
reasonableness, I argue that we must take into cognizance a totality of factors – mainly fiscal –
that concern states and the real impact that any impairment may foist on individual states’ inherent
tax jurisdiction. If an international tax compromise excessively impairs the taxing rights of a state
it may be deemed unreasonable, therefore, inequitable.
I open this chapter with a brief explanation of the point that RIC proposes to reclaim or reinfuse
the fiscal self-determination of LIDCs in the inter-nation equity conversation. Then I move into
the RIC test proper. Here, I discuss the theoretical factors that underpin a state’s tax jurisdiction. I
follow this up with a discussion of the idea of tax compromise by delving into an examination of
the dominant model of compromise in the international tax regime: the OECD Model Tax
Convention on the Taxation of Incomes and Capital (OECD MTC). I have chosen this model not
because it reflects everything that countries do, both in their tax treaties and domestic legislation,
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but because it constitutes the basic structure of the international double taxation regime. It would
be impossible to go through the practices of individual countries one-by-one, but it is certainly
helpful to have a basic common structure that can be referenced. I also consider in that choice the
dominant role that the OECD played and continues to play in the framing of international tax
norms. This continues to be evident in the design of the international tax compromise that I discuss
in chapter 3. In any case, putting the OECD MTC at the center of analysis provides me a target
that I can subsequently use, in contrast with other models, to demonstrate how a compromise can
be “more reasonably” restrictive of tax jurisdiction. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to
discussing the reasonableness component in the RIC test. Here, I briefly discuss some of the factors
that I consider helpful in determining whether it makes sense for a state to compromise its original
or inherent tax jurisdiction.
2.2

Fiscal Self-Determination as the Centerpiece of RIC

Let me begin by reiterating the point that the international tax regime is designed to limit the
exercise of sovereign tax jurisdiction, and it does so by extracting the surrender of taxing rights
aimed at, historically, constraining the burdens of international double taxation. For a century,
countries have “willingly" surrendered their inherent tax jurisdiction on this premise. However,
the international tax regime remains perennially shrouded in a trilemma of tax sovereignty, double
taxation, and tax competition.110 The high degree of multilateral engagement on international tax
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matters demonstrates states’ recognition of the importance of continued coordination of their
sovereign tax policies – by narrowing their exercise of tax jurisdiction – so that cross-border
economic activities do not become inundated by tax burdens and uncertainties. However, the slew
of unilateral digital tax measures that has emerged in recent years, perhaps more than anything
else, also reflects states’ conflicting desire to reassert their tax jurisdiction and fiscal selfdetermination, even if that assertive stance entails departure from the conventional constraints of
the extant regime – in other words, a reprioritization of the tax sovereignty component of the
international tax trilemma. This aspiration holds true for HIDCs and LIDCs alike. Countries’
attempts to forge a multilateral compromise of taxing rights, amidst their unilateral leanings, makes
it as pertinent as ever to reimagine and reincorporate the equity element into any compromise, i.e.,
in a way that better reflects their leanings towards tax sovereignty and fiscal self-determination;
and, this time, more than in the past, the peculiar taxing rights (preservation) claims of LIDCs must
feature prominently. Such a framework should conceptualize inter-nation equity as,
fundamentally, a question of “how much taxing rights should a country be expected to give up”
rather than “how much taxing rights or revenue a country should receive”. It is by framing the
issue in this entitlement image that we can do justice to the case of LIDCs.
RIC does not evolve on a premise that HIDCs ought to redistribute their tax revenue to LIDCs.
That would be charity. Rather, it advocates the insulation of the tax base of LIDCs from
“unreasonable” artificial restriction. Essentially, what LIDCs really need from the international tax
regime is not to redistribute tax aid from HIDCs to LIDCs but rather to prescribe an allocational
framework/formula that does not unreasonably fetter the autonomy of LIDCs to exploit their tax
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base as they deem necessary for their own fiscal aspirations. In that sense, therefore, the RIC
framework, approaches allocational issues in a way that seeks to preserve the tax sovereignty and
fiscal self-determination of LIDCs.
2.3

The RIC Test

Application of the RIC concept requires a trifactor analysis of any international tax compromise
that apportions taxing rights between states. Through such analysis we can ascertain whether a
compromise can be deemed reasonable – and therefore equitable – to the states involved. The three
questions constituting this test are: first, whether there is a normative basis for a state to tax;
second, whether a compromise impairs tax jurisdiction; and third, whether the impairment is
reasonable in the circumstances. The test is progressive, which means that we move from stage to
stage and can stop at any stage of the analysis if we deem the outcome to be in the negative. For
instance, if it is concluded that there is no basis to tax, the analysis ends there. If we conclude that
the state has a basis to tax, we can then proceed to the next step, and so on.111
2.3.1 Is there a Legitimate Basis to Tax? (Theories of Tax Jurisdiction)
The first step in the trifactor analysis of RIC is to ascertain whether there is some legitimate basis
to tax income. Once there is such a basis then tax jurisdiction (exclusive or concurrent) inheres in
a state. There is no attempt to reinvent the will here. Instead, the approach is simply to reaffirm
the established theoretical norms of international tax law that underpin a state’s entitlement to
exercise tax jurisdiction. Although there are various such theories – and a few of them are
examined here – I zero in on the theory of economic allegiance, which is the dominant view.
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A state’s competence to tax is an amalgam of economic, political, and administrative realities.
International fiscal law, the projection of general international law in matters of taxation,112
customarily recognizes the right to tax as an aspect of sovereignty.113 Various theories have been
propounded to justify a sovereign state’s jurisdiction to tax. They include: (1) the realistic theory,
which equates jurisdiction to a state’s capacity to exercise physical power over the subject of
taxation; (2) the contractual theory, which regards taxation as a contractual payment made by
the subject in exchange for services provided by the state; (3) the ethical theory, which asserts
that taxation is a return for benefits or advantages received from the state; and (4) the sovereign
theory, which regards tax jurisdiction as an element of sovereignty – by reason of which any
person that owes (economic) allegiance to a state is obligated to contribute to the preservation
of that state. Below, I briefly explain each of these theories.
2.3.1.1 Realistic Theory
The view held by realistic theorists like Stimson is that jurisdiction is equivalent to physical
power.114 According to Stimson:
The fundamental principle of jurisdiction is simple enough. Jurisdiction is physical power.
A sovereign State has no physical power over persons and property outside its territory.115
According to Dutch legal scholar Rutsel Martha, the realistic position implies that wherever an
entity can or actually exercises physical power it has jurisdiction as a matter of law, including
jurisdiction to tax.116 Criticism of the theory, therefore, follows its excessive emphasis on physical
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power.117 The theory has been dismissed on account of its lack of reality, considering, as Martha
observes, that states do exercise physical power (sometimes even in defiance of the law) outside
their territory without therefore gaining a right to tax; and considering that states have long
prescribed taxes even where they have no physical power.118 A contrary and, perhaps, more
realistic view is expressed by Beale to the effect that the creation of legal right is an act of law;
and the power of a sovereign, therefore, to affect legal rights, depends upon the law, which is the
source of all sovereign jurisdiction.119
Even if the realistic theory were initially defensible, its continued defensibility in the context of
modern realities is questionable because the theory would effectively rob a state of jurisdiction to
tax persons and property outside its physical borders even though the state has provided the
enabling environment for the taxpayer to earn taxable income.120
2.3.1.2 Contractual Theory
The contractual theory regards taxation as a presumptive quid pro quo arrangement between the
state and the taxpayer. It advances the view that taxation is the payment for goods and services
received from the taxing state121 on the basis of a (presumed) contract between the holder of fiscal
jurisdiction and the fiscal subject.122 In its more moderate and, perhaps, conventional sense, the
theory affirms that the right to tax is essentially a contractual one, albeit not entirely subject to the
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same rules that govern ordinary contracts.123 Going by this theory, states’ entitlement to tax entails
a tacit bargain to provide goods and services to the taxpayer. This would mean that legitimacy to
tax derives from an agreed and concomitant provision of goods and services to the taxpayer.
A basic flaw of the contractual theory, it has been argued, is the absence of a key ingredient of a
valid contract: consensus. Taxes are, by nature, imposed, not “agreed”.124 The non-consensual
nature of taxation is thus at variance with the doctrine of freedom of contract.125 Indeed, as far as
tax obligations are formed, there is nothing comparable with a bargain between the parties as to
the terms of the 'contract': how much the taxpayer must pay and how much the taxpayer must
receive in return. The terms are variable at the will of the state, which may alter or abolish existing
taxes and introduce new ones, spending the proceeds as it deems fit without any obligation to
consult the foreign taxpayer.126
A.R. Albrecht does identify two instances where contractual relations can affect or (re)define a
state’s right to tax: (1) when the state enters into a binding and mutually advantageous agreement
with a taxpayer that sets out the nature and amount of taxation (e.g., a binding advance pricing
agreement); and (2) when two or more states have concluded a tax treaty, say for the avoidance of
double taxation, discrimination or for the conferment of special privileges. Although such a treaty
does not create or impose tax, it restricts it.127
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2.3.1.3 The Ethical Theory
The ‘ethical’ or retributive theory – also called the ‘benefits’ theory – regards taxation as a return
for benefits or advantages derived from the state.128 Martha identifies the silent normative
underpinning of this theory as: he who belongs to – or rather benefits from –an economic
community has an ethical duty to pay taxes to that community.129 It has been noted that the
fundamental justification for a government levying taxes on their community members is the
services provided by the government to community members, and that this is inherent in the
concept of responsible government.130
As a norm that is deemed to derive from ‘metajuristics’ (‘justness’) rather than ‘pure juristics’
(‘legal thought’), the weakness of this theory, it has been argued, lies in that “no objective
parameters of ‘just’ can be said to exist, and, therefore, attempts to formulate them often result in
metaphysical speculation”.131 Also, in reality, it might be difficult to attain a matching correlation
between taxes paid and benefits received. Those who pay more may not necessarily receive more
from the state, and vice versa. This criticism, however, suggests that the benefits theory is more
aspirational than precise in its manifestation.
2.3.1.4 Sovereignty Theory
There is a generally accepted principle in international law that taxation is a justifiable “attribute
of statehood or sovereignty, limited by international law, and exercised in varying manner
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according to the policies of the states possessed of it”. 132 In other words, taxation is an exercise
of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereignty. 133
According to the American law scholar Joseph Beale:
The power to tax is one of the attributes of sovereignty; and the jurisdiction to exercise the
power is coterminous with the bounds of the sovereign's jurisdiction. "It is obvious that it
is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive with that to which it is an incident. All
subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation, but those
over which it does not extend are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation....
The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority or is
introduced by its permission…. The power to tax involves the power to destroy." "The
power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily
limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state. These subjects are persons, property
and business.134
The French scholar Allix traces a state’s derivation of the right to tax to the historical
development of the state concept. He notes that the primary right, as well as the primary
obligation of the state is to secure its own existence. Accordingly, the state enjoys the right to
demand the necessary means from those subject to its laws. 135
The original conception of sovereignty, as a political concept, entails that only those who owe
political allegiance to a state are subject to its jurisdiction and, therefore, taxable by it. This was
problematic in the context of taxing foreigners especially in the face of rapid cross-border
interactions of individuals and economic activities. 136 Does the fact that foreigners do not
recognize the sovereign authority of a foreign state negate the jurisdiction of states to tax persons
other than their nationals? Albrecht observes emphatically that the sovereignty theory is not
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nullified by the fact that foreigners do not recognize the foreign taxing state as their own
sovereign, for while they cannot for this reason be compelled to pay taxes to it on the ground of
political allegiance, they may nevertheless become subject to taxation by virtue of the territorial
sovereignty of the foreign power whenever they, their property, or their economic activity may
be located within its jurisdiction. 137 This jurisdictional evolution is justified on the foundation
that a state is more than political, and has both social and economic dimensions. 138 The now well
established concept of “economic allegiance” is the embodiment of this thought, and explains
the duty of foreigners or non-residents to pay taxes to a state because of their presence, their
possession of property, or economic activity within its borders. 139
Of the theories discussed here, the sovereignty theory appears to be the most plausible and
defensible justification for tax jurisdiction. 140 Although the dynamics of global economic
integration and capital mobility tremendously challenge the exercise of tax sovereignty, 141 the
underlying legal theory of sovereignty remains a most valid and most universally accepted basis
for the assertion of jurisdiction. It is worth highlighting, however, that although sovereignty
comprises both political and economic allegiance, the latter continues to define international tax
jurisdiction.142 I am, therefore, in concurrence with the settled notion that a justifiable basis for
the exercise of tax sovereignty is the existence of economic allegiance by the taxpayer to the
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state. This conversation, therefore, proceeds on the track of economic allegiance, the dominant
theory of tax jurisdiction.
The doctrine of economic allegiance suggests that a government has jurisdiction to tax when
there is a sufficient connecting factor between the taxpayer and the state, i.e., a recognized basis
of economic allegiance.143 In other words, a taxpayer’s economic allegiance lies to the state
where the true economic interests of the taxpayer are. 144 To ascertain such interests,
consideration must be given to the acquisition of wealth, the location of wealth, the
enforceability of the right to wealth, and residence or domicile. 145 Taxing wealth on the basis of
economic allegiance is partly justified on the notion that the taxing state(s) provides the
conditions suitable for the acquisition, protection, and enjoyment of that wealth. 146 In that sense,
the doctrine incorporates the view that those who benefit from government services are obliged
to fund the government.147
Distinction is often made between a tax that is imposed on a person and a tax that is imposed on
an activity or thing (in rem). In the context of international taxation, while the personal tax
requires some connection between the person and the taxing state, the in rem tax requires
connection between the activity or property and the taxing state. 148 The income tax focuses on
the activity or thing from which the income derives, as well as the person deriving income. 149
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2.3.1.5 Economic Allegiance of the Person (Residence-based Taxation)
It is common for states to exercise jurisdiction to impose income tax on persons who are deemed
to have a sufficient connection with them. As previously stated, a person may be connected to a
state in various ways, including their presence, or residence within that state or, more politically,
their citizenship or nationality of that state. These forms of connection are deemed to have varying
degrees of substance and formality.150 However, “residence” is widely accepted as an appropriate
connection justifying the imposition of income tax on the person.151 According to Harris & Oliver,
residence is neither ‘too fleeting’, as ‘mere presence’ may be, nor ‘too formal’, as citizenship may
be.152 A person may be a citizen of a country and yet be resident elsewhere, while a person that is
present in a country may not receive any substantial government services from that country.153 The
United States is a rare example of states that impose taxes on the basis of citizenship.154 Another
example is Eritrea, which imposes a 2% ‘diaspora tax’ on its citizens.155
To further my articulation of the first branch of the RIC test, I focus on “residence”, the most
widely accepted connecting factor entitling a state to tax a person – one that is entrenched in both
domestic tax law and tax treaties.156 “Residence” describes the measure of personal connection or
adherence that a “person” (taxpayer) has to a tax jurisdiction.157 The term “person” refers to a
natural person (an individual) or a legal person (an artificial person). While there is no serious
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debate as to the character of the natural person, there are various forms of entities that may
constitute artificial persons, and this plurality can be consequential for tax purposes. Common
forms of artificial persons are corporations, partnerships, limited liability partnerships and trusts.
An entity that is not recognized as a person (whether for general law or tax law purposes) is said
to be transparent, i.e., the law looks through it to see who the persons behind it are and it is those
persons who are charged to tax.158 While corporations typically enjoy a separate legal existence
from their members, even for tax purposes, some artificial entities may be regarded as either
transparent or possessing a distinct legal identity. This characterization applies for either general
(corporate) law or tax purposes.
The question of whether an entity meets the requirement of a ‘person’ is generally determined by
domestic law. Each country’s domestic tax law specifies which entities are considered “persons”
for tax purposes. Usually, domestic tax law either adopts the general law definition of legal
personality (e.g., corporate law) or stipulates its own peculiar definition.159
Sometimes, domestic law also deals with the characterization of entities organized under foreign
law. This can result in situations where a person characterized as a separate legal entity under the
laws of one country is concurrently treated as transparent (i.e., not a corporation, but a mere branch
or partnership) under another country’s laws.160
It is also within the purview of domestic law to determine whether ‘separate legal entities’ in a
corporate group (such as subsidiaries) should be taxed separately or as a unit. In most countries,
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domestic tax law follows general (corporate) law in mostly regarding subsidiaries as tax subjects
separate from their parent corporation.161
After identifying the subject of taxation (the person) the next determination to be made is whether
the person is ‘resident’ in the state seeking to tax their income. The domestic law of each state
stipulates the criteria for determining what it means to be resident in that state, although such
domestic stipulations are usually streamlined by internationally accepted norms. Countries adopt
different tests for determining whether a person is resident in their territory.162 The nature of the
person – whether natural or artificial – impacts the applicable test.163 For individuals, there are two
main ways of determining residence: according to the time spent in a particular country or
according to the degree of connection that the person has to that country. 164 With regard to the
latter, most tests focus on the maintenance of a dwelling or abode in the particular country,165 while
factors, like family and social ties, location of income-producing activities, bank accounts,
citizenship, domicile, right to stay (e.g. visa status) and a prolonged physical presence in a country
may also come into play.166 Ultimately, facts are extremely important in any such determination.167
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The determination of corporate residency has its peculiarities. Basically, it involves two
approaches: the legal approach and the economic approach.168 The legal approach regards the
country of incorporation or registration as the country of residence, while the economic approach
regards the place of management or the principal business location of the entity as its residence.169
Both approaches attract varying practical challenges. For instance, the economic test may be
difficult to apply particularly in the era of electronic communication, and it may not be clear where
such management decisions are made or they may be made in a number of places
simultaneously.170 The legal test is also susceptible to manipulation because of the capacity of
corporations to register their businesses outside the countries where they operate, for sheer tax
avoidance purposes.171 Countries may use either test or a combination of both tests.172
To sum it up, there are a few recognizable connecting factors that justify a state’s jurisdiction to
tax the income of a person. Principal among them, in the eyes of international tax law, is residence.
International tax law recognizes the jurisdiction of a state to tax the income of a person who is
resident there, whether the taxpayer is a natural person or artificial entity. Residence is generally
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defined under domestic law. Where a person is a resident of more than one state, each of those
states has jurisdiction to tax the person’s income, in exercise of its sovereignty.173
2.3.1.6 Economic Allegiance of the Activity/Property (Source-based Taxation)
Although all income taxes ultimately fall on persons, the jurisdiction of a state where income
yielding activities are located to tax that income, even when the taxpayer is resident overseas, is
well-established in international law.174 Source entitlement permits a state to tax income arising
from within its geographical borders but accruing to non-resident persons.175 Therefore, when a
state asserts entitlement to tax the income of a non-resident person, especially, we ask whether that
non-resident person is the beneficiary of an income earning activity AND whether that activity
takes place (wholly or partly) within the territory of the state.176 An affirmative determination of
these questions elicits the inference that there is sufficient nexus between the state and the income
to warrant the exercise of tax jurisdiction.
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The ‘activity’ is the subject of taxation in the context of source-based taxation. Although it is taken
for granted that it is an income generating activity that can be taxed 177, the range of economic
activities that can generate or contribute to the generation of income is unlimited. Experientially,
they include things like entrepreneurship, labour, cultivation, harvesting, mining, construction,
installation, transportation, manufacturing, financing, R&D, licensing, advertising, marketing, and
sales. Therefore, source, as an economic concept, is determined with primary reference to
underlying factors such as the location of those mentioned above.178 Each of these factors is seen
as contributing, whether wholly or in part, to the creation of wealth179; and it is often the interaction
of various factors/activities that creates wealth.180
The tax laws of most countries classify economic activities into different categories and
subcategories. For instance, the provision of labour may be subcategorized into employment or
independent contracting.181 The use of assets may be subcategorized in many ways including use
of immovable property, use of movable property, use of tangible property and use of intangible
property.182
There is also a common classification of income into “active income” or “passive income”. Active
(business) income refers to income derived from direct exertion by the taxpayer in a business
activity or, otherwise carrying out some activities such as an employment.183 This form of income
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requires the combined provision of labour and use of assets and may be subcategorized into things
like agricultural business, banking business, insurance business, construction business, etc.184
Passive income usually accrues to the taxpayer as a result of another person using the taxpayer’s
assets and takes the form of dividends, interest, rent, or royalties.185
Under subsection 2(3) of the Income Tax Act (ITA) the income of a nonresident person is taxable
in Canada in three instances: (1) if that person is employed in Canada; (2) has carried on a business
in Canada; or (3) has disposed of a taxable Canadian property.186 A different segment of the ITA
(Part XIII) provides for the taxation of passive income such as interests, dividends, rents, and
royalties derived from Canada. The law requires tax on such incomes to be paid in the form of
withholding tax.
There are two steps to ascertaining whether a person’s income is taxable under a schedular system,
such as operative in many countries.187 First, we must examine an activity to ascertain whether it
falls within one of the categories or schedules referred to in the tax law.188 Second, one must
identify payments made or received by a person as connected to or arising out of that activity, in
other words, determine that a payment has a sufficient nexus with the activity.189
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Finally, income tax laws contain so-called “source rules” that connect taxable activities to their
jurisdiction.190 For Canada, the source rules are embedded in the charging clause, for instance,
subsection 2(3) ITA, which clearly stipulates that only that portion of a non-resident person’s
income that is “earned in Canada” is taxable in Canada. This stipulation is supplemented by other
provisions of the ITA, e.g., subsection 115(1), which severally refers to “incomes from duties of
offices and employments performed by the non-resident person in Canada”, and “incomes from
businesses carried on by the non-resident person in Canada”. These provisions require a
connection between the payment and some activity performed or carried on in Canada by the
payee. Also, a non-resident person’s passive income (including interest, rents, and royalties) is
subject to Canadian tax only if the relevant amount is paid or credited by a person in Canada.191
These provisions leave no doubt – at least in principle – about the scope of taxation of nonresidents contemplated in the statute. Only payments that flow from (a source in) Canada are
subject to tax in Canada.
To sum it up, a valid basis on which a state can exercise jurisdiction to tax income arising from a
particular activity (or property) is that the activity takes place (or is located) within that country.
There must be a sufficient nexus between the income and the activity. Economic allegiance owes
to a state where income earning activities are located. A sovereign state has jurisdiction to define
the degree of activity that constitutes a sufficient connection, even though it is worth stipulating
that as regards active income (business or employment) states typically stipulate a threshold of
physical presence of the non-resident person in the jurisdiction to trigger the exercise of
jurisdiction. These are long-standing global norms, but as I discuss in Chapter 3, significant
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developments in the way economic activities are carried out in more recent years has made
countries to reconsider the conventional thresholds, especially for taxation of active business
income. In the meantime, at a basic normative level, a state is simply entitled to exercise tax
jurisdiction over income earning activities that take place there.
2.3.1.7 Administrative Competence to Tax
A state’s tax jurisdiction is not defined by economic-political theory alone. It has been observed
that whether there is any limitation on a state’s taxing power with respect to international or foreign
dealings will be determined by domestic constitutional law, customary international law,
administrative considerations and, of course, any treaty limitations.192 Administrability constitutes
a check on tax jurisdiction. If a tax is difficult to administer, or if compliance burdens, regardless
of how perfect it may seem in theory or design, the tax will fail to serve its intended purpose as a
source of revenue.193 Harris & Oliver rightly suggest that the customary international law
requirement of some sort of connecting factor, some link to a state in order for that state to have a
recognizable jurisdiction to tax might be no more than a reflection of the fact that, if there is no
connecting factor, a state will find it near impossible to enforce its tax outside its territorial
limits.194 Some of the arguments proffered for and against residence or source jurisdiction taxation
are partly anchored on administrability. As Ring observes:
Residence jurisdiction could be preferred on the grounds that: (1) It best reflects ability to
pay (because the taxing state can "readily" base its taxation on the entirety of the taxpayer's
income and thus have an accurate sense of the taxpayer's fiscal picture). (2) Income
"belongs" to people (residence), not places (source). (3) People are less mobile than
activities. (4) The source approach would put tremendous pressure on the definition of
source. Alternatively, source jurisdiction could be preferred: (1) The source country
provides the infrastructure permitting the creation of the income (the benefits principle).
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(2) The source country may be aware of the income's existence and hence better able to
capture the tax. (3) The source country can tax it.195
These observations are instructive because countries typically do not enforce the tax obligations
of one another;196 and only a few countries have mutual collection language in (some of) their
treaties.197 Moreover, the constantly evolving problems of capital mobility, information
asymmetry (between taxpayers and tax jurisdictions) and aggressive tax planning, often facilitated
by sophisticated tax planning, conspire to challenge the fiscal sovereignty of countries and,
perhaps, “incentivize” countries to define their tax jurisdiction more pragmatically.198
The forms of nexus that exist (person or activity/property) shapes the way countries structure their
tax systems for effective exercise of tax jurisdiction. Conventionally, countries classify the taxable
income base into two broad streams, for administrative reasons. The common practice is to tax
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active income at source, on a net basis by assessment (that is, after allowing for costs of earning
income) because the activity by the non-resident taxpayer to produce the income generally means
that there is a sufficient presence in the source country to rely on filing and assessment of a tax
return.199 In contrast, passive income is taxed by withholding by the payer at source on a gross
basis.200 Indeed, the withholding tax emerged as the principal means of taxing non-residents
because of the administrative convenience such an approach offered.201 Generally, there is no
sufficient presence of the person deriving the income in the source jurisdiction to enforce payment
after the income has ‘escaped’ the country, and correspondingly there is no means of enforcing
lodgment of returns or verifying deductions through a tax return process.202
The rates of tax on such income are generally flat rate and low, reflecting two related factors: an
implicit allowance for some expenses, as well as a policy preference for very limited source
taxation (apart from income from land) perhaps on the basis that the benefit obtained by the person
deriving the income from the source jurisdiction is less than in the case of active income.203
There is scope for flexibility in defining a country’s tax jurisdiction by administrative competence.
Administrative competence is a constantly evolving factor, and experience shows that countries
can either make strides in administrative capacity that enable them to more effectively assert tax
jurisdiction or lose ground due largely to the dynamism of economic activities or the adaptability
of taxpayers and tax planning. Tax administration is not today what it used to be a century ago
when the framework for international tax (jurisdictional) principles were defined and partly
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constrained by administrative considerations. To begin with, the notion that residence jurisdiction
could be preferred because it best reflects ability to pay (because the taxing state can "readily" base
its taxation on the entirety of the taxpayer's income and thus have an accurate sense of the
taxpayer's fiscal picture), to paraphrase Diane Ring, is no longer tenable because of the incidence
of capital mobility, which signifies the growing capacity of corporations and high net worth
individuals, especially, to move their income across borders and to locate income away from their
countries of residence.204 As Brooks & Krever explain:
Since the early days of treaty design spearheaded by the League of Nations, times have
changed dramatically. Globalization, financial innovation, and increased reliance on
services and intangibles as the key generators of business profit have undermined or largely
eliminated the potential for simpler administration of residence-based taxation.205
It has been proven consistently that the system put in place decades ago is no match for the
ingenuity of lawyers and bankers armed with increasingly sophisticated telecommunications
technology and tax planning techniques.206 In short, residence-based taxation no longer enjoys that
acclaimed administrative advantage over source-based taxation. Therefore, the delineation of tax
jurisdiction that is based on that dichotomy no longer holds water.
Tax administration in many countries has consistently strived for greater efficiency and efficacy.207
Tax authorities continue to deploy more capable administrative tools, to expand audit and
collection capacities and, generally, have better access to taxpayer information. Unlike the post-
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Second World War period which was marked by “a total absence of interinstitutional
collaboration”, since the 1970s, there has been a gradual shift towards transparency and exchange
of taxpayer information between jurisdictions, a shift that has grown exponentially since the 2008
global financial crisis and the subsequent launch of the OECD transparency initiatives.208 The
fiscal challenges that attended that situation spurred the political will in HIDCs, especially, to
equip tax authorities with greater information tools. As a consequence, many countries have
relaxed their financial secrecy regimes, and there is now a large network of bilateral transparency
and exchange of information agreements, as well as a Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for
automatic exchange of tax information, a new standard of tax cooperation – adopted by over 100
countries – which compels financial institutions to identify and report to their home tax authority
certain accounts held by or for the benefit of non-residents.209 There is also a multilateral reporting
standard – also ratified by over 100 countries – that requires MNEs to file tax information about
their global operations in each jurisdiction of operation.210 Despite their perceived shortcomings211,
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these measures, undoubtedly, take tax administration to unprecedented levels of sophistication and
efficacy.212
One development that could better equip tax authorities to tax the economic activities of nonresidents especially in the digitalized economy is the digital transformation of tax administration.
There has been a steady digital modernization of tax administration in many countries, including
developing countries where measures like eFiling for domestic revenue and the use of electronic
cash registers for VAT have since been introduced to enhance efficiency.213
There are various levels of digital transformation – with implications for tax collection capacity –
and countries operate at these various levels. Tax consultants, Ernst & Young, categorized the
levels of tax authority digital transformation into five: ‘E-file’, ‘E-accounting’, ‘E-match’, ‘Eaudit’
and ‘E-assess’.214 These categories range from the use of standardized electronic forms for filing
tax returns, at the ‘basic’ end, to tax authorities using submitted data to assess tax without the need
for tax forms, at the most advanced end.
Despite the (technological) gains made in tax administration, significant challenges remain. A
recent survey involving eight developed and developing economies chronicles several ways in
which tax administration has evolved in recent years in adaptation to, and leverage of, digital
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advancements.215 Important (but varying from country to country) gains have been made in the
areas of local and cross-border data collection and storage.216
At an advanced level, tax administration systems would be integrated and consolidated with the
natural ecosystem of business and regulatory framework (e.g., accounting systems, financial
institutions, digital service platforms, cryptocurrency platforms and payment systems).217 The
integration allows taxes to interact seamlessly as a business transaction occurs, whereby taxes are
collected and verified in (near) real-time.218 Unfortunately, none of the sampled countries yet
operates at this level.219
Various tax authorities operate at an intermediate level where they can leverage information
technology to collect, and efficiently and accurately analyze taxpayer data. In such systems, the
registration, submission, and payment process for all tax types (personal income tax, value added
tax/goods and services tax (VAT/GST)), are also digitalized.220
The tax authorities, from mostly developing economies, were adjudged to operate at a ‘limited’
digital response level, where tax administration systems are not digitalized, partially digitalized
for certain tax types (such as VAT/GSTs) or digitalized with the ability to access third party data,
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prepopulate tax returns and calculate the tax liability, but the data used is inaccurate and
incomplete.221
These results show that the digital focus of tax administrations is aimed at simplifying tax
compliance, optimizing tax administration, utilizing data to improve taxpayer services, systems
and operating systems, facilitating international cooperation in tax matters, and attaining a holistic
national and international system of dealing with taxpayers.222
Technology bridged some of the administrative gaps between states and non-residents. The
improvements in tax administration over the years diminish the traditional constraints to tax
competence because states now have a better reach to assess tax on non-residents. However, while
most countries have registered tremendous progress in administrative capacity, it is also apparent
that there is significant room for improvement especially in a potential atmosphere of unilateral
digital economy tax enforcement. Greater integration between tax administration and payment
systems, especially in developing economies, will, undoubtedly, enhance the capacity to assert tax
jurisdiction across their borders.
In sum, tax competence rests on a combination of economic-political factors that are deemed to
confer tax jurisdiction on a state, as complemented by the feasibility of administering a tax
potentially imposed by a state on a cross-border tax base. It is only with these competence defining
factors in place that a state can enter the fray of an international regime that streamlines when
and/or how tax jurisdiction is exercised.
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2.3.2 Does the Compromise Impair (the Exercise of) Tax Jurisdiction?
Once it is established that a country has sufficient normative competence to assert tax jurisdiction,
the next factor to consider in the RIC analysis is whether an international tax compromise which
that country is involved in impairs its exercise of tax jurisdiction. Any limit on the exercise of tax
jurisdiction that is not inherent in the competence factors discussed in the previous section would
constitute an impairment. Impairments may take the form of tax rate restrictions and hikes in the
threshold of connection to the country that is required to exercise tax jurisdiction. In the latter case,
we can quickly refer to things like the requirement that a non-resident employee spend a lengthy
number of days in a source country before that country can tax their income. The stipulated number
of days is a threshold compromise that fetters the right of the country to tax income – however
significant – that is derived in a fewer number of days. Countries may agree to a more limited
threshold (impairment) with regard to another class of income such as, for instance, income
derived by an artist or entertainer. This is, generally, the nature of international tax compromise.
The analysis that follows in this section – and for most of the thesis – focuses on the impairment
of source taxation, for a few reasons. First, as Peggy Musgrave rightly observes, there is little
doubt that the source jurisdiction is in a more favourable position to tax income accruing to nonresidents, and source entitlement is generally regarded as the primary right to tax and is more
emphatically asserted in tax agreements and model tax treaties.223 Second, the current international
tax climate lends itself to a renewed reassertion of source jurisdiction on the backdrop of an
international tax regime that has predominantly constrained source taxation. The push for a new
global tax deal (chapter 3) that is largely being orchestrated on the OECD platform is a culmination
of agitations by countries for a more robust source taxing rights allocation. Third, inter-nation
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equity arguments tend to focus on the impact of the existing tax compromises on the taxing rights
of LIDCs and, given that most LIDCs are predominantly identified in those discussions as source
jurisdictions, it makes contextual sense to focus on source taxation. Adopting this approach thus
fits with the objective of projecting RIC as a framework that emphasizes reassertion of fiscal selfdetermination for LIDCs.224
It is beyond contention that much of what the international tax regime, as a compromise on the
allocation of taxing rights, does is to impair the international tax jurisdiction of countries. The
double taxation regime, in particular, was designed with the primary aim of restricting the exercise
of tax jurisdiction. Countries were expected – or required – to “give up” taxing rights primarily to
address double taxation.225 The restrictions that were agreed internationally are reflected as norms
in the domestic tax legislation of countries, as well as, even more restrictively, in tax treaties. Tax
treaties, notably, suppress tax jurisdiction (especially source tax jurisdiction) through their
embodiment of restrictive concepts like the permanent establishment principle for taxation of
active business income and rate limits for taxation of passive income. A restrictive threshold
stipulation such as the permanent establishment rule effectively narrows the scope of in-country
activities that would be subject to tax if a pre-compromise jurisdictional status was maintained.
The next section of this paper discusses the current state of international tax compromise which
has subsisted for a century. As I note earlier, this compromise is embodied in a network of about
four thousand tax treaties as well as in the domestic tax legislation of individual countries.226
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However, as I also note at the beginning of this chapter, it is patently impossible to discuss the
entire body of tax compromise in detail. Therefore, I adopt a modular approach to the analysis.
Admittedly, the most suitable framework for this analysis is the OECD MTC. In 2.3.2.1, I examine
some of the ways in which the OECD MTC, as a proxy for the whole international tax regime on
the allocation of taxing rights between residence and source countries, as well as source states inter
se, impairs the taxing rights of source countries. In 2.3.2.2, I attempt to explain, briefly, some of
the rationales for international tax compromise, i.e., the considerations that drive countries to
surrender their taxing rights. In 2.3.2.3, I use, “histo-political” and critical approaches to examine
the foundations of the subsisting international tax regime, bearing in mind that without these
perspectives, we cannot fully appreciate the context of fiscal self-determination that countries now
crave.
2.3.2.1 The League of Nations/OECD Allocational Compromise
Perhaps, the League of Nations label in the above heading may come across as a bit misleading.
This is because I make no effort in this section to attribute the framework that I discuss here – the
OECD MTC227 – to the League of Nations, the body which is often credited with laying the
theoretical and technical building blocks of that framework. That version of things I reserve for
the eventual section 2.3.2.3. But, in the same instance, I consider it necessary to place the label in
that headline to provide a glimmer of the historical source of the discussed framework and to lay
some foundation – albeit slim – for the conversation that follows in 2.3.2.3. In this section, I focus
wholly on a doctrinal analysis of select provisions of the OECD MTC that are relevant to the
allocation of taxing rights.
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The OECD MTC is a model convention on the taxation of cross-border income and capital.228 It
comprises 32 articles, some of which prescribe formats of taxing rights allocation. Some of the
first major demonstrations of compromise in the OECD MTC are the tie breaker rules which help
to assign tax residence to one country in a situation where a person is adjudged a dual resident
under the domestic law of both contracting states.229 The tie-breaker clause overrides the domestic
law specifications of residence, for the purpose of the tax treaty, a good recipe for tax certainty,
and also provides a platform (“mutual agreement”) to resolve conflicting positions on residence.230
The OECD MTC, recognizes and maintains the primary right of the source country to tax income
from immovable property (including income from agriculture or forestry).231 However, the
language of Article 6 is not exclusive, which implies that the country of residence may tax the
residue of income derived by its residents from immovable country, likely, with a credit or
deduction for the tax paid at source.
Article 7 of the OECD MTC awards the primary right to tax profits from active business to the
country of residence. The exception is where an enterprise carries on business through a permanent
establishment in the source country.232 In that case, the source country can tax the income to the
extent that is attributable to the permanent establishment. In this all-important case, it is the source
country’s taxing rights that are mostly impaired. This is expressive in the details of the permanent
establishment threshold. Article 5 provides an elaborate explanation of a permanent establishment.
It defines the term as “a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is
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wholly or partly carried on.”233 The term includes a place of management, a branch, an office, a
factory, a workshop, and a mine.234
Some hugely significant impairments can, however, be found in the things that are excluded. For
instance, a building site or a construction or installation project does not constitute a permanent
establishment unless it lasts for more than twelve months.235 By virtue of paragraphs 5(4)(a) & (b),
the use of facilities or maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise for the purpose of storage,
display or delivery would not constitute a permanent establishment. The implication of these
exclusions is that a source country’s right to tax income outflows that emanate from these activities
is severely impaired regardless of the size of those outflows.
Article 8 deals with taxation of profits from international shipping and air transport. It exclusively
reserves the right to tax this form of income to the state of residence of the shipping enterprise,
again, regardless of the amount of profits derived from the source state.
Based on the schedular model, various categories of passive income are contained in the OECD
MTC framework. These include dividends236, interest237, and royalties.238 In most cases, the
OECD MTC restricts source taxation rather than residence taxation. In the case of dividends,
paragraph 10(2)(a) of the OECD MTC stipulates that both the residence and source states may tax
dividends paid by a company in the source state to a resident of the other state. However, where
the recipient of the dividends is their beneficial owner and holds directly at least 25% of the payer
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entity, the tax charged by the source state shall not exceed 5% of the gross amount of dividends.
In cases where these ownership qualifications are not met, the tax shall not exceed 15%.
In respect of interest payments, article 11 of the OECD MTC stipulates, generally, that both the
resident and the source state may tax. However, the source state shall not tax at a rate exceeding
10% of gross payment where the recipient is also the beneficial owner.
Article 12 is even more restrictive of source country taxation. It stipulates that royalties arising in
a contracting state and beneficially owned by a resident of the other contracting state shall be
taxable only in the other state. In essence, this stipulation excludes source taxation of royalties,
provided that the recipient of the payments is also their beneficial owner.
Other restrictions are discernible from the provisions of article 13(2) & (4) which specify that
capital gains derived by the resident of a contracting state from the alienation of property such as
ships, aircrafts (operating in international traffic), and intangibles are only taxable in the state of
residence. In each of these cases it does not matter where the gains are realized from. The source
country – the country where the payment emanates from – is entirely constrained from exercising
its right to tax the gains. So, hypothetically, if a UK-resident enterprise that carries on international
shipping business gainfully offloads one of its used vessels to a Nigeria-resident shipping
enterprise, in principle, Nigeria, as a source state, would be entitled to tax the gain. However,
Nigeria cannot do so under the OECD MTC framework, which effectively impairs (suspends) the
exercise of Nigeria’s right to tax. The same goes for gains realized from the alienation of
intangibles such as patents, knowhow, and copyrights by the resident of one country to the resident
of another.
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The notion of impairment in the OECD MTC is visible and ubiquitous in part because of the broad
settlement of tax norms midwifed by the OECD as “international best practice”.239 The domestic
rules of most countries mirror these patterns of impairment, albeit sometimes at less restrictive
levels. In some cases, domestic source rules have a broader scope than the OECD MTC envisages.
In such cases, a country that follows the OECD MTC for its tax treaties accepts a more restrictive
effect on its jurisdiction than it already entrenched domestically. It means that the dictates of
domestic legislation become secondary, as reference can simply be made to the applicable tax
treaty to determine the appropriate taxation of a non-resident.240 However, in circumstances where
domestic law source rule are narrower than that in tax treaty stipulations (based on the OECD
MTC) or where there is no domestic charge to tax on a type of income that the treaty permits the
source country to tax, the treaty is only permissive and will not ground a charge to tax.241
In sum, the compromise that reigns in the international tax regime is that residence countries should
yield primary tax jurisdiction to source only with respect to certain income types (active business
income and income from immovable property) while source countries should yield substantial
taxing rights to residence countries for other kinds of income (e.g., passive income and capital
gains). Yet, the right to tax active business profits at source is also significantly impaired by the
permanent establishment requirement. To reiterate, these compromises are entrenched, not just in
various tax treaty models, but also in bilateral tax treaties and domestic tax legislation.
States, including LIDCs, lose significant tax revenue from mere participation in a compromisebased system of international taxation.242 For instance, a state that accepts to not tax business
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profits arising from its borders unless a certain high-bar physical presence threshold is met or that
accepts to tax cross-border interest outflows at a reduced rate or altogether forgoes its right to tax
royalty payments to non-residents implicitly agrees to surrender potentially significant chunks of
revenue. Conventional wisdom suggests that since these are sovereign states with subjective
interests (including important domestic revenue mobilization goals) there must be some good
reason why they take the “counterintuitive” path of surrendering their taxing rights. It, therefore,
makes sense to dig, even briefly, into the fundamental reason(s) why sovereign states compromise
their tax jurisdiction. I do so in the next section.
2.3.2.2 Why Do Sovereign States Compromise Tax Jurisdiction?
A state may compromise the exercise of its tax jurisdiction for a variety of reasons. The main one
is that countries give up taxing rights to alleviate the burden of double taxation on foreign capital,
which is regarded as inimical to international trade and investment.243 Second, a capital poor
country may desire to attract foreign capital investment from a capital rich country, and therefore
execute a tax treaty with favorable tax concessions to investors from the latter country.244
Likewise, a country that is keen to attract the import of technology may compromise its right to
tax royalty payments made to non-resident owners of intangible assets. Cooperation and
compromise are also ways of showing that one is part of the international tax community; and the
opposite posture may be self-isolationist.245 It seems, in this sense, that for LIDCs, accepting
restrictions of tax jurisdiction is just a necessary evil of being a part of the international tax
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community.246 Perhaps more remotely, but also in the spirit of cooperation, tax jurisdiction may
be compromised as part of a broader deal to secure cooperation with other states for cross-border
enforcement of tax liabilities (administrability).247
When states engage in international tax compromises, they tend to have one or more of these
rationales as a driving force. They view compromise as a way of fulfilling one or more of these
policy goals, notwithstanding the consequential impairment of tax jurisdiction that ensues.
However, it is worth emphasizing that the prevention of double taxation is the paramount reason
why countries compromise the exercise of their tax jurisdiction. The international tax regime was
built on a foundation of double tax avoidance. It has been observed that basic economic theory
identifies several efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility.248 Companies
compete globally for four reasons: (1) strong potential market internationally, (2) enhanced
profitability (3) low-cost production and quality are critical to successful competition in global
markets, (4) success may be achieved by selecting particular market segments.249 Free trade in
capital allows a superior utilization of resources, the spreading of risk, and ultimately a higher rate
of economic growth through the adoption of higher-yield, higher-risk activities.250 However, the
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benefits of global business may be overwhelmed by the burdens of taxation, which may,
potentially, disincentivize wealth creation through cross-border business activities.
Double taxation, ‘the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer
in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods’251, can arise where a person owes
economic allegiance to more than one country. This may be the result of dual (or multiple)
residence, dual (or multiple) source or combinations of residence and source. Two countries may
concurrently claim entitlement to tax the income of a person if that person is resident in one country
and derives income from an activity that is located in the other country. The source country may
tax the income before it leaves its borders while the residence country may also tax the income in
the hands of the income earner.
Double taxation may also arise where two or more countries claim to be the source of income.
This is a common phenomenon because of the integration of value chains in different countries. If
two countries have normative grounds to tax the same income on the basis of source, the source
jurisdictions’ taxes may run concurrently with taxes imposed by the residence jurisdiction – if the
taxpayer is resident in a third country. The typical way to deal with the problem is for countries to
compromise their tax jurisdiction. This may be done unilaterally or in cooperation with other
states.252 Cooperation would typically require at least one state to give up some (or all) of its
entitlement to tax. While like many commentators, I am willing to accept that some level of
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impairment to the exercise of tax jurisdiction is necessary to address the problem of international
double taxation and, perhaps, to achieve one or more of the other rationales for revenue sacrifice,
I am convinced, as a practical matter, that any state that is involved in such a compromise must
confront the ultimate question of whether giving up all or some of its taxing rights is a reasonable
choice in the context of the facts before it.
2.3.3 Is the Impairment Reasonable?
Now I turn to the third test of RIC: “reasonableness” (or “reasonable”). I am inclined to think that
this is the most challenging – yet, most important – component of the trifactor test. How can we
say that a restrictive tax norm – an impairment – is reasonable (or not)? Can any bright-line
response to this question suffice, bearing in mind, by many accounts, that philosophical terms like
“reasonableness” often defy precise denotation?253 As I arrive this critical juncture, I am brusquely
reminded of the ageless Indian parable of the (six) blind men and the elephant.254 Deprived of the
privilege of sight, each touched a different part of the elephant’s body and, as if living a true
synecdoche, emerged with different descriptions of the mammoth mammal. In the end, those wise
blind men leveraged their divergent perspectives to arrive at some common ground.255
Visually impaired or not, people have different senses of what is “reasonable”. I have thought
through my elephant in several ways. I have thought to frame “reasonable” or “reasonableness” in
negative terms, by asking: “what or how much is “unreasonable” to concede”? Perhaps, a “simple”
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way to respond would be to say that any taxing rights allocation compromise - or rule – that tends
to render a state’s tax base vulnerable to base erosion should be considered unreasonable. A state,
as a rational actor, should not be expected to embrace such a compromise – not willingly. Still, I
find myself back in positive framing, asking, for instance, “is it reasonable to insist that a nonresident entity must spend a minimum of 12 months earning income in a country before that
country can tax the income”? Is this what makes the most sense? I do not think so; but even if you
agree with me, this is just one constrained answer to a broader problem. What is required is a
generic (but adaptable) test, rather than a response that only resolves one scenario of the broader
problem.
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have grappled with the conundrum of “reasonableness” in
various facets of legal application.256 The term has been used to explain acceptable standards of
conduct. Hence, we are often confronted with variations like a “reasonable man,” “reasonable
notice,” “reasonable use,” “reasonable force,” “reasonable expectation,” “reasonable care,”
“reasonable time”, etc.257 A standard of reasonableness has been applied to constitutional law,258
sexual harassment law,259 criminal law,260 international law,261 international investment
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arbitration,262 human rights law,263 torts law264, administrative law (judicial review), and, not the
least, international trade law.265 In 2013, Graham Cook, then of the Legal Affairs Division of the
WTO, observed that WTO law and jurisprudence contained more than 8,000 uses (including
variants) of the term “reasonable”.266 The courts of common law countries like Canada, New
Zealand, and the UK apply a reasonableness test to evaluate whether a public officer has exercised
their administrative discretion in a manner that de-necessitates judicial intervention, regardless of
whether the court would have come to a similar exercise of discretion.267 In torts law,
“reasonableness” has been a vital ingredient in the evaluation of liability for negligence. 268 It
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assesses negligent behaviour on the scale of what a “reasonable man”, in the same circumstances,
would do.269
A “reasonable” test has also been applied in tax law discourse to examine potential shortfalls in a
rule designed to address an aspect of international tax (in)efficiency,270 as well as to examine issues
of fairness in tax administration,271 but to my knowledge, not yet to the often discordant subject of
inter-national tax equity.
Although their contexts may differ, it seems to me that in many of these respects the application
of reasonableness is aspirational: it aspires towards a position or outcome that is fair, sound, or
moderate.272 It does not imply that which is perfect, although perfection would not be deemed
inimical to it. It is a fitting standard for a determination or judgment that ordinarily defies scientific
precision, but is tied, more often than not, to the circumstances of each situation.273 To borrow the
words of the WTO Appellate Body when interpreting the term “reasonable period” in the context
of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
The word ‘reasonable’ implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of
the circumstances of a particular case. What is ‘reasonable’ in one set of circumstances
may prove to be less than ‘reasonable’ in different circumstances. This suggests that what
constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the
specific circumstances of each investigation.274
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It is through this prism that I conceive “reasonable”; and I am convinced that such a flexible and
functional approach fits with the subject of taxing rights allocation, since no countries – or class
of countries – can pretend to conceptualize (never mind actualize) outcomes of perfection. The
peak level that countries can aspire to is a fair outcome, a moderate outcome, or, more aptly, a
reasonable outcome; and that ‘reasonable outcome’ must be adjudged, not in terms of how much
countries receive – for it is they who give it up – but in terms of “how much tax jurisdiction is
reasonable for a sovereign to concede in order to limit the distortionary effect of double taxation
on international trade”? This functional conceptualization of reasonableness reflects the pattern
that scholars have followed in both understanding and deploying the concept. For instance, Corten
notes that the functions played by “reasonable” can be divided into two categories: “technical” and
“ideological” functions.275 Technical functions enable the legal system to work, while ideological
functions mean that reasonable is used to the benefit of one particular actor in the legal system.276
As a technical functional concept, reasonableness embodies attributes of adaptability/flexibility. It
displaces resort to the rigidity of legal texts. For instance, what constituted a reasonable threshold
for a permanent establishment in the 1960s – a compromise threshold that source countries were,
therefore, willing to accept – may not meet such standards in the 2000s considering the digital
transformation of economic activities. Reasonableness is adaptable to such changes. While a legal
test, such as a 180-day rule, may be too rigid to adapt to present realities, a reasonableness test
would more easily supersede such rigidity. In an adjudicatory context, a reasonableness test would
allow a judge to provide a reasoning in the absence of more precise criteria.277 The same can be
applied to a profit allocation framework, for instance. While there are no methodologies to
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precisely determine the degree of activities that take place in an LIDC and the due reward for those
activities, a methodology that best preserves or least impairs the taxing rights of that country may
be adopted.
With regard to its ideological function, Corten remarks that the notion of “reasonable” should be
analyzed with particular reference to the phenomenon of legitimisation.278 He posits that
“reasonable” is used in order to legitimise an assertion which is, by definition, subject to change.279
Reasonable provides legitimacy to the international legal order as a whole, by presenting an image
of a closed, coherent and complete legal system. References to reason portray an ideal of unity and
community of values that is particularly remarkable in an international system which is very
loosely integrated, and which is characterized by decentralized centres of power and acute cultural
and political differences.280 Thus, in an international order such as the international tax regime
comprising states of divergent backgrounds, interests and distribution of power, reasonableness,
in the context of taxing rights allocation, connotes an imperfect solution that regards the right to
fiscal self-determination of states. It reflects “an agreement on the lack of agreement. Each State
maintains its own conception of what is reasonable, and will exercise its powers according to that
concept”.281 Such a compromise allows each state better autonomy to determine, for instance, the
pivotal question of how much taxing rights that it can afford to surrender to fulfill its responsibility
of contributing to an efficient international trade system. That determination is not imposed by
states more powerful.
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In the end, I have formulated a fragmented framework that gravitates towards this impulse of fiscal
self-determination. I opine that, at this stage, what we should aspire to ascertain is whether, taking
into account the entire circumstances of the compromise, including the economic status of states,
the impairment of tax jurisdiction makes sense for the country(ies) involved. In order to establish
whether a taxing right impairment is reasonable, several factors should be considered. These
include: (1) the disparity of means factor, which generally assesses a state’s capacity to give up
taxing rights based on that state’s overall revenue mobilization capacity; (2) the vitality factor,
which bases the capacity to give up taxing rights on the relative importance of the specific tax base
to the state; (3) the substantive reciprocity factor, which assesses whether there is actual reciprocity
in the levels of taxing rights given up by compromising states; (4) the alternativity factor, which
focuses on whether there is a less restrictive and, yet, efficient alternative(s) to the proposed or
subsisting tax compromise; and (5) the non-tax benefits factor, which considers the scope for
concrete non-tax benefits that are expected to flow (directly or indirectly) from the compromise.
These factors may be considered severally, cumulatively, and contextually. Without further ado, I
proceed to examine them.
2.3.3.1 Disparity of Means
This is a critical consideration as far as LIDCs are concerned. The contention here is simply that
the international tax regime must not unduly suppress the tax jurisdiction of poorer countries. Put
differently, we should not place heavy expectations on countries to concede taxing rights if to do
so would hurt their revenue mobilization in a way that they can ill-afford.
International tax compromise has always been about giving up taxing rights. Therefore, the
question of what/how much countries can afford to give-up is both implicit and imperative. It has
been so from the initial compromise. Incidentally, during the nascent years of the double taxation
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regime the issue was largely framed in terms of “who (between residence and source countries)
should give up taxing rights.”282 Thus, at the end of the bargain, residence countries were asked to
give up taxing rights over certain kinds of income while source countries were asked to give up
taxing rights over other kinds of income. The distributional lopsidedness that ensued from that
framing is well documented.283
Assuming instead that the fundamental question of double tax relief is also framed in terms “who
CAN AFFORD to give up taxing rights” rather than just “who should give up taxing rights”, I am
of the view that the response could result in a more nuanced and, frankly, more equitable surrender
of taxing rights. The approach that was taken was, instead, over-generalized, applying the same
rules to all residence countries and the same rules to all source countries, so to speak. Some
countries are predominantly source countries, while some may be predominantly residence
countries. Yet, some countries may be a complex mix of residence and source. This is certainly
the case for the capital-importing countries of continental Europe who soon found themselves as
capital exporting countries when engaging with non-European LIDCs.284 In the same vein, not all
"developing countries” are in the same league. It has been noted, for instance, that “developing
states” is a very heterogenous group including BRICS countries and least developed countries, at
opposing ends of economic power. Therefore, it may not be ideal to focus on the BRICS countries
as representatives of the developing world.285 A nuanced approach has the potential to better reflect
the disparity of means between individual countries (or class of countries) – that is, to reflect the
respective capacity of countries to give up taxing rights.
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Depending on the circumstances, a country with low per capita income286 or low GNI287 or even
low untaxed GDP288 may have less capacity to give up taxing rights than one with higher figures
in any of these metrics. Therefore, it might be relatively unreasonable to expect such a country to
give up much of its taxing rights, regardless of whether it is a predominantly residence or
predominantly source country.
The disparity of means approach mirrors the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibility” articulated, in an international tax context, by Ivan Ozai to support a fair
distribution of the consequential burdens of ending international tax competition.289 Ozai
advocates a similar approach to that adopted by the international community in tackling the
common problem of climate change. Although there is consensus that all states should contribute
to combating climate change, reasons of “justice and political feasibility” also compel states to
equitably distribute the levels of contribution that each state must make towards reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.290 This concept of “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR)
is entrenched in the language of the 2015 Paris Agreement291 and has been justified on several
grounds, mainly that HIDCs bear overwhelming historical responsibility for benefits and damages
ensuing from past emissions292 and that HIDCs simply have greater ability to pay for greenhouse
caps than LIDCs.293
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For our purpose, disparity of means, mirroring CBDR, accepts the view that double taxation is a
common international problem but argues further that countries’ obligation to contribute to solving
that problem should closely reflect their respective capacities to surrender taxing rights. A onesize-fits-all solution that causes LIDCs to “equally” surrender domestic revenue mobilization
capacity will only aggravate the endemic problems that necessitate and perpetuate global
(substantially) humanitarian programs like the SDGs (before that Millennium Development
Goals).
Importantly, the argument here is that the international tax regime should shield the tax base of
LIDCs from inordinate artificial restriction and countries should, therefore, as much as possible
avoid international tax norms that unduly constrain the rights of LIDCs to tax income that they are
ordinarily entitled to tax. International tax compromises, including tax treaties, should take into
account the wealth disparity between participating countries when setting restrictions on the
exercise of tax jurisdiction.
One handy way to illustrate the disparity of means test is to examine the restrictions on source
taxation of business profits. I earlier outlined the various forms of economic activity that are
excluded from the permanent establishment definition, which means that a source country cannot
tax income arising from such activities regardless of the revenue outflows. A notable example is
the exclusion of facilities and activities relative to the distribution of goods. This kind of restriction
allows a non-resident entity to carry out significant storage and distribution activities in a source
country without paying any taxes on the income derived from those activities. While HIDCs may
be able to stomach such revenue losses due to their broader tax bases, the same cannot be said of

basis for a “disparity of means” approach to prospective international taxing rights compromise, I am solely focused
on the “ability to pay” notion. This aligns with the view that states with lesser means should be less expected to
surrender taxing rights.

89

LIDCs. Perhaps, a more reasonable approach would allow the source country to impose some tax
on distribution activities of significant value, in order to ameliorate the erosion of its tax base.294
We can further articulate this test by examining the taxation of royalties under Article 12 of both
the OECD MTC and the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed
and Developing Countries (UNMTC).295 Even the most recent version of the OECD MTC (2017)
remains consistent in exclusively reserving the right to tax cross-border royalty payments to the
country of residence of the beneficial owner of the payments.296
A “royalty” is a payment made to the owner of intangible property for the right to use or exploit
that property.297 Article 12(3) of the UNMTC defines “royalties” as:
payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any
copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, or films or
tapes used for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan,
secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific
experience.298
To state generally, the items captured in the UNMTC definition of royalties include: payments for
the use of copyright; payments for the use of patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret
formula or process; payments for the use of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment; and
payments for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.
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The rights identified in the definition are commonly referred to as “intangibles,”299 “intellectual
property,”300 or intellectual property rights,301 and are recognized and protected by intellectual
property laws.302 This reality makes references to intellectual property literature highly relevant to
the definition of royalty and its affiliate terms. It also means that our understanding of the kinds of
payment that are within the scope of royalty would be enhanced by appreciating the things that are
defined and protected by intellectual property law. If a thing is defined and protected by intellectual
property law – whether in the form of copyright, patent, trademark, or know-how – then it makes
sense to infer that a payment that is made for the license to “use” that thing, in a manner that only
the owner of the right would, is a royalty.303
The position, in the OECD MTC, to make taxation of royalties an exclusive right of the residence
country is a consequence of the compromises reached in the initial formation of the international
tax regime, particularly, the framework of tax treaties, where it was determined that passive income
should be taxed at residence, while active income should be taxed at source, upon the existence of
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a permanent establishment.304 Although that extreme restriction of source taxation subsists in the
OECD MTC, it does not wholly reflect the practice of many states, as there seems to be an
increasing recognition that such outright restriction is neither tenable nor fair, especially in the
case of LIDCs.305 This position holds especially true for LIDCs because of the potential impact on
domestic revenue mobilization. Not only do royalty payments pose a significant base erosion risk
for countries because of the premium price of intangibles and the deductibility of outbound
payments,306 an exclusive source taxation principle is especially bad for LIDCs because, as
available data also shows, a disproportionately high volume of global payments for the use of
intangibles goes to HIDCs.307 This is not surprising considering the disparate capacities of HIDCs
and LIDCs to develop and license intellectual property.308 What this also entails is that the only
material opportunity that LIDCs have to tax significant portions of royalties would be nullified if
they were to strictly adopt the OECD framework. Suffice it to state that such a policy would
produce what might be considered unreasonable revenue outcomes for LIDCs. It is, therefore,
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encouraging that the UNMTC provides a treaty framework that is less restrictive on LIDCs ability
to tax outbound royalty payments.
Since the UNMTC, as well as many tax treaties now accommodate LIDCs’ source taxation of
royalties, contemporary debate on the subject is no longer about whether LIDCs should tax
royalties at source but about the extent to which they should, both in terms of what is covered and
the rate of withholding tax that they should impose.309 In terms of coverage, the conversation is
essentially about whether to add to the items adumbrated in Article 12(3) UNMTC or to expand
their meanings, where such potential exists, to broaden the scope for source taxation by LIDCs.
After all, if they are so willing, countries can negotiate a broader or narrower definition of royalties
for their tax treaties; and some do.310
Definitions have consequences. If a definition that is narrower than what is prescribed in the model
convention is adopted, the implication is that certain payments for intangibles which would
ordinarily qualify as “royalty” may not be covered.311 Such payments may instead be characterized
as “business profits” under Article 7. This classification may be problematic for the DRM
objectives of LIDCs because the country of residence enjoys exclusive right to tax business profits,
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unless the “profits” are derived through a permanent establishment in the source country. 312 The
implication is that certain payments may wholly escape taxation at source when they could be
captured by a broader definition of royalty. A good example, one that has been the subject of recent
debate, is payments for the use of (computer) software.
Paragraph 12.1 of the OECD commentary describes a software as:
[a] program, or series of programs, containing instructions for a computer required either
for the operational processes of the computer itself (operational software) or for the
accomplishment of other tasks (application software). It can be transferred through a
variety of media, for example in writing or electronically, on a magnetic tape or disk, or
on a laser disk or CD-Rom. It may be standardised with a wide range of applications or
be tailor-made for single users. It can be transferred as an integral part of computer
hardware or in an independent form available for use on a variety of hardware.
The term “software” or “computer software” is not yet included in the definition of “royalties” in
either the OECD MTC or the UNMTC. However, considering the market significance of software
in today’s global economy, it seems reasonable for source countries, especially LIDCs, to want to
tax outbound payments for the use of software as royalties.313
If countries are to include payments for the use of computer software as royalties, so that they can
tax at source, there are two approaches to inclusion, and each of these approaches has implications
that are based on reliance on intellectual property law standards. One approach is to include
software as a form of “artistic, scientific or literary work” in which case only compensation for the
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“use” of a software copyright can qualify as royalties. The other approach is to include software
as a patent or sui generis (same as things like patent, trademark, design, plan, secret formula, etc.),
in which case the (technical) “use” requirement, which is a major barrier to source country
taxation, is sidestepped.
The Commentary of the UNMTC observes that “the copyright laws of many countries deal with
this problem by specifically classifying software as a literary or scientific work”. 314 The BEPS
Monitoring Group also observes that as many as 600 tax treaties include “software” in their
definition of royalties.315 Most of these treaties, however, regard “computer software” as a species
of “artistic, scientific, or literary work”.316
A sui generis, less common, approach to software inclusion in the definition of royalties can be
found in the India-Russia tax treaty which lists “computer software” (detached from copyright)
alongside things like trademark, patent, know-how, and secret formula, as a property that is eligible
for royalty payment.317 This suggests that computer software stands on its own in the class of
things that intellectual property law, generally, protects and, in terms of tax consequences, implies
that payments for the use of computer software may amount to royalties even without the kinds of
“use” that copyright use contemplates (e.g., reproduction, modification, and distribution).318

314

UNMTC, Commentary to Article 12, para 12 quoting para 13.1 OECD MTC Commentary to Article 12.
The BEPS Monitoring Group, “Inclusion of Software Payments in the Royalties Article of the UN Model
Convention” (6 October 2020) online: https://perma.cc/B3RH-W8KQ.
316
An example is Paragraph 12(3)(a) of the India-Romania tax treaty which places software within the cluster of
things that are subject to copyright protection.
317
Article 12(3)(a) of the India-Russia tax treaty.
318
Copyright law recognizes a general right to use computer software as an end user. This is distinct from the right to
exploit the copyright in a computer software by, for instance, reproducing or modifying the software for distribution.
Currently, the answer to the question of how payment for computer software should be treated depends largely on
whether the right granted by the software owner to the “user” is a mere right to use the software product, as an end
user, or a right to exploit the underlying copyright in the software, in which case the user can (with some contractual
limits) deal with the software in a manner that only the copyright owner legally could, e.g., reproducing, revising,
distributing, displaying, or selling copies of the software. See, generally, Ganesh Rajgopalan, “United Nations Model
Tax Convention - Proposed Inclusion of Software in the Definition of Royalties in Article 12: Comments on the 2020
Discussion Draft”, SSRN (2020) online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715609; Nurul
315

95

Evidence from individual state practices and international consensus buttresses the status of
software as intellectual property that should be accorded legal protection,319 with copyright as the
main form of protection. The OECD MTC commentary notes at paragraph 12.2 that:
The rights in computer programs are a form of intellectual property. Research into the
practices of OECD member countries has established that all but one protects rights in
computer programs either explicitly or implicitly under copyright law.
This “consensus” is further reflected in the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) – the minimum standard international scheme for IP protection –
which explicitly protects computer software as “literary work”.320 However, TRIPS only protects
the source and object codes of a software, and leaves computer behavior to the realm of (domestic)
patent law.321
The commentary of the OECD MTC (quoted in the UNMTC commentary), contains various
technical explanations about the tax treatment of payments for the use of software (usually as either
business profits or royalties) depending on how the software is used. The commentary mainly sets
out instances where payments for the use of software do not amount to royalties. This includes
payments made by an intermediary distributor to a copyright owner for the right to distribute copies
of the software program (without the right to reproduce or modify the software).322 Such payments
would be treated as business profits, and not royalties.323
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The limitation that allows payments for the right to distribute software products to entirely escape
source country taxation aligns with the general recognition of software ownership as a copyright
only. This is notwithstanding the longstanding debate over whether computer software can also be
registered – and protected – as a patent.324 Historically, software companies have sought “double
protection” of their products against potential infringement by securing both copyright and patent
registration325 and there are instances where patent protection has been granted.326 A copyright
provides an exclusive right to reproduce, revise, distribute, display, or sell published material.327
A copyright, thus, protects published versions of software.328 However, because software
developers view their products as more than a publishable idea, they have also sought the issuance
of patents to protect the codes and systems inherent in software programs.329 A patent is a right to
exclude others from making, importing, using, keeping, offering to dispose a patented process or
the product of a patented process without authorization.330
Unlike a copyright use, a patent use does not require the reproduction/modification element. Mere
distribution of the patented material would qualify as “use”, which implies that payments for the
right to distribute a patented software would qualify as royalties, and, therefore, taxable at source.
Such an approach would soften the restriction on the right of source countries to tax payments
made to non-resident software owners for the right to distribute. It is in that spirit that the UN Tax
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Committee has recently explored the possibility of expanding the definition of royalties to include
payments for the use of software that do not entail the use of copyright.331 Although the option
explored by the UN Tax Committee deviates from the traditional software = copyright position, it
does have the potential to rectify the current position that does not allow LIDCs to tax various
forms of software payment (including commercial distribution). It gives cause for a deeper
consideration of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the current regime on the taxing
rights of LIDCs as net technology importing countries. Such countries, due to their limited means
of domestic revenue mobilization, have less capacity to surrender the right to tax cross-border
payments for software, and other forms of intellectual property, however classified. Ultimately,
regardless of whether software is construed as copyright protected or patent protected, the bottomline is that LIDCs retain a prime fiscal interest in the distribution/sale of software in their territory.
The exclusion of income from such activities potentially borders on unreasonableness, depending
on the scope for revenue loss that subsists in each case.
The point here is that while countries are generally expected to surrender their taxing rights in
order to facilitate a thriving global trade system, some countries can less afford wholesale
concessions of taxing rights. Countries with smaller tax bases and greater revenue/developmental
needs should not be expected to give up taxing rights in a way that depletes their capacity for
domestic revenue mobilization. We must systematically consider the revenue concession capacity
of such countries in framing international taxing rights allocation rules.
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2.3.3.2 Vitality
The vitality factor holds that when setting limits to the exercise of international tax jurisdiction,
countries should aim to avoid restrictions that may excessively impact tax types that are crucial to
their revenue bottom-line. If a country’s domestic revenue mobilization depends heavily on a
particular income yielding activity, industry, or tax stream, it would seem unreasonable to expect
that country to embrace an international tax compromise that significantly impairs its ability to tax
that activity or impose that kind of tax. This may be particularly important for sector specific tax
arrangements but also general compromises that target specific kinds of tax (in the schedular
approach). As a generic example, it might seem unreasonable to expect a country whose main
engagement with international trade is that it controls a major international shipping port, but
which owns no vessels, to forgo source taxation of international shipping in favor of residence
taxation. It might, likewise, seem unreasonable to expect a country like Canada to embrace a
compromise that significantly restricts source taxation of income earned by non-residents from
real property, considering that the real property market is a huge chunk of Canada’s GDP.332 Such
a compromise has the potential for colossal base erosion.333
African countries are well known to heavily depend on corporate taxes, unlike their, say, OECD
counterparts that have diverse sources of tax revenue, such as personal income taxes and
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consumption taxes.334 The corporate tax is crucial for developing countries where it “frequently
amounts to over twenty-five percent of total revenues”.335 As Hearson observes:
Developing countries have much lower per capita national incomes than developed
countries, but they also convert a much smaller percentage of that income into government
revenue... This means that taxation raised from multinational companies and wealthy
individuals is more precious to them than it is to developed countries, hence the focus of so
much attention from development campaigners in recent years on the avoidance and evasion
of such taxes.336
A tax compromise that significantly impairs a country’s jurisdiction to tax the income of
corporations earned in its territory may be deemed unreasonable to countries that are heavily
dependent on corporate taxes, even though it may be less so for countries with viable alternatives.
Also, resource rich countries might consider how tax treaties limit their capacity to tax income
derived from the extraction of natural resources. A more reasonable approach would entail
insulating taxation of the relevant sector from excessive impairment that may be occasioned by a
compromise. In this specific case, a reasonable way to deal with the problem might be to adopt the
Musgraves’ national rental principle which allows resource rich but capital poor countries to
charge a huge rental value – outside the tax system – on the extraction of their natural resources.337
However, as a matter of general principle, countries may consider unreasonable and, therefore,
strive to avoid tax compromises that make it harder for them to tax income types that they deem
vital to their fiscal needs.
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2.3.3.3 Substantive (or Contextual) Reciprocity
We can examine the reasonableness question from a contextual angle of reciprocity. Because a
compromise is a give-and-take affair, a reasonable compromise would aim to achieve some level
of substantively equal giving – or taking – between parties. Reciprocity is an important
international tax principle, particularly as regards the imposition of withholding taxes on
investment income earned by residents of a treaty partner.338 According to Peggy Musgrave,
reciprocity requires that each pair of jurisdictions should tax the income earned by residents of the
other at equal rates and contrasts with the more generally applied rule of non-discrimination, which
requires that each jurisdiction tax the income earned by investors from abroad at the same rate that
income accruing to domestic investors is taxed.339 This also means that in the particular case of
business profits taxation the withholding tax that is imposed on dividends is independent of the
corporate tax rate applied to the underlying business profits.340
We may refer to the kind of reciprocity envisaged above as formal reciprocity. This form of
reciprocity hinges on the textually or numerically equal restriction of the withholding tax rate that
each country may impose on investment income earned residents of the other. A tax treaty between
France and the UK will be deemed formally reciprocal if the countries agree to include an identical
restriction on the rates of withholding tax on dividends, interest, or royalties. In the case of interest,
for instance, Article 11(1) of the France-UK DTT specifies that “interest arising in a Contracting
State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State”. 341 The
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treaty exclusively reserves the right to tax interest payments for the country of residence of the
recipient, meaning that neither country can impose any form of tax on interest payments at
source.342 In this case there is formal reciprocity because, on the face of it, the restriction on source
taxation applies to both countries. It is not a case of only one country taxing, while the other does
not.
We can also analyze the issue from the angle of substantive or contextual reciprocity. This kind of
reciprocity looks beyond the text of the treaty and considers the capital export capacity or
investment flows between the two countries. In the case of capitally ‘equal’ countries or in a case
where there is relatively symmetric investment flows, neither country would be too concerned
about giving up source taxation since they can compensate for that concession by taxing similar
inflows of interest (or other kind of investment income) to their residents investing in the other
country.343 So, in the above example, even though France and the UK both surrender the right to
tax interest payments at source, they can make up for this sacrifice by taxing interest payments
received by their residents who export debt capital to the other country. We are likely to see this
relatively balanced outcome because they are both capital exporting countries and are, presumably,
capitally equal countries.
However, where we have an asymmetric relationship, such as in a treaty between a capital rich
and a capital poor country, the substantive results, in terms of tax revenue, are likely to look quite
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different.344 The absence of capital export symmetry makes it unlikely that residents of the capital
poor country would have commensurate debt investments in the capital rich country to derive
interest payments that the capital poor country can tax (to compensate for the source taxing rights
that it surrenders). What this means, in practice, is that the only opportunity for the capital poor
country to tax interest payments is at source, while the capital rich country can tax both on the
basis of residence and source. In other words, formal reciprocity is unlikely to translate to
substantive reciprocity. This is because while a treaty-based (total or partial) restriction of source
taxation may be formally reciprocal, the circumstances of the two countries makes such restrictions
non-reciprocal. From a tax perspective, the restriction only truly affects the capital poor country.345
This is why it makes sense to approach reciprocity contextually rather than just formally.
One way to address the potential distributional lopsidedness arising from asymmetric relations is
to adopt non-reciprocal withholding tax rates. First, it means that exclusive residence taxation is
not a reasonable option, at least not for the LIDC. Second, it entails “allowing” the LIDC to impose
withholding taxes at a higher rate than the HIDC, to balance out tax revenues arising from the
uneven interest (dividend, royalty, etc.) outflows. The Musgraves, decades ago, championed the
incorporation of this kind of fairer distribution mechanism into the international tax regime.346
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Some countries have, to some extent, embraced such policies.347 It is a mistake to portray such
measures in the language of tax aid.348 Perhaps, such a policy should be regarded as preservative
or curative. It ameliorates the lopsidedness in taxing rights restrictions which inhere in
asymmetrical relations.349 It is also about preserving the source taxing rights of LIDCs, as
discussed above. There is no “aid” involved, since the LIDC was already entitled to tax the interest,
based on the source rules, but was prevented from doing so by the artificial barriers of the tax
treaty.350
In evaluating the fairness of international tax compromises, especially those contained in bilateral
tax treaties, we may consider whether there is substantive reciprocity in terms of the impairment
that each country submits to. This is particularly relevant in the case of a HIDC-LIDC
compromises. What appears to be reciprocal on the surface may not constitute real reciprocity
when one digs deeper. Where the arrangement points to one country – especially the LIDC – giving
up more than it receives, in a tax sense, then we may be inclined to infer that the arrangement is
not “really reciprocal” and therefore unreasonable.
2.3.3.4 Alternativity
Another way to assess the reasonableness of an international tax compromise is to consider
whether there are alternative measures or formats of compromise that are efficient but less
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restrictive of tax jurisdiction.351 The relevant question here is, is it reasonable to use option A when
option B imposes lesser restriction on the tax jurisdiction of a country? If there are alternative
methods to allocating taxing rights or to achieve the objective of double taxation relief, the choice
of a method that imposes relatively stringent restrictions on the taxing rights of LIDCs may be
deemed unreasonable, unless there are compelling justifications for adopting the more restrictive
method. This test calls for a comparative assessment of principles and measures relating to or
affecting the allocation of tax jurisdiction. Selecting between two or more competing approaches
– separate entity vs unitary taxation, for instance – can prove to be both complicated and
controversial, as countries would generally prefer the option that best aligns with their fiscal
interests; and, arguably, the choice of one option over another may be more political than technical.
Moreover, even on the technical side, the choice is not always clear-cut.
We can also approach this factor from the perspective of qualified restriction. The view here is
that while contemplating the adoption of a certain international tax compromise, policymakers
should also consider any qualifications which, if embedded, can mitigate the restrictive effect of
the proposed measure on the tax jurisdiction of countries. This element provides a basis for
policymakers to, for instance, incorporate factors like location savings in transfer pricing regimes.
Such qualification can help to bring more equity to an international tax compromise that would
otherwise underrepresent or undervalue the contributions of certain jurisdictions to the value chain
where such contributions become the basis for allocating taxing rights.352
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Perhaps, we can digest the alternativity factor by revisiting Article 8 of the OECD MTC. That
clause grants the country of residence of an enterprise operating ships or aircrafts (collectively
“mobile vessels”) in international traffic the exclusive right to the tax profits derived from such
operations.
The international shipping and air transport industry (collectively) is worth trillions of U.S. dollars
yearly and is still growing in value.353 It is implicit that source countries – the countries from where
shipping and air transport operators receive payments in exchange for their services of loading,
conveying, and offloading people and cargo – can raise substantial revenue from taxing these
activities. The equity question, therefore, is whether only countries of residence should enjoy the
right to tax? To answer this question, I must first trace back the historical justification for the
current position.
The principle of exclusive residence-based taxation of income derived from the operation of
vessels in international waters – and air – evolved as a practice between the mid-19th to early 20th
centuries.354 In the early 20th century, countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom
made attempts to impose source taxes on international shipping, but could not find an
administratively feasible way to do it. From 1916, the United States attempted in futility to
implement several formulas to apportion the shipping profits earned in its territory by foreign
owned vessels.355 Both the United States and the United Kingdom also faced severe criticism from
other states, as well as the shipping industry, for the problematic tax measures that they sought to

353

Martin Placek, “Container Shipping – Statistics & Facts” (23 September 2021) online: https://perma.cc/5X225XXG [“global maritime container trade is estimated to account for around 60 percent of all seaborne trade, which
was valued at around 14 trillion U.S. dollars in 2019”]; ICAO, “Future of Aviation”, online:
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/FutureOfAviation/Pages/default.aspx [“aviation represents 3.5 per cent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) worldwide (2.7 trillion US dollars) and has created 65 million jobs globally”.].
354
Guglielmo Maisto, “The History of Article 8 of the OECD Model Treaty on Taxation of Shipping and Air
Transport” (2003) 31:6/7 Intertax 232.
355
Ibid at 234.

106

implement, and it appears that both countries were moved by the concern that taxing foreign
shipowners would invariably lead other countries to tax British and American shipowners.356 In
the end, after conferring extensively with other states, both countries ultimately legislated to forgo
source taxation. The United States and several European states, therefore, started to either
unilaterally or through bilateral tax treaties give up their right to tax international shipping income
at source.357 Countries that acted unilaterally usually extended the benefit on a reciprocal basis.
That is, countries made the benefit of source non-taxation available to only vessels resident in (or
owned by entities resident in) countries who extended a similar treatment to their vessels.358
For all countries, administrative infeasibility was the defining reason for the exemption of income
from international shipping from source taxation.359 According to Maisto:
Exempting income from operation of vessels and aircraft was viewed by States as a
practical solution to double taxation of income as any apportionment formula proved to be
unsatisfactory; the exemption was construed as an exception to the territoriality rules on
direct taxation (as opposed to the alternative represented by the extraterritoriality of the
income which could have been applied to non-residents under certain circumstance).360
From the work of the League of Nations to the OECD, there are several confirmations of the
administrability justification for exempting international shipping income from source taxation. A
report published in 1925 by the Technical Experts appointed by the League of Nations’ Fiscal
Committee notes that:
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In the case of maritime navigation undertakings, in view of the very particular nature of
their activities and of the difficulty of apportioning their profits, particularly in the case of
companies operating in a number of countries, the experts admit an exception to this
principle – to the effect that the tax should, subject to reciprocity, be imposed only by the
country in which the real centre of management and control of the undertaking is
situated.361
The reasoning behind the above submission is explained by the Technical Experts as follows:
When an industrial concern carries on its activities throughout the whole world, the
importance of the actual headquarters, or the “brain” of the enterprise, becomes paramount;
and, above all, very serious technical difficulties may be encountered in determining an
apportionment of the profits. The representatives of the Maritime Sub-Committee of the
League of Nations have asked how it is possible to determine the profits earned in each of
the twenty or twenty-five ports at which a vessel belonging to a trans-Atlantic company
may have loaded or discharged cargo, when ten or fifteen different countries have to be
taken into consideration.362
The principle was originally applicable to maritime navigation, but was subsequently extended to
air navigation, recognizing the advancement of the industry, through the 1928 Geneva Model
Convention, also developed under the coordination of the League of Nations. The extension of the
special rule of exemption to air navigation was done in acknowledgment of the fact that this form
of transportation raises similar double taxation concerns.363 The subsequent Mexico and London
Models also contained the principle of exclusive residence country taxation with the explanation
that granting exclusive taxation to one country was “intended to facilitate the operation of
international transport enterprises” and “also avoids the numerous difficulties which experience
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has shown to be involved in the taxation of profits from international navigation outside the homecountry of the operating enterprise”.364
The principle was reaffirmed by the OECD during the development of the first OECD MTC of
1963. The Working Party assigned the task by the OECD considered that deviating from the
general principle of business income taxation (including the permanent establishment rule) and
maintaining a special regime for the taxation of income from international shipping and airport
operations was necessary for administrative reasons:
The rule of reciprocal exemption of foreign shipping or air transport enterprises, giving the
taxing power to the State in which the enterprise has its place of management or its fiscal
domicile, can perhaps be criticised on ground of principle (derogation from the principle
of permanent establishment). But, from the practical standpoint, in view of the condition
of international navigation, this rule must, in the opinion of Working Party No. 5, be
regarded as the most suitable and most rational method of avoiding double taxation.
Consequently, it is presumable that principle of reciprocal exemption will still be the basis
of all future work in the field of bilateral Conventions.365
These considerations also reflects in the Commentary on the 1963 OECD MTC:
By the nature of their business, shipping, inland waterways transport and air transport
enterprises are more exposed than most other industrial and commercial enterprises to the
danger of multiple taxation on their income, as they are liable to be taxed simultaneously
in their own countries and in the other countries where they receive payment for the
carriage of passengers or goods or where their activities are exercised. To avoid double
taxation, many special Conventions concerning the taxation of these enterprises have been
signed or special clauses inserted into general double taxation Conventions. As it would be
very difficult to determine what proportion of the profits of a shipping or air transport
enterprise is attributable to each of the countries concerned, most Conventions provide that
income from the international business of shipping or air transport is to be taxed only in
the State in which the enterprise concerned is established.366
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From the foregoing historical reflections, it is clear that the Article 8 exclusion of source country
taxation is mainly justified on account of administrative feasibility of applying taxes at source
without imposing multiple tax burdens on shipping and air transport operators. 367 The
administrative hurdle underlying this principle has to do with peculiarities in how international
shipping and air transport enterprises typically operate. According to Kofler:
[T]his exclusive taxation takes account of the way in which international shipping and air
transport industries are typically organized, as their operations may be spread out over a
multitude of states in which PEs are set up to handle the business: Exempting such profits
from tax in the state where the activities were exercised, regardless of whether or not the
enterprise maintains a PE in that state, article 8 of the OECD Model indeed avoids
difficulties in allocating to each PE (e.g. docks, hangars, cargo terminals, ticket offices,
etc.) its proper share of the profits arising from transportation activities and fragmented
taxation of profits.368
Kofler contends that there is broad agreement to retain the special rules regarding Article 8 even
in times where the source taxation is being strengthened and the threshold for permanent
establishment is being lowered. This is because, according to the author:
Even in times where source taxation is strengthened and the threshold for the existence of
a PE is lowered for other businesses, there seems to be broad agreement on the necessity
of such a rule for the shipping and airline industries and the corresponding justification for
the deviation from the general rule of article 7 of the OECD Model. This is because
reciprocal exemption avoids multiple taxation and considerable difficulties of income
allocation in a very large number of taxing jurisdictions. This is specifically true for
modern-day liner shipping, where a carrier’s service involves multiple ports of call and
multiple international cargo origins and destinations on every single voyage, but could also
be the case in tramp shipping, i.e. the maritime transportation of bulk materials, which may
exhibit similarities to containerized trades.369
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It is not disputed that, like other forms of international economic activity, international shipping
and air transport gives rise to competing taxing rights between two or more jurisdictions: the
country of residence, the country of source and, in this case, multiple countries of source. It seems
that the entire justification for the outright exemption from source taxation of international
shipping and air transport income – perhaps one of the swiftest compromises ever built on a
multilateral engagement – rests on the notion that there is simply no way to allocate this type of
income to the potentially many source countries without causing unsustainable double (multiple)
taxation for the industry. The only prudent choice, therefore, is for all source countries to surrender
their taxing right in favor of exclusive residence country taxation.
The Article 8 rule is a quintessential example of efficiency – and, in this case, administrability –
overriding equity in international tax regime formation. Indeed, the complex intersection between
these three policy objectives of international taxation is evident throughout the evolution of Article
8. On the one hand, the elimination of double taxation of income from international shipping and
air transport, generally, became a genuine necessity, as states recognized double taxation as a
significant barrier to efficient markets.370 Efficiency also factors in determining the protracted
question of whether taxing rights (at residence) should be reserved for the state of registration of
the vessel – the so-called “flag of convenience problem” 371 – or the central location where the
operations are managed from (the “real centre of management and control” or, subsequently,
“place of effective management”).372 Second, the preferred method of dealing with the double
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taxation problem (exclusive residence taxation) draws largely from administrative feasibility.373
Yet, equity was also a major consideration in the development of Article 8. This is first reflected
in the concern of states for reciprocal treatment in the surrender of source taxing rights. A state
was willing to give up source taxation if its own residents could receive the same treatment from
other states as they navigated international waters and air.374 Also, despite the imperative of
eliminating double taxation, some states were not willing to accept wholesale elimination of source
taxing rights. Their concern was peculiar about the taxation of income from inland waters
navigation. This led to a carveout for source taxation of vessels operating in the territorial waters
of a state (inland navigation) from the general rule of source non-taxation, which now applies only
to vessels operating in the high seas (maritime navigation).375
The reasonableness of the contrasting treatments of inland navigation and maritime navigation
stems from the fact that, unlike inland navigation, most of maritime navigation takes place outside
the territorial waters of a source state.376 So, from a comparative equity perspective, it might seem
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less reasonable to expect a source country to agree to not tax inland navigation which takes place
almost entirely within its territorial waters, under near exclusive protection of its laws, regardless
of the place of residence (or registration) of the vessel.377 The fundamental problem of profit
apportionment that bedevils the administration of a tax on international navigation is implicitly
less pronounced in inland or territorial waters navigation since the entire income more likely
derives from a single source country and is, therefore, more readily attributable to that source.
Logically, the question that follows is whether a rule that excludes source country taxation of
income from international shipping and air transport should still be considered “reasonable” if
there is an “alternative” (administratively feasible) way to deal with the double taxation problem
without the extremity of taxing rights exclusion for source countries? In other words, it is worth
questioning whether the total exclusion of source taxation of income from maritime and air
transport continues to be a reasonable impairment of source tax jurisdiction or whether there is an
alternative solution that is reasonable in terms of how it addresses the trilemma of double taxation,
administrative feasibility, and inter-nation equity. This issue – which seemed settled for decades –
appears to be worth revisiting partly because of the strain that the current exclusionary rules place
on domestic revenue mobilization in LIDCs and partly because of how the rules have allowed the

altogether eliminated in 2017 largely out of redundancy. Most countries did not address taxation of nonresidents
operating in inland waterways in their tax treaties.
377
In the early years of the development of the Article 8 rule, some source states strenuously objected to the inclusion
of territorial waters navigation in the exclusive residence state taxation rule. Countries like Argentina were of the view
that most of the services in territorial navigation took place within their territory, under their protection and accounted
for a substantial part of their domestic revenue. There was, therefore, no basis to exclude their right to tax income
arising from these activities. This objection appears to have been a major factor in the carveout; and remained the
consensus position until 1963 when the pioneer OECD MTC purported to place all forms of navigation (air, maritime,
and inland) within the exclusive residence taxation rules. See Maisto supra note 354 at 238 & 244.

113

shipping industry to become a “low- or no-tax industry” benefitting from the harmful competition
between states to become “registration states”.378
The UNMTC prescribes an alternative framework for the Article 8 rule that is more
accommodating of source taxation than what is currently contained in the OECD MTC. Article 8
(alternative B) of the UNMTC provides that:
2. Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of ships in international
traffic shall be taxable only in that State unless the shipping activities arising from such
operation in the other Contracting State are more than casual. If such activities are more
than casual, such profits may be taxed in that other State. The profits to be taxed in that
other State shall be determined on the basis of an appropriate allocation of the overall net
profits derived by the enterprise from its shipping operations. The tax computed in
accordance with such allocation shall then be reduced by ___ per cent. (The percentage is
to be established through bilateral negotiations.).379
It has been observed that “exclusive residence state taxation of shipping profits is problematic
when the size of mercantile fleets and shipping flows between two states are unequal in size”.380
Such an outcome is more likely to play out in relations between a developed and developing
country because the LIDC would often lack the domestic mercantile fleet but would nevertheless
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serve as a viable revenue generating port state for the developed country’s fleet.381 In such
circumstances, the UNMTC’s provision can be considered a more equitable alternative for source
countries, especially LIDCs who may not have commensurate ownership stakes in international
transportation entities or vessels, vis-à-vis HIDCs (except, perhaps, as “flag states”), but who,
nevertheless, desire to tax significant income outflows from their territories to non-resident
enterprises operating in the air and sea transport industry.382
Article 8B also seemingly attempts to mitigate the potential double taxation problem – the kind
identified by Samuel Instone in 1928383 – by allowing source states to tax only where the shipping
activities are “more than casual”, i.e., where the shipping activities are (deemed) significant. The
question of what amounts to “more than casual” shipping activities is a threshold question which
states can address by compromise. The UNMTC does provide guidance on what the phrase entails.
Paragraph 13 of the Commentary to Article 8 of the UNMTC stipulates that the “the phrase ‘more
than casual’ means a scheduled or planned visit of a ship to a particular country to pick up freight
or passengers”. Of course, such threshold prescriptions are not new to international taxation. A
prominent quantitative example can be readily found in the rules governing business profits
taxation, particularly the permanent establishment thresholds stipulated in Article 5. Therefore,
states can explore the potential of a more appealing threshold.
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The nexus between the “more than casual” requirement and administrability is vital. After all, if
the potential for administrative feasibility has not evolved to a satisfactory level, any attempts to
tax income from international shipping would still prove problematic for taxpayers and tax
authorities. If non-taxation at source, or overall, is inequitable, multiple taxation might be even
more detrimental (to the shipping industry), and perhaps, even reignite drumbeats of trade war.
Therefore, it is helpful that the UNMTC contemplates that, where contracting states adopt
Alternative B, the authorities in the state of residence of the enterprise should assess the overall
net profits of the entity. The contracting states must then agree on the formula for apportioning the
net profits between the residence and source state(s).384
If states adopt the option (Alternative B) that the UNMTC presents, they have to rely on the
availability of information to apportion the enterprise’s profits for assessment. Thankfully, as
Falcão observes, and contends, taxing the shipping industry does not face as much complexity as
taxing the digital economy because, unlike the digital economy, "shipping traffic, port calls, and
merchandise transactions are extensively monitored – and unlike the digital economy, it is not just
the shipping companies themselves that conduct the monitoring but also third parties”.385 Shipping
documents, which are normally filed at port, can reveal how many trips a vessel makes to the ports
of a given jurisdiction, the size and/or value of cargo loaded and offloaded there and ultimately
the turnover income that the vessel or enterprise derives from its operations in that jurisdiction.
Where tax authorities are cooperating, in terms of information exchange, the consolidated data that
is available to them may be used as the basis of a, potential, formulary apportionment of profits
between source jurisdictions or between residence and source jurisdictions, in which case, only
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“residual profits” from maritime shipping would be allocated to the source state (or market
economy).386
Contracting states can agree that unless the income that a foreign shipping enterprise derives from
a source state is “more than casual”, i.e., based on a threshold defined by their compromise, then
there would be no obligation for the entity to pay taxes in that source state. Indeed, for
administrative purposes, stipulations may also be made to exclude filing obligations in a state
where the shipping activities do not reach a certain threshold. So called “safe harbor” provisions
are already a part of the international tax regime, particularly in the regulation of transfer pricing
filings.387
It is difficult to see why similar strategies cannot be adapted to the taxation of income from
international shipping. Unlike in the last century, the existence of things like country-by-country
reporting, as well as digitalized country-specific data, means that countries now have better tools
to access and assess the taxability of shipping enterprises; and, as stated earlier, apportionment of
profits can be made on the basis of an agreeable formula that operates on readily available data.
Therefore, the administrative strings that rendered tax assessment and compliance a non-starter for
the shipping industry have been lowered significantly by technological advancements and more
sophisticated regimes of transnational cooperation in tax administration. Again, compliance
burdens for taxpayers can be eased by technology and by limiting source taxation to predetermined

386

See Falcão ibid.
See OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris:
OECD, 2017) at 205 [“A safe harbor “applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and relieves eligible
taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a country’s general transfer pricing rules”]. For concept
analysis, see, e.g., Thomas W. Giegerich, "Transfer Pricing Safe Harbors - An Idea Whose Time Has Come" (2017)
43:5 Int'l Tax J 35; Gregory Pun, "Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: How Corporations Use Transfer Pricing to Avoid
Taxation" (2017) 40:2 B C Int'l & Comp L Rev 287; Alexander Ezenagu, “Safe Harbour Regimes in Transfer Pricing:
An African Perspective” (2019) ICTD Working Paper 100; Tatiana Falcão “Formula-Based Transfer Pricing: How
Brazil Can Improve the OECD’s Framework” (2021) 101:5 Tax Notes Int’l 609.
387

117

thresholds of significant economic participation in a source state. The inclusion of a safe harbour
threshold also limits the number of states where taxpayers are required to file. If a shipping entity’s
operations in a state do not produce a turnover that meets a certain threshold, then it may be
exempted from even filing returns in that state. This way excessive compliance burdens do not fall
on shipping entities in states where they have a de minimis economic involvement.
The absence of international consensus on the revamp of Article 8 does not mean that source
countries are asleep on the subject. Indeed, it appears that a growing number of countries is moving
away from the anachronistic practice of source non-taxation that remains embedded in Article 8
OECD MTC. A recent study by Michel & Falcao reveals that a host of South/South-East Asian
states now have language in their treaties that is similar to Article 8B and in some cases, countries
are leaving the subject out of their tax treaties and taxing shipping income at source pursuant to
their domestic tax rules.388 These countries also stipulate certain practical requirements that are
meant to mitigate the likelihood of double taxation. For instance, all Bangladeshi tax treaties that
do not exclude source taxation provide that the tax charged in the source state shall be reduced by
50%. In some of the treaties, it is further prescribed that after all reduction of the 50% the eventual
tax shall not exceed 4% (2.5% in one treaty) of gross receipts. 389 The fact that these “deviant”
provisions have existed for decades reinforces the contention that there are viable – and more
equitable – alternatives to the OECD MTC prescription.
In sum, if the total exclusion of source taxation in Article 8 is (or was) justifiable on the basis of
double taxation and the lack of a workable profit appropriation method for source taxation, the
existence of an alternative framework that deals with these practical concerns but also allows
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source countries to tax renders questionable the continued reasonableness (equitableness) of the
OECD MTC approach and the rationale for its perpetuation. The alternative framework, the
UNMTC (Alternative 8B), still impairs source tax jurisdiction but, compared to the subsisting
OECD MTC approach, its impairment may be considered (more) reasonable.
2.3.3.5 Scope for Non-Tax Benefits
This evaluative criterion compels me to revisit the reasons why countries agree to compromise
their tax jurisdiction in the first place; and here I am looking beyond the overarching reason:
elimination of double taxation. I am looking more specifically at those individualistic reasons
for compromise, such as the attraction of foreign capital and the import of foreign technology.
A complete evaluation of reasonableness would take into account the scope for non-tax benefits
that a country derives from compromising its tax jurisdiction. In other words, when we evaluate
the reasonableness of a tax compromise, including one involving an LIDC, we should include in
that evaluation the scope for tangible non-tax benefits that the country stands to benefit from the
regime.390
Giving up the right to tax may be viewed as a tradeoff for other benefits arising from international
economic integration. Attraction of foreign capital has been a primary motive for LIDCs’
willingness to give up tax revenue through tax treaties.391 In a world of unequal capital ownership
capacity, it is not uncommon for LIDCs to enter into tax treaties with HIDCs as a strategy to attract
foreign capital.392 There are conflicting views on whether giving up taxing rights in exchange for
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foreign capital tends to yield the desired results especially for LIDCs or whether the potential
results of compromise are an acceptable trade-off for lost tax revenue.393
Tax treaty practice experience suggests that split withholding tax rates on taxation of royalties can
be used as policy tool to streamline the import of intangibles. There is no universally prescribed
or acceptable royalty tax rate for tax treaties. Instead, the rates prescribed in tax treaties – where
taxation at source is permissible – are usually the outcome of bilateral treaty negotiations.394 Some
countries insert a singular royalty rate for the various forms of IP included in the definition of
royalties, while others use split rates, which means different rates for different classes of
intangibles. Is this the best approach, or would split royalty rates be more beneficial for LIDCs?
Whether a singular rate or a split rate is preferable may depend on the LIDC’s priorities. If the
priority is to attract the import of certain kinds of IP, then a split rate may be the reasonable policy.
Some of the tax treaties between LIDCs and HIDCs reflect tax rates variations from treaty to treaty
and, sometimes even in the same treaty there may be different rates for different forms of royalty
income.395 For instance, each of Chile’s tax treaties with Australia, Belgium, and France, contains
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a withholding tax rate of 10% for royalties, but then carves out a 5% rate for royalties paid for
industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment.396
One plausible rationale for this kind of rate disparity is that the LIDC prioritizes the import of
certain intangibles (e.g., patent and know-how); hence, the willingness to concede to a lower
withholding tax rate on royalties paid for that form of property aims at incentivizing imports of
those forms of intangibles. In this sense, what we have is a trade-off between technology imports
and tax revenue. The royalty rates may even be zero if the ‘source’ country deems it necessary.
The items that benefit from this low – or zero – rate may be further streamlined to meet the specific
non-tax needs of the technology importing country (LIDC), while, as much as possible, limiting
the erosive impact of the treaty on domestic revenue mobilization.397
Regardless of where one stands on the trade-off debate, I am of the view that it is a necessary
component of a holistic reasonableness analysis. If a country stands to derive genuine, tangible,
and proportionate non-tax benefits from compromising its taxing rights, then the tax revenue
given up may not be considered unreasonable, even for an LIDC. 398 After all, as Diane Ring
implores, “a country must measure its success by more than its current tax revenue; economic
growth is also valued. If tax rules discourage taxpayers from engaging in otherwise desirable
cross-border transactions, there may be a significant drag on the resident economy and
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revenue”.399 However, the scope for non-tax benefits should, generally, not be a standalone
consideration, at least not for long-term compromises, unless it is clear that the derivable nontax benefits substantially outweigh the need for domestic revenue mobilization.
2.4

Chapter Conclusion

In chapter one, I discussed what I consider to be a narrative problem in the way inter-nation
equity issue is presented for LIDCs. In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate a different
approach to framing the issue. I began by discussing what it means for a sovereign state to have
tax jurisdiction, using different theories that scholars have propounded over the years. I
concluded on the note that scholars have settled on the theory of “economic allegiance” as the
basis for tax jurisdiction, and that “economic allegiance” best reflects as residence and source
tax jurisdiction. In that light, I also tried to demonstrate (and have reiterated throughout these
chapters) that the jurisdiction to tax, as a matter of principle, is not conferred or donated by o ne
country to another. I proceeded to examine what the international tax regime does to the tax
jurisdiction of states. I argued that the regime principally impairs or restricts the exercise of tax
jurisdiction. In other words, the regime does not strip tax jurisdiction, but restricts a state’s
capacity to exercise jurisdiction. I argued that this impairment is most pronounced in the respect
of source taxation. The principal purpose of impairment of tax jurisdiction is the elimination of
double taxation. This explains the nomenclature of “double taxation regime” by some scholars.
I then proceeded to discuss what a reasonable compromise should look like, considering that I
present the RIC concept as the way to frame the inter-nation equity question. In this regard, I
discuss the concept of “reasonableness” as used in some of the literature. I then conclude by
discussing various approaches to reasonableness that may be used to evaluate the fairness of an
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international tax compromise. I use various case studies, drawn mostly from subsisting tax treaty
provisions, to articulate the points in each test.
There is an international tax “deal of the century” on the horizon. This new tax deal aims to
apportion taxing rights with respect to the digital economy. There are conflicting views on
whether the deal is fair to LIDCs. I have tried to steer clear of that subject thus far. What I
proceed to do in chapter 3 is to use the framework that I have built in chapter 2 to evaluate the
equity concerns around the new tax deal.
Chapter 3 also discusses the political dynamics that surround the formation of international tax
compromises, that is the process through which sovereign states agree to impair or restrict their
exercise of taxing rights. I leverage various theoretical and historical perspectives to demonstrate
that this process is technical, but also highly political. States with greater economic power are
more likely to influence the outcomes. However, the level of pressure and scrutiny that non-state
actors, including economic interest groups and tax policy scholars, exert on the political process
also influences the compromises that states make.
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Chapter 3: Taxation of Active Business Income in the Digital Era
3.1

Overview

As the preceding chapter documents, the normative principles of the international tax regime were
framed about a century ago, mainly from the League of Nations’ 1923 Report to the entrenchment
of the permanent establishment principle in the 1963 OECD MTC. It is important to mention the
permanent establishment principle because it is the specified nexus threshold based on which a
source state may exercise jurisdiction to tax the business profits of a non-resident entity.400
“Permanent establishment” entails a physical presence in the source country of the form
contemplated in Article 5 of the OECD MTC, as well as the UNMTC, the tax treaties and domestic
laws of states, and may be regarded as one of those international tax principles that have attained
the status of customary international law.401 The permanent establishment threshold requires, as a
precondition for the exercise of source country tax jurisdiction, that the non-resident entity
maintains a certain physical presence in the source country and derives income from activities
attributable to that identifiable presence or location. The presence may include an office, a place
of management, a branch, a factory, a workshop, or place of extraction of natural resources.402
The permanent establishment principle evolved as a compromise between mainly capitalexporting countries seeking to tax business profits predominantly or entirely at residence and
mainly capital-importing countries seeking to tax business profits predominantly or entirely at
source and heralded an initial breakthrough in the partition of international taxing rights.403 In the
early-to-mid-20th century, when the permanent establishment principle evolved, cross-border
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business activities of economic significance normally involved a physical presence in the source
country – the so-called “brick and mortar” economy.404 In those circumstances, it was reasonable
to make physical presence a component of the source rules for taxation of business profits. That
situation has changed quite significantly in the last few decades with the rapid digital
transformation of the global economy.405 A great deal of economic activities now take place
remotely and an entity that is resident in one country can leverage digital technology to derive
huge profits from another country without any physical presence there.406 The digital
transformation of the global economy has rendered the permanent establishment framework
obsolete and unfit for purpose and, in the view of many, necessitates reform or deviation from the
permanent establishment rule.407 It is for this purpose that countries have been engaging
multilaterally on a scale not seen since the early to mid-20th century to rewrite or adapt the rules
of international taxation to address the tax challenges arising from the digital economy.
The reform of international tax rules requires a new compromise that would enable states to
reclaim tax sovereignty by reversing some of the restrictions to the exercise of source tax
jurisdiction. But it may also require some measure of continued concession of taxing rights for
purposes of double tax avoidance, innovation enticement, administrative convenience, and even
political feasibility. The question is how much taxing rights should states concede?

404

Asaf Harpaz, "Taxation of the Digital Economy: Adapting a Twentieth-Century Tax System to a Twenty-FirstCentury Economy" (2021) 46:1 Yale J Int'l L 57 at 62.
405
For a definition of the commonly used terms “digital transformation” and “digitalization”, see Jason Bloomberg,
“Digitization, Digitalization, And Digital Transformation: Confuse Them At Your Peril”, Forbes (29 August 2018)
online: https://perma.cc/276K-6QZ9.
406
Monica Gianni, “OECD BEPS (In)Action 1: Factor Presence as a Solution to Tax Issues of the Digital Economy”
(2018) 72:1 The Tax Lawyer 255 at 259.
407
Michael J Graetz, “Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policies” (2001) 26:4 Brook J Int'l L 1357; Wolfgang Schon, “Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the
Digitalized Economy” (2018) 72 Bulletin for Int’l Taxation 278. Hentschel supra note 8.

125

A tentative global tax deal was published – and reviewed – in the middle of 2021. The deal is being
presented as a framework for taxing rights allocation in the digital economy. The deal will,
unsurprisingly, limit source taxation by setting determined thresholds for the exercise of those
taxing rights. Nearly 140 countries, including many LIDCs, have signed up, amidst protests about
its fairness, to LIDCs, especially.
This chapter evaluates the new global tax deal from an equity perspective, using the reasonable
impairment compromise (RIC) framework developed in the preceding chapter. I start by
examining the tax challenges of the so-called “digital economy”. I proceed to introduce the
multilateral efforts that countries are undertaking, through the OECD, to address these challenges.
I then discuss the political circumstances underpinning the formation of the new global tax deal,
showing how political dynamics shape the distributional outcomes of the deal. Finally, I conduct
an inter-nation equity evaluation of the new global tax deal. Here, I examine the normative
entitlement of source states to tax income arising from the digital economy; I establish the new
global tax deal as a compromise that allocates taxing rights; I establish that the compromise impairs
the exercise of tax jurisdiction by source states; and I analyze the question of whether the
impairment of source tax jurisdiction can be deemed reasonable, based on three reasonableness
tests: disparity of means, alternativity, and the potential for non-tax benefits. I conclude that there
is no simple answer. There are components of the deal that can be faulted, based on their
application to some countries. The new global tax deal falls short of the disparity of means test,
even though there is an attempt at differentiated allocation of taxing rights to some LIDCs. The
alternative that I review here better preserves the taxing rights of LIDCs but is beset by various
difficulties of its own; therefore, I am not entirely convinced of its viability. Pillar One performs
slightly better on the non-tax benefits test based on a general assessment.
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3.2

The Tax Challenges of Global Economic Digitalization

Global trade has grown tremendously in the last few decades, from a nominal value of U.S.$22.7
trillion in 1990 to a nominal value of U.S.$87.6 trillion in 2020. 408 A lot of that growth is
attributable to rapid advances and integration of digital technology into the global economy. 409
To this point, a recently published estimate by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) puts the value of global e-commerce transactions, a key component
of the digitalization trend, at a total of US$26.7 trillion. 410 This sort of impact is possible because
digital technology enables easier and increased product diversity, thereby enhancing firms’
capacity to produce, market and distribute their products at minimized costs. 411 Schmidt &
Spengel describe the impact of digitalization in the following words:
The digital transformation of industry (including “Industry 4.0”) is progressing
continuously. It revolutionises value creation processes and supply chains, makes
production processes smart and promotes employees’ know-how in dealing with
innovative technologies. Not least of all, it influences business strategies and corporate
culture. More and more digital business models are emerging, spurring on competition
and disrupting entire sectors. At the same time, new digital opportunities work as a
catalyst on research and development, for instance by stimulating innovation processes
and shortening development cycles. 412
Digitalization is transforming the way businesses interact with users and customers globally. 413
Digitalized businesses obtain and exploit user data for advertising, marketing, and other
commercial purposes, platform operators break access barriers by connecting users with services
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(e.g., food delivery, cab hire, dating, and accommodation) and provide user access to a greater
catalogue of consumable content than is available in the pre-digital global economy.414
Digitalization enables the emergence of new, highly digitalized business models, capable of
delivering a variety of innovative products and services, while also enabling traditional business
models to alter and enhance their productivity and delivery. 415 Businesses that considerably
exploit these transformative tools are some of the most successful on the global stage. Tech
behemoths such as Alibaba, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, TenCent, and Meta
(Facebook) are quick references. 416
Global economic digitalization also presents a variety of challenges for governments around the
world, no less so than in the area of taxation where the phenomenon has upended pre-existing
domestic revenue mobilization opportunities and rendered some important international tax
norms largely obsolete and ineffective. In the former case, digital services continuously supplant
physical products417 and e-commerce platforms continuously displace local shops and physical
business establishments.418 These changes have accelerated with the COVID-19 pandemic, which
caused many businesses to move online or increase their digital integration.419 Digital
displacement reduces a government’s tax collection through the closure of tax-paying local

414

European Commission, Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services
Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, (Brussels, EC: 2018) 148 final at 13-20.
415
See, generally, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Digital Economy Report 2019 Value
Creation and Capture: Implications for Developing Countries (U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DER/2019).
416
FXSSI, “Top 10 World's Most Valuable Technology Companies in 2022” (3 February 2022) online:
https://perma.cc/Z7VL-ZFUH. There are also many less nominally valuable tech companies that are extremely
important to their users for the services that they provide. Examples are Airbnb, Adobe, Didi, Netflix, Spotify,
Twitter, Uber, Zoom, etc.
417
Christopher Mims, “A Surprisingly Long List of Everything Smartphones Replaced,” MIT Technology Review (22
July 2012), online: https://perma.cc/N3NP-YG5P.
418
Nathaniel Meyersohn, “American retailers already announced 6,000 store closures this year. That's more than all
of last year,” CNN Business (6 April 2019), online: https://perma.cc/Q2X8-VUDY.
419
John Koetsier, “97 Executives Say COVID-19 Sped Up Digital Transformation”, Forbes (10 September 2020)
online: https://perma.cc/6TBT-9W9N.

128

businesses,420 the neutralization of sales taxes otherwise charged on physical goods,421 and the
elimination of payroll taxes due to local job losses.422 Global economic digitalization also poses
major challenges from a tax administration perspective due to the transformation in business
structures and the huge dependence on intellectual property and intangible assets, as well as the
vanishment of physical borders between countries.423
In the specific context of international taxation, technical limits in the subsisting international tax
regime allow for significant base erosion from trade conducted through the digital economy.424
Non-resident entities operating remotely from one country can leverage digital technology to
derive significant income from other countries without having to trigger the thresholds of physical
presence (under subsisting international tax rules) that would ordinarily render such income
taxable in the source country.425 As noted in chapter 2, the current international tax rules, which
allocate taxing rights between states, were drawn in the early to mid-20th century, long before the

420

See Vijay Govindarajan et al, “The Problem with France’s Plan to Tax Digital Companies,” Harvard Business
Review (17 July 2019), online: https://hbr.org/2019/07/the-problem-with-frances-plan-to-tax-digital-companies.
421
Ibid.
422
Ibid. See also Policy Horizons Canada, “The Next Digital Economy” (20 June 2019), online:
https://horizons.gc.ca/en/2019/06/20/the-next-digital-economy/ Although digitalization has a diminishing effect on
conventional jobs when digital services are delivered remotely, digitalization also has the effect of creating many new
jobs; Karim Sabbagh et al, “Digitization for Economic Growth and Job Creation: Regional and Industry Perspectives”,
World Economic Forum (2013) online: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GITR/2013/GITR_Chapter1.2_2013.pdf. The
problem in the present case is that those new jobs are largely based overseas, which means that they are outside the
tax net of the local authorities.
423
Association of Chartered Certified Accounts (ACCA), “Technology Tools and the Future of Tax Administration’,
Research Insight Report” (13 December 2018) online: https://perma.cc/2MSM-TBKG at 12-20.
424
Rifat Azam, “Global Taxation of Cross-Border E-Commerce Income” (2012) 31:4 Va Tax Rev 639 at 652; Gianni
supra note 406 at 277.
425
See Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Three Steps Forward, One Step Back? Reflections on “Google Taxes” and the
Destination-Based Corporate Tax”, (2016) 2 Nordic Tax J 69. See Jean-Louis Medus, “Proposals to Regulate Digital
Business: Some Critical Comments”, (2017) J Int’l Tax 35 [“One main characteristic of digital business is the crossborder dissemination of assets through various jurisdictions and a sort of fragmentation of activities entailing a taxoptimized location of profits and permitting digital companies through treaty shopping to avoid establishing a
permanent establishment (PE) (thus subject to taxation) in consumer markets, and to attribute the main part of profits
to specific entities and jurisdictions (especially those providing IP (intellectual property)-favorable tax regimes”]; Ana
Paula Dourado, “The OECD Report on Pillar One Blueprint and Article 12B in the UN Report” (2021) 49:1 Intertax
1 at 1 [“Enterprises of one contracting state are increasingly providing substantial services to customers in the other
contracting state and maintaining a significant economic presence there without having any fixed place of business
and without being present in that state for any substantial period of time”.].

129

digital transformation of international trade.426 Those rules allow a source state to tax only the
business profits of a non-resident entity if that entity has a permanent establishment in the source
state and derives income through its operations in the permanent establishment.427 The permanent
establishment rule simply does not envisage the taxation of business profits that are derived
remotely and, thus, allows such business profits to escape taxation in the source country. 428 A
common recognition of these shortfalls in the existing rules has led states to converge to try to
develop a framework that addresses the problems of taxing rights allocation in the digital
economy.429
3.3 A New Global Tax Deal: The OECD BEPS Pillar One Compromise
The tax challenges posed by digitalization have been recognized by states since the e-commerce
revolution of the 1990s.430 However, in the first two decades of those challenges, states took a
generally passive approach, perhaps on a presumption that the taxation of cross-border ecommerce would not result in substantial revenue losses for high tax states. 431 This collective
attitude changed remarkably after the global financial crisis of 2008, which left the global
economy in dire straits.432 The appetite to reform the international tax rules coalesced around
that time. As a result, since 2012 states have gathered mainly on the platform of the OECD, to
tackle various international taxation problems, including those directly related to the digital
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economy.433 The OECD BEPS report of 2015 identifies the digital tax problem as a crucial priority
of the modern international tax reform agenda.434 Action 1 of the BEPS report provides a detailed
outline of the tax challenges associated with global economic digitalization.435 Pursuant to this
framework, the OECD has had cause to consider several proposals for taxing the digital economy.
These include the significant economic presence (SEP), equalization levy, user participation, and
marketing intangibles proposals.436 Any proposal so considered seeks to identify a new justifiable
nexus for the taxation of business profits derived by a non-resident entity through the digital
economy, i.e., derived without meeting the existing requirements of the permanent establishment
nexus.
Briefly, the SEP nexus would entitle the jurisdiction where users reside to tax the income of a nonresident enterprise where that enterprise has a sustained economic interaction with the jurisdiction
through the digital media.437 Sustained economic interaction may be ascertained by reference to a
number of factors, including the amount of revenue derived from the jurisdiction (revenue factors),
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the extent of engagement with users or user data in the jurisdiction (user-based factors), the
engagement with users through digital means, such as a localized domain name, website or digital
payment platform (digital-based factor), or any combination of these factors.438
The user participation model recognizes that soliciting the sustained engagement and active
participation of users is a crucial component of value creation for highly digitalized businesses.
The proposal, therefore, regards the users as a sufficient connection between the non-resident,
highly digitalized business and the state where those users are located, which, therefore, should
entitle the state to tax this value.439
The marketing intangibles proposal recognizes that business entities exploit marketing intangibles
– as distinct from production intangibles – to penetrate a foreign jurisdiction either remotely or
through a limited local presence. This proposal regards the use of marketing intangibles in a foreign
jurisdiction as creating an intrinsic link between the entity and the market jurisdiction. This link
should, therefore, allow the market state to tax.440
The equalization levy is a withholding tax that may be charged on the sales of non-resident
digitalized businesses as a means of addressing potential disparities in tax obligations between
domestic business and non-resident digitalized businesses.441 It seems that the objective of the
equalization levy lies somewhere in between neutrality and equity.442
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Between 2016 and 2021, more than 130 states (and jurisdictions), under the OECD/G20 Inclusive
Framework, were locked in complex negotiations towards a consensus-based global deal that
would alter the allocation of international taxing rights to fit the digital economy. 443 The planned
alterations would make MNEs liable to tax on profits made in countries where they have significant
sales (and possibly users) even without the physical presence (permanent establishment) that is
traditionally required.444 These negotiations progressed until their most concrete stage yet in 2021
when states reached a consensus on such a deal: a “Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax
Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy”.445 As at November 2021, no fewer
than 137 states (and jurisdictions), representing more than 90% of the global economy, had signed
up to the compromise framework.446 Of the two pillars, Pillar One aims to resolve the tax
challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy by altering the existing (physical) nexus
and profit allocation rules as they apply to a defined category of MNEs, while Pillar Two aims to
limit international tax competition, the so called “race to the bottom”, by establishing a global
minimum tax rate – eventually 15% – that would ensure that MNEs pay their “fair share” of tax
regardless of the tax planning arrangements that they undertake.447 Although both pillars raise
443
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inter-nation equity concerns, this chapter discusses only the Pillar One aspect of the deal because
of its more direct focus on digitalization and its direct objective of taxing rights allocation.448
3.3.1 Basic Details
Pillar One aims to adapt international tax rules to the realities of the modern economy, which is
highly impacted by digitalization, by allowing “market jurisdictions” (market state or destination
state) to tax the profits of MNEs regardless of whether the MNEs maintain a threshold physical
presence there. Pillar One has three components, labelled ‘Amount A’ (a framework for the
allocation of taxing rights to market jurisdictions) ‘Amount B’ (a framework for the allocation
of revenue with regard to certain marketing and distribution activities physically occurring in a
market jurisdiction) and ‘Amount C’ (a dispute resolution mechanism for Amount A).
Amount A – the focus of this discussion – provides a basis to tax the “residual profits” (or nonroutine profits) of the largest and most profitable MNEs. A specified portion of residual profits
of such MNEs would be taxable in the countries where the customers are located or where goods
and services are used or consumed, i.e., the “market jurisdictions”. 449 Residual profit is defined
as profit in excess of 10% of revenue. 450 That portion of an MNE’s profit that is allocated to
market states as residual profit is referred to as “Amount A”. This is distinct from routine or nonresidual profits – technically, profits not exceeding 10% of revenue – that remains taxable under
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normal business profits taxation rules (i.e., the permanent establishment and arm’s length
principles).
Amount B has two functions. First, it is intended to enhance simplicity for tax administrators in
the administration of transfer pricing rules and to ease compliance costs for taxpayers. 451 Second,
it is intended to facilitate tax certainty and limit controversy between tax administrators and
taxpayers in the application of transfer pricing rules. 452 To achieve these dual objectives, Amount
B will allocate a “fixed return” to related party distributors that perform “baseline marketing and
distribution activities” in the market jurisdiction (source country). 453 The market jurisdiction can
then tax this fixed return according to its own laws. 454 The fixed return is an arbitrary
remuneration rate that is intended to deliver a result that closely mirrors one that is determined
in accordance with the arm’s length principle. 455 Thus, what is stipulated as a fixed return in each
case may be determined with consideration given to the specific industry or region.456
Provisions are also made for tax administration, dispute resolution, and double taxation relief,
with respect to Amount A. In the first case, provision will be made to ease compliance burdens
for MNEs, including allowing an MNE group to manage the process through a single entity.457
As regards dispute resolution, the deal contains a mandatory and binding dispute prevention and
settlement framework that ensures tax certainty for taxpayers. Some low-capacity countries,
however, enjoy some elective rights to use the dispute resolution system. 458
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The deal aims to eliminate double taxation on profits allocated to market jurisdictions by using
either the credit or exemption method. Credit or exemption will be granted to the entity (or
entities) that bears the tax burden, i.e.., the entity that earns residual profit. 459
By 2022, the OECD plans to produce texts for a Multilateral Convention to implement “Amount
A” of Pillar One, as well as Model rules for domestic legislation for the implementation of Pillar
One. This is part of a Detailed Implementation Plan that was agreed to fully establish the rules
and instruments required to bring the Two-Pillar Solution into effect by 2023. 460
In terms of revenue output, the OECD expects Pillar One to reallocate taxing rights on more than
US$125billion of profit to market jurisdictions each year. 461
3.3.2 Scope
The residual profit tax regime introduced under Pillar One 462 is intended to apply to “in-scope
companies”, i.e., MNEs with “global turnover above €20 billion and profitability above 10%
(i.e. profit before tax/revenue) calculated using an averaging mechanism.” 463 The plan is to
reduce the turnover threshold to €10 billion, following a successful implementation of the deal,
including the tax certainty provisions on Amount A. A review of the implementation status is
stipulated to begin 7 years after the agreement comes into force and should be completed within
a year.464 There is a carveout for companies in Extractives and Regulated Financial Services. 465
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The reason given for these exclusions is that the tax policy problems that Pillar One attempts to
resolve are not presented by these business models:
The aim of the Two-Pillar Solution is to make sure that MNEs can’t take advantage of
the old rules on international tax to avoid paying their fair share and the new rules are
designed to capture and address this problem. The exclusions provided for relate to types
of profit and activities that are not part of this problem either because the profit is already
tied to the place where it is earned (for example, regulated financial services and mining
companies will have to have their operations in the place where they earn their income)
or the activity benefits from different taxation regimes due to their specific nature (such
as shipping companies and pension funds). These types of businesses are still subject to
all the other international tax standards on transparency and BEPS to ensure that tax
authorities can tax them effectively. 466
One observation to make here is that an earlier push by some countries was for Pillar One to
cover taxation of “digital business models” or “highly digitalised (global) businesses” – mainly
Automated Digital Services” (ADS). 467 Other countries favoured a broader scoping that would
cover both ADS and “Consumer Facing Businesses” (CFB). 468 The absence of political
consensus on this issue hampered a global solution. That idea of business line scoping, which
would ringfence “highly digitalised businesses”, was eventually jettisoned in favour of the
current quantitative scoping model, mainly because of the difficulty of ascertaining what
businesses appropriately fall into (or out of) a “highly digitalised businesses” category, in a
global economy where almost every business model actively – and increasingly – exploits digital
technology.469 The quantitative scoping model also accounts for the fact that the Pillar One
reform has always targeted the most profitable MNEs, those who are often seen as the chief
466
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beneficiaries of the global trading system, including the subsisting taxing rights allocation
rules.470
The broad scoping language of Pillar One leaves a great variety of business types within scope.
In February 2022, the OECD provided some pinpoint guidance on the business types that are
within scope when it published a consultation document on the Draft Model Rules for Nexus
and Revenue Sourcing (2022 Draft Model Rules). 471 The 2022 Draft Model Rules identifies a
wide variety of market end business activities that would entitle the market state to tax an MNE’s
residual profits: location-specific services; advertising services; online intermediation services;
transport services; customer reward programs; other business to business (B2B) and business to
customer (B2C) services, including financing; license or alienation of intangible property; real
property; revenues from government grants; and non-customer revenues.472 A non-resident
entity that earns income from any of these sources would be subject to tax in the market state
regardless of whether it has any physical presence there.
The 2022 Draft Model Rules also provide definitional guidance for each of the mentioned
activities. For instance, “advertising service” is defined as “the provision or facilitation of
advertising and includes services for the purchase, storage and distribution of advertising
messages, and for advertising monitoring and performance measurement”. 473 Advertising
service comprises online and non-online forms. The rules do not specify the distinction between
the two identified forms of advertising services, but, instead, note that the distinction will be
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provided in a forthcoming commentary. 474 However, with regard to non-online advertising, the
source indicator rules refer to “advertisements displayed on a billboard or at another fixed site”,
“advertisements displayed in newspapers, magazines, journals or other publications”, and
“advertisements displayed on television or broadcast on radio.” Thinking by elimination, these
references imply that advertisements conveyed through these media do not qualify as “online
advertising”.
Conversely, there is suggestion that an online advertisement is one that can be viewed475 as well
as “clicked” on.476 This means that internet-based advertisements that can be clicked on are
within scope. There is no mention of internet-based advertisements conveyed by sound, such as
those that interject music or podcast streaming. It may be the case that such sound-conveyed
advertising services fall out of scope, perhaps, because their mode of conveyance does not
provide opportunity for the listener to “click” on the advertisement, which, perhaps, makes it
impossible to ascertain consumer response – an apparent requirement for revenue sourcing.
Another important business covered by Pillar One is online intermediation service. The 2022
Draft Model Rules defines online intermediation service as “the provision of an online platform
to enable users to sell, lease, advertise, display or otherwise offer goods or services to other users
provided the revenues derived from the service are dependent on the conclusion of transactions
between users of the service.” 477 It is also stated that online intermediation service “does not
include the online sale of goods and services of the platform’s own inventory”. 478 Online
intermediation service, therefore, provides a platform for third party users to interact and trade
474
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in tangible goods, digital goods, digital services, and offline services. 479 Really, online
intermediation service functions as an interaction between two business entities and one
customer. One business entity, the platform owner/intermediation service provider, combines
with another business entity, the third-party supplier, to deliver tangible goods, digital goods,
digital services, and offline services to end users or consumers on the platform. In exchange for
providing the connection, the first mentioned business entity earns compensation in the form of
commission, listing or subscription fees. 480 It is this compensation that is subject to tax in the
market state.
The 2022 Draft Model Rules expressly include revenue derived from a transaction for the
licensing, sale, or other alienation of intangible property, as well as user data, within the scope
of Pillar One. It defines “intangible property” as “property which is not in a tangible form and
which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities but does not
include financial assets, digital goods, user data or computer programs that benefit from the
protection for computer programs covered by the WIPO Copyright Treaty. It includes
copyrights, trademarks, tradenames, logos, designs, patents, know-how and trade secrets.”481
Intangible property may be transacted in several ways. It may be used to support a service; it
may be the component of a finished good; or it may be attached to a copyrighted work. 482
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In addition to the services that are specifically mentioned, the 2022 Draft Model Rules also
makes a general inclusion of B2B and B2C services within the scope of Pillar One. B2B service
is defined as a service that is provided to a business customer, apart from transactions in
intangible property.483 An example is a cloud computing service that is provided by an MNE to
another entity for the latter’s use as part of its business. B2C service is simply defined as a
service that is provided to consumers. 484 It would include, for instance, CFBs, i.e., a type of
business where an MNE generates revenue from the sale of goods or services of a type commonly
sold to consumers, in this sense, to individuals (end users) that purchase items for personal use
and not for commercial or professional purposes.485
3.3.3 Nexus
In a limited deviation from traditional nexus rules, Pillar One creates a new “special purpose
nexus rule” that permits allocation of taxing rights to a market jurisdiction (sales-based), with
respect to Amount A, regardless of the (non)existence of a permanent establishment. However,
the nexus is qualified by a threshold that limits the right of a market state to tax the profits of an
in-scope MNE to only situations where the MNE derives revenue of at least €1 million from that
state. This threshold is lowered to €250,000 for “smaller jurisdictions”, i.e., jurisdictions with
GDP lower than 40 billion euros.486 The special purpose nexus rule applies only for the purpose
of determining whether a jurisdiction qualifies for the Amount A allocation. 487 It is implied that
the purpose of the thresholds is to limit compliance costs, especially for MNEs, as well as for
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tax authorities who may, otherwise, have to expend limited resources tracing small amounts of
sales.488
3.3.4 Profit Allocation
Pillar One specifies that 25% of the “residual profit” – i.e., profit in excess of 10% of revenue –
will be split among market jurisdictions. Each market jurisdiction would be allocated a share of
the MNE’s residual profit that is proportionate to the quantum of overall revenue that is sourced
from that jurisdiction.489
3.3.5 Revenue Sourcing
Profit is allocated to a market jurisdiction based on the quantum of an MNE’s revenue that is
sourced from that jurisdiction. It is, therefore, necessary to develop sound methodologies for
sourcing income to the specific market jurisdictions where the goods or services supplied by an
MNE are sold to customers. The OECD recognizes that sourcing functions need to be performed
by the in-scope MNE, based on the factual nature of its business. For this reason, Pillar One
includes a mandate for development of “detailed source rules for specific categories of
transactions”.490 The rules will require an in-scope MNE that is applying them to use a “reliable
method” that is based on “the MNE’s specific facts and circumstances”. 491
In accordance with this mandate, detailed sourcing rules are now provided in the 2022 Draft
Model Rules. The rules define “revenue” as “the Total Revenues of a Group after the exclusion
of Revenues derived from Extractive and Regulated Financial Services.” 492 “Total Revenues”
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refers to “the Revenues reported in the MNE’s Group Consolidated Financial Statements
prepared in accordance with an Acceptable Financial Accounting Standard, after applying the
agreed adjustments to the tax base, as relevant”. 493
The Draft Model Rules contains distinct revenue sourcing rules for different types of income
yielding activity. For instance, in the case of finished goods sold to a final customer, the market
jurisdiction is the place where the finished goods are delivered.494 Closely related to finished
goods, in the case of revenue derived from a transaction for the sale of components, the market
jurisdiction is the place of delivery of the finished good that embodies the component. 495 For
online advertising, revenue is sourced to the jurisdiction where the viewer of the advertisement
is located.496 For online intermediation services that facilitate the sale or purchase of tangible
goods, digital goods or digital services, the revenue is split in equal half between the location of
the purchaser and the seller of the goods or services that are sold via the intermediation
platform.497 This means that where the purchaser and the seller are located in one state, that state
becomes the sole market jurisdiction, entitled to tax the entire market-allocated profit. For
intangible property, the sourcing requirements differ according to circumstance. Where the
intangible property supports the provision of a service, the market jurisdiction is the place of use
of the service.498 In other cases, the market jurisdiction is the place of use of the intangible
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property by the final customer.499 Revenue derived from the licensing, sale or other alienation
of user data is sourced to the jurisdiction where the user associated with the data is located.500
There are similar destination-based sourcing rules for transport services, customer reward
programs, the provision of financing and other non-specified B2B and B2C services, real
property, government grants, and non-customer revenues.501
3.4

Evaluation of the OECD Pillar One Compromise

Every international tax compromise that allocates taxing rights arouses concerns of inter-nation
equity. The same assessment can be made of the evolving multilateral compromise on Pillar
One. As I referenced in the previous section, Pillar One has been accepted as a compromise by
nearly 140 states (and jurisdictions), constituting over 90% of the world economy. However,
there are still noticeable agitations about its distributional fairness, especially to LIDCs and,
consequent to that, a few Inclusive Framework participating states, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka, have shown reluctance to endorse the deal. 502 In view of the fairness questions
trailing Pillar One, this section undertakes an equity-based evaluation of the compromise, as
presently constituted, using the RIC framework. The first question that I address is whether and
when an LIDC has jurisdiction to tax the income of an MNE that is derived from that MNE’s
participation in the digital economy, i.e., without a physical presence in the taxing state. The
second question is whether the Pillar One compromise impairs or has the potential to impair the
tax jurisdiction of LIDCs. Finally, this section addresses the reasonableness of any adjudged
impairment that the compromise imposes on the tax jurisdiction of LIDCs.
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3.4.1 Jurisdiction to Tax the Income of Non-Residents in the Digital Economy
Pillar One proposes to recognize a new form of taxing rights for the market jurisdiction on top
of the existing nexus and profit allocation rules that rely on activities taking place through a
physical presence in a jurisdiction. 503 The idea underlying this proposition is that the location of
sales, i.e., the market jurisdiction, contributes to value creation for MNEs.504 This
conceptualization has sparked scholarly debate over whether there is normative justification for
the proposed new taxing right. 505 It seems to me that there are two interconnected issues at play
here. The first is whether the concept of market jurisdiction is a new form of tax jurisdiction that
is unique or distinct from existing conceptualization of source tax jurisdiction. The second
borders on the nature of activities that can be deemed to create a justifiable nexus for a state to
tax as a market jurisdiction.
In my view, the first issue is relatively straightforward. The often-called “new taxing right”506
does not require a unique form of theoretical justification. This is because it hinges on wellestablished grounds of tax jurisdiction: economic allegiance (mainly) and the benefits principle,
both of which intersect with the newer concept of value creation. 507 As far as economic allegiance
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goes, the 1923 Report remains unimpeached in its recognition of the market as a vital component
of the origin of income and, therefore, a basis for taxation:
In the attempt to discover the true meaning of economic allegiance, it is clear that there
are three fundamental considerations: that of (i) production of wealth; that of (2)
possession of wealth; that of (3) disposition of wealth… By production of wealth we
mean all the stages which are involved up to the point of the wealth coming to fruition,
that is, all the stages up to the point when the physical production has reached a complete
economic destination and can be acquired as wealth. The oranges upon the trees in
California are not acquired wealth until they are picked, and not even at that stage until
they are packed, and not even at that stage until they are transported to the place where
demand exists and until they are put where the consumer can use them. These stages, up
to the point where wealth reaches fruition, may be shared in by different territorial
authorities.508
The language used by the four economists in the fundamental 1923 Report leaves no doubt as to
the relevance of the market jurisdiction nexus. Clearly the production of wealth involves both
the supply side (manufacturing, production, and transportation to the market) and the demand
side (purchase and consumption).509 The production of wealth can be broken into four segments:
(1) the on-site production input; (2) the high-level entrepreneurial input; (3) the transportation
of good or service between stages of production; and (4) the sale of good or services at the end
market.510 It is emphatically stated that “no one of these four elements can be omitted without
ruining the efforts of the other three and spoiling the whole apparatus for the production of
wealth.”511 The state where customers are located is an integral part of the wealth creation chain,
such that without the customer base, the non-resident entity’s goods or services bear no economic
value whatsoever.512 After all, there might be no market for a product in its country of design,
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but a great market for it elsewhere. 513 It is, therefore, beyond doubt that the concept of market
jurisdiction, being a component of source jurisdiction, is not nascent. It follows a constant
underlying principle that a sovereign state is entitled to tax all persons, activities, or things that
are within its territory.514 I am of the firm view that these original principles contemplate taxation
by a state in whose territory the sale/use of goods or services occur (market jurisdiction), since
such sale/use can be deemed to contribute to the creation of wealth for the responsible enterprise,
regardless of that enterprise’s physical location. 515
However, as I have also been keen to espouse, the underlying principles of tax jurisdiction are
not always identical with the nexus thresholds that states establish for the actual exercise of tax
jurisdiction. This is certainly the case with regard to the taxation of business profits of a nonresident entity. Largely for reasons of political feasibility and administrative convenience, states
established a compromise that has, historically, limited a source state’s exercise of tax
jurisdiction to only those situations where wealth creating activities are carried out through a
physical nexus, i.e., a permanent establishment or fixed base. 516 States also agreed – and
reaffirmed – that only production activities on the supply side would ground the exercise of
source tax jurisdiction.517 Naturally, this compromise eliminated market-based or demand side
activities as an active component of the exercise of source tax jurisdiction. Such a compromise
made sense in the brick-and-mortar economy when significant cross-border economic activities
were mostly carried out through some form of physical engagement with the foreign source
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country. Those were the pre-digitalization years. In my view, even though digitalization has
transformed the landscape of cross-border economic engagement, allowing for significant
economic activities to undermine the established physical nexus, no such violence is done to the
original underlying principles of tax jurisdiction. Therefore, the notion that Pillar One “creates”
a new taxing right is correct only to the extent that Pillar One revives the exercise of an aspect
of source tax jurisdiction – the market jurisdiction – that has been left dormant. It does not
warrant a reimagination of the underlying economic-political logic of jurisdiction, as Vella &
Devereux rightly observe:
The income being allocated among countries owes as much to the market as it owes to
the various parts of the supply chain. Income depends on the price charged at the point
where supply and demand meet: it simply would not have arisen in the absence of a
market. It is not entirely clear why the international corporate tax system should depart
from a simple and uncontroversial economic understanding of value creation. 518
Accordingly, the only factor that stands to change is the way that states choose to apply the
original/underlying principles of tax jurisdiction, i.e., the thresholds that they choose to abide
by. In the era of digitalization, it does not seem sensible for states to continue to ignore the
demand side of wealth creation when asserting tax jurisdiction. Even the U.S. Supreme Court
has declared in recent time that keeping a rule that exempts out-of-state vendors from collecting
and remitting sales tax on their in-state sales because the vendors themselves do not maintain a
physical presence in the state has become unsound and progressively “becomes removed from
economic reality” when one considers the technological changes that now exist. 519
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Thus, the incorporation of “market jurisdiction” merely reflects a readjustment of the
compromise nexus thresholds that states perceive as sensible for the exercise of source tax
jurisdiction rather than a shift in the underlying principles which they understand as conferring
the right to tax.520 The pervasive shift from the traditional physical presence nexus to a demandside, market-based or destination-based nexus reflects states’ discontent with the emergent
distributional implications of the former521 and, therefore, a reaffirmation of the market
engagement (in-bound sales conducted remotely through digitalized means) as sufficient nexus for
taxation.522 This shift of approach is backed by another well-established theoretical justification:
the benefit principle.523 It has been said, on this point, that “market jurisdictions” provide service
to MNEs through maintaining a market for the goods and services of MNEs, which, thus, entitles
the state to tax a portion of the MNE’s market-based (not entire) profit.524 Market-based profit is
said to derive from an MNE taking advantage of the market that is maintained by governments
through investing in the legal, physical, digital and other infrastructures.525 While an MNE may
not be physically present in a state, it is able to project itself into the economic life of that state
through the digital infrastructure and user market that are maintained there, which it exploits for
profit.526 In support of the benefit principle as a basis for source state taxation in the digital
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economy, Cai & Li argue that “a market jurisdiction can, by all means, tax foreign exporting
companies on the grounds that those companies benefit from its market accesses”.527 Likewise,
Elliffe identifies five major perspectives of source country contribution to the conduct of
digitalized business in its territory:
•

•

•

•

•

the contribution to the business environment and economy: this includes the general
business confidence, corruption and law and order, affluence and ability to consume.
Often goods and services purchased by a resident in the source country are then consumed
either in the production of further business activities (requiring a viable fiscal
environment) or in private consumption (requiring a consumer with spending power);
the contribution to the technological infrastructure: this includes suitable
telecommunications infrastructure, Wi-Fi and broadband, and a population with
appropriate devices (computers and smartphones);
the contribution to the legal system: this includes providing reliance to enforce payment
for transactions, uphold intellectual property rights (such as trademarks), and maintain a
competitive and conducive business environment. The protection of intellectual property
rights (for example in the case of computer software) is critical to vendors of intangible
products and digitalised services. The ability to deal with fraudulent and criminal
behaviour is also important as are consumer protection laws;
the contribution to infrastructure: modern infrastructure to allow physical delivery of
goods in a timely and protected way, provision for waste disposal for packaging
materials;
the contribution of users to the digital business: this may take many forms but include the
role of users and social media (designing or providing content), the contribution
individuals make to the network effect (family, followers and friends), the provision of
assets and services as part of the sharing economy (either physically located or physically
performed in the source jurisdiction), the process of review, validation and assessment
(on services or goods), etc. 528
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pays reach these several governments which render him service?”529 I would also add, however,
that the existence of discernible benefits provided the non-resident by the market state is not a
prerequisite for the market state to tax outbound income.530 The mere existence of some form of
economic allegiance would suffice.
The second question – whether a particular activity that can be deemed to create a justifiable
nexus for taxation as a market state – is more controversial and requires both qualitative and
quantitative analyses. It requires some examination of the type of activity that is taking place
and the degree of its existence that would justify the market state asserting the right to tax. This
question is especially relevant with regard to the taxation of business income that hinges on the
participation of users – as against sale to customers – in the wealth creation process of MNEs.
For instance, from a qualitative angle, one might ask whether a state should be entitled to tax
revenue from online advertising viewed by its residents when it is a non-resident third-party –
rather than those residents – that pays for the advertising. Quantitatively, one might ask whether
any sort of user data collection from a jurisdiction creates justifiable nexus for the exercise of
taxing rights or whether it only makes sense to tax if the MNE has a “sustained engagement”
with users in the state and does commercially exploit the collected data.
I should emphasize that my venture into this issue is, as far as Pillar One is concerned, academic.
This is because of the broad scope of business activities that Pillar One covers. Because Pillar
One applies to all business models – beside the extractive industry and regulated financial
services carveouts – it seems implicit that all business models qualify for residual profits
reallocation, provided that they also meet the other scoping requirements. My view is that such
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a wholesale application of Pillar One may in some cases be inconsistent with the concept of
market jurisdiction, as envisaged in the 1923 Report. It seems to me that what was contemplated
as market jurisdiction is jurisdiction based upon the location of sale/consumption of goods or
services. This connotes some incorporation of destination principle. 531 It seems that market
jurisdiction, as an aspect of origin or source jurisdiction, is conceptually limited to the location
of sale to customers rather than the place where supply side activities take place. Therefore, in
the context of digitalization, the right to tax as a market state should only accrue to a state where
the sale/consumption of goods or services (supplied through the medium or with the facilitation
of digitalization) is located. This ‘narrow’ view of market jurisdiction does not seem to accord
with the scope of Pillar One. Instead, Pillar One appears to contemplate a broader view of market
jurisdiction which incorporates the user jurisdiction. 532
To use a few examples, starting on the affirmative side, it seems sensible to attribute marketbased taxing rights to a state where an MNE derives revenue from the provision of online
intermediation services. The revenue earned from this service is sourced from end users of the
platform who make purchases of goods or services sold on the platform from third parties. In
this case, the MNE’s revenue, whether as commission, listing or subscription fees, derives from
payments by end users or customers on the platform. Therefore, the state where those users or
customers are located can rightly be regarded as the market state.
Similarly, I reason that market-based taxing rights allocation rightly attaches to the taxation of
income derived from the trade of intangible property to residents of a state, as the 2022 Draft
531
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Model Rules contemplate. 533 This is because revenue is sourced to the location of use of the
intangible property by the MNE’s final customers. 534 Payment for the intangible property would
in such situations, be ordinarily attributable to the final customers who are resident in the market
state. Therefore, the taxing right of the market state is discernible.
The same logic applies to the sale of finished goods or components of finished goods. In either
case, the tax base (revenue) is traceable to the place of delivery, which is deemed the location of
the final customer paying for the good or component. It, therefore, makes sense that the state
where that final customer is located – i.e., where the good or component is delivered – is entitled
to tax the outbound revenue, as a market state.
In each of the foregoing cases, tax nexus is established by the presence or participation of the
non-resident MNE in the economic life of the market state through the sale of goods or services
to customers located there. 535 All that may then be settled (by unilateral or negotiated
compromise) is the question of how much of a presence (threshold) should exist before the
market state can exercise its vested tax jurisdiction. Some thinkers would say that the economic
presence should be “significant” or “sustained”. 536 Others assert that the market state should
exercise jurisdiction only when the non-resident MNE “actively intervenes and benefits from
that state’s infrastructure in order to create value for itself.” 537
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I am less convinced about the vesting of market-based jurisdiction with respect to activities such
as online advertising service and the license or transfer of user data – to the extent that both
predicate nexus on user participation alone. The sourcing rules of Pillar One attribute revenue
from online advertising service to the state where the viewer of advertisement is located. 538
However, it is not the viewers of advertisement that pay for advertisement service. Rather it is a
third-party customer, usually another business entity, that pays the MNE (digital platform
operator) to advertise its products or services to users of the platform (viewers). The advertising
customer, like the MNE, may be located in a state that is entirely different from the users/viewers.
For this reason, I am of the view that it is the state where the advertising service customer is
located, from where payments for advertising service emanate, that may be properly termed the
“market jurisdiction”. It is a customer located in that state that the MNE markets its advertising
service to and receives taxable compensation from.
So, what could be the rationale for sourcing revenue from advertising to the jurisdiction where
viewers are located rather than where the customer is located? Online advertising is often tailored
to fit the interests, preferences, routines, and choices of its targeted viewers. 539 This increases
the potential that viewers would click on the advertisement and, therefore, access the products
and services advertised. Such precise advertising is achievable when the MNE (advertiser) is
able to collect and utilize the data of its users, as they interface with its digital platform (e.g.,
social media platforms and search engines). 540 It is for this reason that states and jurisdictions
like the United Kingdom and the European Union during the OECD Pillar One reform process
advocated the attribution of taxing rights to states where users reside under the user participation
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proposal.541 The user participation proposal became one of the metrics by which the OECD
gauges the attributability of taxing rights to a “market state”. 542
However, the fact that an MNE manages to collect troves of data from users of its platform and
exploits that data to tailor their advertising viewership does not make them (users/viewers)
customers of the MNE. Rather, as stated above, the advertising arrangement is between the MNE
and a third-party customer which pays to advertise its products or services, and which may not
share a common location with the viewers of advertisements. It, therefore, does not seem entirely
logical to attribute market-based taxing rights to the state where the users/viewers are located.
I should stress that I do not contend that the state where viewers of advertisement reside is
entirely bereft of basis to tax online advertising revenue. I am only not convinced that such a
state can be characterized as a “market jurisdiction”. Undoubtedly, user data has become a
valuable resource for online advertising companies.543 For this reason, it is arguable that user
data can be treated as a resource of commercial value, which is integral to the value chain of
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online advertisers. It is also arguable that a state from where user data is collected is a source
state, i.e., a state that contributes to wealth creation for the MNE by providing a resource of
value.544 This is especially so in a situation of “sustained user relationship” which can be
harnessed consistently for data mining. 545
Ideally, perhaps, user data should be treated as a unique resource, somewhat like extractives or
agricultural produce (like the classic example of the oranges picked in California), but with
understanding that not all the data that an MNE harvests would ultimately be commercially
utilizable.546 Therefore, a compromise may be formed at a juncture that enables the data origin
state to tax the resource only in the case of exploitation. Where the MNE exploits the resource
to enhance its own products or services, for instance, the data origin state may be entitled to tax
a proportionate share of the MNE’s income, since the data is, inferably, a contributor to value
creation for the MNE.547 On the other hand, where exploitation takes the form of third-party
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advertisement, taxation could mean, like Pillar One, taxing the fees earned by the advertiser, not
as a market state, but as a supply side state. This achieves the same purpose envisioned in Pillar
One without mischaracterizing the taxing state as a market jurisdiction. Importantly, this also
preserves the right of the actual market jurisdiction – the state where the online advertising
customer is located – to tax as such. In each of these cases, the overarching idea of economic
allegiance – or origin, as a subset – is maintained.
In the same vein, where a non-resident MNE harvested user data, through its digital platform
operated in a state, and then trades that data to a customer, it seems implicit that the data cache
is a resource of commercial value to the transacting MNE and the data origin state should,
therefore, be entitled to a share of the revenue derived from the trade. To my mind, the data
origin state does not qualify as a market jurisdiction, contrary to the implication of Pillar One, 548
unless where data is sold to a person in that state. Nevertheless, the data origin state retains a
right to tax the MNE’s revenue as a pre-market source state. In the case where data is sold
elsewhere, the data origin state is, in my view, a supply-side source jurisdiction but not a market
jurisdiction. The tax imposed on the data sale revenue, for instance, may be more appropriately
characterized as a data “collection” levy.
Perhaps, it may be argued in the alternative that an arrangement for advertising service between
an MNE and its paying customer is not complete until the advertising service is delivered.
Therefore, the state where the advertising service is delivered – i.e., where viewers are located
– can be regarded as a market state. 549 This is also a plausible, yet more remote sentiment, since
“supportive auxiliary function” for companies that do not perform targeted advertisement and data trading, and,
therefore, should not warrant the attribution of taxing rights to the market jurisdiction. See ibid at 310.
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viewers do not pay for advertisement. I am less inclined to embrace the idea that mere delivery
of advertising service without the concomitant flow of payment from the person to whom the
advertisement is delivered, or their privy in interest, qualifies the state of delivery as a market
state and, therefore, confers upon that state a right to tax as such.
In sum, it remains a solid principle that a state’s right to tax is an attribute of its sovereignty over
all taxable factors within its territory. Digitalization radically expands the capacity of a nonresident entity to engage in economic activities in a state without meeting the set nexus
thresholds for taxation and, to that extent, triggers a strong response by source states to reaffirm
and reassert their sovereign tax jurisdiction. If we remain faithful to the original (precompromise) principles of tax jurisdiction, as well articulated in the 1923 Report, we will easily
conclude that an LIDC, like any state, is entitled to tax income derived by a non-resident entity
from engagement in economic activities in the LIDC. This fundamental position abides even if
the non-resident entity engages remotely through a digital platform or merely carries out market
activities such as sale of goods and services, without establishing a physical presence in the
LIDC. Therefore, an LIDC taxing income from market activities, which it did not previously tax,
does not expand its underlying tax jurisdiction, but merely reasserts it, perhaps, to avert wanton
loss of revenue that may ensue from maintaining the subsisting nexus compromise.
Given that the underlying normative entitlement of a market state to tax is well-established in
the principles of international fiscal law, the spin-off issue in this section regards what business
activities warrant the exercise of market jurisdiction. My view is that market jurisdiction merely
encompasses taxation of market activity, i.e., sale to the user or customer. Any activity that is
not of this nature seems extraneous to the idea of market jurisdiction and may, instead be
conceptualized in some other way that justifies origin-based taxation. Yet, even if we view
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market jurisdiction in this limited way, it still amounts to a broadly significant embodiment of
tax jurisdiction, which, if fully exercised may substantially inundate cross-border digital trade,
hence the inevitable appeal of some level of restraint.
3.4.2 How Does the Pillar One Compromise Impair Source Tax Jurisdiction?
As broadly discussed in chapter 2, a sovereign state is entitled to limit its taxing rights, and many
states do so for a variety of reasons, including primarily to achieve the objective of double
taxation relief. If a state elects to limit the exercise of its tax jurisdiction, it may do so unilaterally
or enter into a bilateral or multilateral convention for that purpose. States have continued to
follow these principles even in the context of the digital economy. In recent years, even though
many states have pushed to assert their taxing jurisdiction over digital trade, those that have
enacted unilateral digital tax measures have at the same time unilaterally limited the exercise of
their taxing rights by stipulating taxability thresholds that exclude below threshold incomes from
taxation. For instance, a country that enacts a “significant economic presence” tax legislation
might aim to tax not just income from any sort of economic presence of non-residents in its
territory, but only economic presence that it deems to be of “significant” quantum.550 India’s
Finance Act of 2018, for instance, introduced taxation of income derived by non-resident entities
through digitalized business operations in India. 551 India's SEP regime covers activities that
include data or software downloads, user interaction, advertisements, and data sales. 552 However,
India also introduced nexus thresholds that limit application of the tax to only non-resident
persons deriving revenue in excess of INR20 million (approximately $280,000 U.S. dollars) or
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having a user base of over 300,000 (Indian users) in a given financial year. 553 These thresholds
are meant to be active from April 2022. 554
Countries that enact digital services tax (DST) legislation also include thresholds that limit the
exercise of their taxing rights. For instance, France’s proposed DST legislation would only tax
(at 3%) the profits of companies generating more than €750 million in global digital sales and
more than €25 million digital sales in France. 555 The estimation is that only 30 companies would
fall within that scope.556
Likewise, Spain’s proposed DST legislation that was adopted on 7 October 2020 applies a 3%
tax on specified digital services revenues derived from online advertising, intermediary services
and data transmission services. 557 The DST applies only to companies with worldwide revenues
higher than €750 million in the preceding calendar year and the total amount of their revenue
derived from the provision of digital services subject to tax exceeds €3 million in that year.558
Spain’s DST also lists various exempted activities. The exempted activities include:
The sale of goods or services contracted online, through the website of the provider of
those goods or services, in which the provider is not acting as an intermediary;” i.e., “the
retail activities of ‘electronic commerce’”; “The facilitation of underlying supply of
goods or services directly between users, within the framework of an online intermediary
service;” “The provision of online intermediary services, when the sole or main purpose
of said services provided by the entity that makes a digital interface available is to provide
digital content to users or provide communication or payment services;” “The provision
of financial services regulated by regulated financial entities;” “The provision of data
transmission services, when they are carried out by regulated financial entities;” “The
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provision of digital services when they are carried out between entities that are part of a
group with a, direct or indirect, 100 percent ownership. 559
The unilateral measures discussed above all contain self-imposed limits of taxing rights. The
thresholds and exemptions define the extent to which each state is willing to exercise its taxing
rights and the activities that the state is willing to exempt from taxation. However, the unilateral
measures were mainly viewed as interim measures, to operate pending a multilateral solution, 560
and because states have such divergent ideas about what is the ideal limitation of source tax
jurisdiction that they are willing to entertain, Pillar One steps in as a compromise framework that
is designed to perform that tax jurisdiction restriction function on a multilateral basis. This
multilateralism bears the advantage of coherence and certainty.
As earlier stated, nearly 140 countries have accepted the taxing rights limitations introduced by
the Pillar One deal. What exactly are these limitations (impairments)?
There are few impairments worth mentioning here. They are mostly found in the scoping and
nexus prescriptions. First, Amount A is designed to apply to only MNEs with a global turnover
that exceeds €20 billion. Second, even for MNEs that meet the above €20 billion turnover
threshold, they cannot be taxed (under Pillar One) unless their profitability exceeds 10% of
turnover.561 Third, Amount A only reallocates residual profits, as against the total profits earned
by an MNE. Only a country where an MNE achieves a minimum turnover of €1 million can
participate in the residual profits of that MNE. Of course, for “smaller jurisdictions” – countries
with GDP lower than €40 billion – the participation threshold is lowered to €250,000.562 One
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can see important differences between the limits specified in Pillar One and the limits that some
countries have been willing to impose on their unilateral measures. For instance, the €20 billion
global turnover limit contrasts with the €750 million global turnover limit unilaterally proposed
or enacted by some OECD countries. The in-country revenue thresholds of €1 million and
€250,000 respectively also preclude a country from participating in an MNE’s residual profit
unless the threshold is met in that country. The profitability threshold of 10% also means that
even a country where an MNE has attained significant sales cannot exercise its right to tax if the
MNE’s overall profits do not exceed 10% of turnover. In other words, there is no “residual profit”
to tax. At a glance, these are restrictions that impair market state taxation.
3.4.3 A Three-Sided Reasonableness Analysis of the Pillar One Compromise
In this section I undertake a three-sided evaluation of the reasonableness of the Pillar One
compromise. The reasonableness test has various components. I consider that three of these
components – disparity of means, alternativity, and scope for non-tax benefits – are most fitting
for conducting a reasonableness assessment of Pillar One. The first test enables an assessment
of whether the compromise embodies sufficient consideration of the relative affluence of
participating countries and, therefore, their capacity to give up taxing rights. The second test
enables me to gauge the fairness of Pillar One against an alternative compromise that was also
recently developed by the OECD’s “rival” in tax policy formation, the UN. The third test enables
me to explore the potential non-tax benefits of the compromise and to ascertain whether they
justify or compensate for the “revenue sacrifice” that the compromise entails.
3.4.3.1 Disparity of Means
One way to gauge the fairness of the OECD Pillar One compromise is to examine the extent to
which it impairs the taxing rights of countries that one may consider less able to concede taxing
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rights. Pillar One makes a conspicuous concession to a certain category of LIDCs – “smaller
jurisdictions” – in respect of the level of nexus that might entitle such states to partake in the
exercise of market jurisdiction. The sum of €250,000 – the nexus threshold for “smaller
jurisdictions” – is only a quarter of the €1 million turnover threshold that is required for all other
countries. It seems evident, therefore, that a “disparity of means” consideration is embedded in
the architecture of the compromise. States with less means – measured in terms of GDP – suffer
a relatively small level of taxing rights impairment.
Pillar One defines “smaller jurisdictions” as countries with GDP lower than €40 billion. In US
dollar terms, the €40 billion amounts to roughly $45 billion. 563 Since the deal was reached in
2021, it can be assumed that the available GDP data at the time were from 2020. It seems
sensible, therefore, to examine the improvised $45 billion GDP benchmark against the backdrop
of countries’ 2020 GDP records. The aggregate global GDP estimate for 2020 is approximately
US$85 trillion.564 A few developed market economies like the U.S., China, Japan, The U.K.,
Germany, Canada, and France, as well as the likes of India, Russia, and Brazil account for a
large chunk of that amount.565 These countries’ GDPs are each well in excess of “$45 billion”,
which means that they all come within the €1 million turnover threshold.
On the other side, many LIDCs fall within the smaller jurisdiction classification and may,
therefore, take advantage of the disparity of means stipulation. 566 However, there are a good
number of LIDCs that fall into the general category. These countries, despite their relatively
“high” GDP are small market jurisdictions, which means that they are unlikely to retain
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significant taxing rights under the general category – examples are Nigeria and Kenya, two of
Africa’s most populous countries. 567 Nigeria’s 2020 GDP was roughly $429 billion while
Kenya’s was a little above $101 billion. 568 I am keen to point out Nigeria and Kenya because
both countries maintain a digital tax law, which underscores their eagerness to assert their tax
jurisdiction in the digital economy, and also because both countries are “dissenters” to the TwoPillar agreement (including Pillar One). These two dynamics are discussed below.
Nigeria introduced a digital tax into its domestic law through the Finance Act 2019, which was
subsequently complemented by the Finance Act 2021. 569 The two statutes amend subsection
13(2) of the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA), a statutory provision that governs the taxation
of business profits earned by non-resident companies in Nigeria.570 Nigeria’s digital tax
legislation is based on the SEP model. The amended paragraph 13(2)(c) of CITA stipulates that
the profits of a non-resident company from any trade or business shall be deemed to derive from
or be taxable in Nigeria where that company:
[t]ransmits, emits or receives signals, sounds, messages, images or data of any kind by
cable, radio, electromagnetic systems or any other electronic or wireless apparatus to
Nigeria in respect of any activity, including electronic commerce, application store, high
frequency trading, electronic data storage, online adverts, participative network platform,
online payments and so on, to the extent that the company has significant economic
presence in Nigeria and profit can be attributable to such activity.
A non-resident company is, therefore, liable to tax in Nigeria if it carries out business in Nigeria
through a designated electronic means, in so far as the company meets the required SEP threshold
in Nigeria and profit can be attributed to its Nigerian activities.
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The SEP threshold is not stipulated in the CITA. A ministerial order fulfills that purpose.
Pursuant to the Companies Income Tax (Significant Economic Presence) Order 2020 (SEP
Order) a non-resident company is deemed to have an SEP in Nigeria in any one of three ways:
(1) if its digital trade activities earn a turnover or income amounting to more than ₦25,000,000
(U.S.$60,000) in the relevant accounting year from an in-scope activity; (2) if it uses a Nigerian
domain name or registers a website address in Nigeria; or (3) if it has “a purposeful and sustained
interaction with persons in Nigeria by customising its digital page or platform to target persons
in Nigeria…”.571
With respect to enforcement, a newly added paragraph 30(b)(iia) of the CITA empowers the tax
authority to assess and charge an in-scope company (for a given year of assessment) “on such
fair and reasonable percentage of that part of the turnover attributable to that presence” where
the true amounts of the company’s assessable profits cannot be ascertained. This provision grants
the tax authority discretion in applying a tax rate that it deems reasonable in the taxation of
income derived by a non-resident company. Nigeria’s Finance Minister has, during a budget
speech to the National Assembly, implied that the digital tax regime could result in a 6% turnover
tax assessment for non-resident companies.572
With Nigeria being an active member of the OECD Inclusive Framework throughout the
development of its digital tax legislation, the unilateral measures were designed to operate
pending its substitution by a multilateral compromise agreed at the OECD. 573
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Like Nigeria, Kenya introduced digital taxation in 2019. Kenya amended its Income Tax Act to
include a provision that taxes income generated through a “digital marketplace”. 574 Section 3 of
the Finance Act 2019, which amends section 3 of the Income Tax Act, defines “digital
marketplace” as “a platform that enables the direct interaction between buyers and sellers of
goods and services through electronic means.” 575 The Finance Act mandates the Cabinet
Secretary for national treasury and planning to make regulations to provide for the
implementation of the new tax regime. 576 In June 2020, Kenya enacted the Finance Act 2020 to
introduce further amendments to the Income Tax Act, including what the Act terms a “digital
service tax”. Section 4 of the Finance Act provides that:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a tax to be known as digital service
tax shall be payable by a person whose income from the provision of services is derived
from or accrues in Kenya through a digital market place:
Provided that a resident person or a non-resident person with a permanent establishment
in Kenya shall offset the digital service tax paid against the tax payable for that year of
income.
(2) The tax payable under subsection (1) shall be due at the time of the transfer of the
payment for the service to the service provider.
The tax rate for Kenya’s digital service tax is 1.5% of the gross transaction value. 577 Unlike what
obtains in some jurisdictions, including Nigeria, Kenya’s DST regime does not include a
turnover nexus threshold. DST paid by a resident or non-resident person with a permanent
establishment in the country may be offset against the person’s tax liability for the applicable
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year of assessment. However, DST paid by a non-resident person without a permanent
establishment in Kenya is the final tax for that person. 578
In December 2020, Kenya’s designated cabinet secretary issued a subsidiary legislation,
the Income Tax (Digital Service Tax) Regulations, 2020. The regulations connect the two
preceding statutory amendments by defining “digital service” as “any service that is delivered
or provided over a digital marketplace.” 579 The regulations also flesh out Kenya’s DST regime
by identifying a broad collection of activities that come within the scope of taxable digital
services. The in-scope activities include:
(a) downloadable digital content including downloadable mobile applications, e-books
and films; (b) over-the-top services including streaming television shows, films, music,
podcasts and any form of digital content; (c) sale of, licensing of, or any other form of
monetising data collected about Kenyan users which has been generated from the users’
activities on a digital marketplace; (d) provision of a digital marketplace; (e)
subscription-based media including news, magazines and journals; (f) electronic data
management including website hosting, online data warehousing, file-sharing and cloud
storage services; (g) electronic booking or electronic ticketing services including the
online sale of tickets; (h) provision of search engine and automated held desk services
including supply of customised search engine services; (i) online distance training
through pre-recorded media or e-learning including online courses and training; and (j)
any other service provided through a digital marketplace. 580
The law applies to every person (platform) that provides or facilitates the provision of a digital
service to a Kenya-based user.581 This includes a website and mobile application and covers any
business activities carried out over the internet or any electronic network, including traditional
electronic markets like eBay and social media like Facebook. 582 The regulations are designed to
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tax both residents and non-residents who accrue income from a digital marketplace. 583 They,
however, exclude application of the DST to financial institutions specified in the fourth schedule
of the Income Tax Act, financial service providers authorized or approved by the Central Bank
of Kenya, and online services provided by government institutions. 584
Kenya is a relatively small market jurisdiction whose digital services market revenue is projected
to reach US$4.4 billion in 2022, up from $1.4 billion in 2016.585 However, while there is no
public disclosure yet of how much revenue Kenya is deriving from its DST law, the country
reportedly has 89 companies already paying the DST. 586 This number includes companies like
Uber and Booking.com.587 Kenya claims that because of the “high” scope and nexus thresholds
contained in Pillar One, replacing its current DST law with Pillar One framework will see the
number of in-scope companies drop from 89 to 11. 588 This is because only 11 of the companies
that are in-scope of Pillar One operate in Kenya and, of that number, it is not quite clear how
many meet the threshold for in-country turnover that would preserve Kenya’s right to tax. 589
Given these circumstances, it may not be surprising that Kenya has been unwilling to commit to
the deal.590 When we look at these numbers and circumstances, we have to ask whether this is a
level of impairment of tax jurisdiction that is reasonable for a small market jurisdiction like
Kenya to accept?
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It is important to stress that an evaluation of reasonableness is a country-by-country affair. What
is reasonable for one country may not be reasonable for another country. Thus, not all “LIDCs”
are situationally identical. The facts and circumstances highlighted above demonstrate why the
Pillar One compromise might fail the reasonableness test for Kenya despite the disparity of
means content of the compromise.
There are genuine concerns that the compromise imposes significant impairments on the tax
jurisdiction of countries like Kenya and Nigeria due to the narrow scope of the deal which
excludes many companies that operate in these countries. 591 While Pillar One’s revenue and
profitability scoping thresholds currently in play might seem reasonable for large market
jurisdictions, its revenue implications for small market jurisdictions like Kenya and Nigeria might
be hard to swallow. Perhaps one way to address the problem, within the Inclusive Framework, is
to allow for variable scoping thresholds, based on groups of countries or for LIDCs to implement
flexible scoping (and nexus) rules based on the company’s level of involvement in a country’s
economic life.592
The nexus thresholds may also significantly undermine the taxing rights of some LIDCs because
they are not large market jurisdictions where the biggest (in-scope) MNEs are likely to meet the
specified nexus threshold. 593 Needless to state that countries like Kenya and Nigeria are also
excluded from the scope of the €250,000 nexus threshold since their respective GDPs exceed the
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€40 billion threshold that qualifies a country as a “smaller jurisdiction”. The rationale for the
minimum threshold (de minimis threshold) is to ensure that companies only become taxable if they
have sufficient involvement in a country’s economic life.594 That, in itself, might not be
unreasonable. However, the real concern is that a threshold as high as €1 million also has the
potential to greatly undermine the tax base of states like Kenya and Nigeria since the “high”
thresholds – as well as the scoping rules – effectively exclude most of the companies that operate
digitally in these countries.595 The prospect of revenue loss deters some developing countries (with
relatively small markets) – who, because of GDP, fall outside the “small jurisdiction” classification
– from signing up to the deal.
Nigeria, for example, has made clear that it welcomes Pillar Two, but cannot sign up because of
its opposition to Pillar One’s terms.596 Nigeria’s lead negotiator at the Inclusive Framework,
Mathew Gbonjubola, claims that the country’s concerns about the potential revenue impact of the
Pillar One (nexus) rule design for developing countries were not addressed:
The economic impact assessment that was carried out on Pillar 1 and 2 were founded on
an unreliable premise. The country-specific impact assessment that was done was topdown. Somebody just looked at the GDP of Nigeria, and says Nigeria’s GDP is this much
and then they should be able to buy this number of shoes and things like that. And you and
I know, in that kind of postulation, the margin of error is usually very wide. That exactly
was what happened with this. Particularly for Nigeria, when we ran the numbers it was
way off the figures that the OECD gave us.597
This assessment advances the view that GDP (without consideration for market power) might be
an inadequate metric for determining the appropriate threshold for a market-based apportionment
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of taxing rights. Countries like Nigeria, with GDP above U.S.$45 billion, risk losing taxing rights
because their relatively high GDP does not align with their status as relatively small market
states.598 Such outcomes can reinforce the distributional bias that already exists in the proposed
framework.599 The West African Tax Administration Forum (WATAF) has thrown its support to
the arguments against the current nexus rules, with respect to Nigeria and other West African states
in the Inclusive Framework:
The building block on nexus, which sets an in-country revenue threshold that will qualify
a jurisdiction for a share in Amount A profit at EUR 1 million (and EUR 250 000 for
smaller jurisdictions with GDP lower than 40 billion) is too high for our members, as it has
further reduced the number of MNEs from which they may get Amount tax revenue. With
the existing nexus rule, none of our members is getting Amount A share of profits from up
to 10 MNEs in the near future, while some have even complained that they may not get
Amount A share of profit from any MNE.600
It is difficult to dismiss the contention that the inclusion of a nexus threshold, while generally
defensible on administrability grounds, might also unreasonably impair the taxing rights of some
LIDCs. A less restrictive and more nuanced approach would tailor its scoping and nexus rules to
account for market size rather than just GDP. This would ensure that smaller market states,
including like Kenya and Nigeria, retain the right to tax income from digital business activities in
their domain. Such an approach would better reflect the disparity of means between parties to the
Pillar One compromise and would inflict a more reasonably impair their tax jurisdiction than the
current framework.
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3.4.3.2 Alternativity: Article 12B of the UNMTC
The alternativity test developed in chapter 2 can also be used to analyze the OECD Pillar One
compromise. There are several alternatives that have been considered or implemented in recent
years by countries and institutions. A few of these alternatives are discussed in previous sections
of this work. I observe that many of these alternatives are in the form of DSTs, turnover taxes
imposed by source countries on digitalized transactions. Bearing that element of similarity in
mind, I elect to analyze one of the alternatives, the legal framework for taxation of automated
digital services introduced by the UN Tax Committee into the UNMTC in 2021. Comparing this
alternative seems sensible because of the UN Tax Committee’s historical role in advancing
international tax policies that are considered more sensitive to the needs of LIDCs and the fact
that Article 12B was specifically designed with the interest of LIDCs in mind. 601
3.4.3.2.1 Basic Details
The UN Tax Committee’s active involvement in modernizing the international tax regime as a
response to the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy reached concrete
levels in 2017 when the committee inserted a new Article 12A in the UNMTC. Article 12A permits
the source state to tax (on a gross basis) “fees for technical services” provided by non-residents
without a permanent establishment or fixed base in the state of the payer.602 This Article was added
at a time of notable protraction in the OECD’s efforts to craft a consensus solution for the broader
problems of taxation in the digital economy. The UN Tax Committee underlined its willingness to
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forge ahead of the OECD in designing a solution that countries could adopt for the purpose.603 A
major development in this regard was recorded on 5 August 2020, when the committee published
an amended draft proposal for taxation of “automated digital services”.604 The proposal was
designed to enable source countries to tax cross-border payments for “automated digital services”
either through a withholding tax on gross income or a net income apportionment formula.605
However, non-resident entities providing “automated digital services” can decide which approach
they prefer. They may opt for a withholding tax on gross income, at a pre-stipulated tax rate, or
they may opt for a net income tax on a company’s “qualified profits”, at a rate determined by the
source country’s domestic law. A final draft of the proposed Article 12B, as well as amendments
to the commentary, was adopted at the committee’s 22nd Session, in April 2021606, and has since
been incorporated into the UNMTC.607
3.4.3.2.2 Scope
Article 12B permits a source state to tax the income of a non-resident person arising from
“automated digital services”.608 Paragraph 12B(5) defines “automated digital services” (hereafter
ADS) as “any service provided on the Internet or another electronic network, in either case
requiring minimal human involvement from the service provider.” The definition is complemented
by Paragraph 12B(6) which outlines the services that qualify as ADS, namely: online advertising,
supply of user data, online search engines, online intermediation platforms, social media platforms,
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digital content services, online gaming, cloud computing, and standardized online teaching
services. The use of “includes” in relation to the listed items suggests that the list is inexhaustive.
However, Article 12B also stipulates that there are certain remote activities that are outside its
scope of application. Thus, any payment that would qualify as “royalties”, pursuant to Article 12,
or “fees for technical services”, pursuant to Article 12A does not qualify as payment for ADS.609
Also, Article 12B does not cover taxation of CFBs.610
Further, where payment for ADS accrues to a person (as beneficial owner) who is a resident of
one of the treaty states from activities carried out by that person in the other state, either through a
permanent establishment or fixed base, the payment is not covered by Article 12B but instead falls
under either Article 7 or 14.611 This provision maintains the general priority of the permanent
establishment rule, since the ADS rule is designed to deal with situations where income is remotely
derived (i.e., without the using a permanent establishment or fixed base).
3.4.3.2.3 Nexus
Article 12B does not stipulate any threshold requirements, such as a permanent establishment,
fixed base, minimum period of presence or minimum sales amount before which the source state
can tax.612 This implies that nexus is formed once payment flows from one contracting state to
another in exchange for the provision of ADS. The fact that modern digital technology allows for
substantial exchange of paid cross-border ADS with little or no presence in the source state justifies
the non-requirement of physical thresholds in the source state.613 This omission, however, should
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not be construed to mean that a state cannot maintain a threshold under its domestic legislation. It
only means that the treaty does not “impose” or expressly recommend a threshold.
3.4.3.2.4 Revenue Sourcing
There are two independent sourcing rules for Article 12B. The first is that the person paying for
ADS resides in the taxing state (the source state). The second is that the person paying for ADS
has a fixed base or permanent establishment in the taxing state “in connection with which the
obligation to make the payments was incurred, and such payments are borne by the permanent
establishment or fixed base”.614 In either case, the state from where the payment is made is deemed
the source state. However, Paragraph 12B(10) emphasizes that if payments for ADS are made by
a resident of, say, state A, which carries on business in state B through a permanent establishment
situated in state B (or performs independent personal services through a fixed base situated in state
B) and such payments are borne by that permanent establishment or fixed base then the income
from ADS shall be deemed not to arise in state A. Instead, it shall be deemed to arise from state B
where the permanent establishment or fixed base is located.
3.4.3.2.5 Profit Allocation
Article 12B allocates rights to tax business profits to the market jurisdiction, a marked departure
from the current rules of international tax which allocate taxing rights to jurisdictions where supply
side activities take place. There are two approaches to profit allocation in Article 12B. There is a
gross profits option (paragraph 2), which is the default approach, and a net profits option
(paragraph 3), which supersedes the former whenever it is invoked (by the taxpayer). Both
approaches emphasize that it is the income of the beneficial owner that is taxable, which means
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that the treaty would only apply if the beneficial owner is a resident of either state; and, therefore,
nullifies the potential for tax avoidance through intermediary entities.
(a)

Taxation of Gross Income

Pursuant to paragraph 2, a source state may tax payments for ADS on a gross basis in accordance
with its own domestic law. The applicable tax rate is left to bilateral negotiation by the contracting
states. However, the commentary of Article 12B recommends a “modest” rate of 3 or 4 percent.615
This “modest” rate recommendation is explained by the perception that a gross basis taxation may
result in “double or excessive taxation”.616 While a modest rate may not eliminate double or
excessive taxation, it, at least, limits the exposure.
For administrative convenience – i.e., owing to the presumed physical absence of the beneficial
owner of income from the source state – Article 12B envisages that this gross basis tax would be
enforced as a withholding tax.617 The withholding tax option places the administrative capacity of
LIDCs at the center of consideration. Paragraph 5 of the commentary of Article 12B explains that:
Many developing countries have limited administrative capacity and need a simple, reliable
and efficient method to enforce tax imposed on income from automated digital services
derived by non-residents. A withholding tax imposed on the gross amount of payments
made by residents of a country, or non-residents with a permanent establishment or fixed
base in the country, is well established as an effective method of collecting tax imposed on
non-residents.618
From a taxpayer’ perspective, the commentary explains that “a method of taxation may also
simplify compliance for enterprises providing such services in another State, since they would not
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be required to compute their net profits or file tax returns, unless they opt for net income basis
taxation”.619
(b)

Taxation of Net Income

The gross profit tax regime set out in paragraph 12B(2) may be substituted for an annual net profits
tax, at the instance of the non-resident taxpayer. Paragraph 3 contains elaborate provisions on net
basis taxation. It entitles the taxpayer to request the source state to tax its “qualified profits” (rather
than gross profits) at the rate specified in the domestic law of that state. Once a request is made,
the source state is obligated to comply.
Paragraph 3 stipulates that “qualified profits” shall be 30% of the amount resulting from applying
the profitability ratio of the beneficial owner’s ADS business segment, where available, to the
gross annual revenue from ADS derived from the source state. However, where the beneficial
owner does not maintain segmental accounts, the overall profitability ratio of the beneficial owner
will be the basis to determine qualified profits. If the beneficial owner belongs to an MNE group,
the applicable profitability ratio is that of the group, or of its ADS segment, if the latter is
available.620 However, to avoid undermining the tax base of the source state, the group profitability
ratio can only be the basis of computation if it is higher than the beneficial owner’s profitability
ratio.621
The qualified profits ascertainment may be broken down as follows:
a. Option A1: 30% of the amount resulting from the profitability ratio of the beneficial
owner’s ADS segment.
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b. Option A2: If the beneficial owner does not maintain segmental accounts, 30% of the
overall profitability ratio of the beneficial owner.
c. Option B1: 30% of the amount resulting from the profitability ratio of the MNE group’s
ADS segment.
d. Option B2: If the MNE group does not maintain segmental accounts, 30% of the overall
profitability ratio of the group. This option only prevails if the profitability ratio of the
group is higher than the profitability ratio of the beneficial owner at entity level.622
An advantage of net basis taxation is that it allows the beneficial owner to incur less tax liability
than it might if its income were taxed on a gross basis, as well as relief where the taxpayer has a
global business loss or loss in its ADS segment during the taxable year. 623 In the case of net basis
taxation, the taxpayer’s exposure to double or excessive taxation is further reduced or eliminated
by the home state through exemption or credit under Article 23.624
3.4.3.2.6 Comparative Analysis
Is the Article 12B framework a more reasonable alternative to the Pillar One compromise from the
perspective of LIDCs? There are two factors that I consider in my response to this question. First,
I compare, based on the metrics of scope, nexus, and profit allocation, the extent to which both
compromises might impair the tax jurisdiction of LIDCs. Assuming that Article 12B is the less
restrictive option, I also consider whether Article 12B – if adopted – sufficiently addresses the
distortive problem of double taxation, vis-à-vis Pillar One. I make this extra consideration because
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I do not think that it is sufficient that an alternative compromise is more deferential to the tax
jurisdiction of LIDCs. An ideal compromise should preserve the tax base of LIDCs but, at the
same time, should strive to not place excessive and distortive tax barriers on international trade.
(a)

Scope

There are overt differences between the scope of Pillar One and Article 12B. Pillar One allows the
taxation of MNEs with a global turnover of €20 billion and profitability above 10%. This applies
to MNEs from all sectors of the global economy, except MNEs in the extractive sectors and
MNEs providing regulated financial services. Article 12B, on the other hand, applies to any nonresident entity that derives income from ADS. The designated carveouts from Article 12B are
payments that are classified as royalties and fees for technical services, as well as payments for
CFBs.
Pillar One has a broader industry coverage than Article 12B. This is because its application is
not limited to so-called digital business models or “highly digitalized businesses”. Article 12B,
on the other hand, is narrower because it only applies to an entity that provides ADS. This means
that it has a more streamlined focus on “highly digitalized businesses”. Given that limitation,
one edge that Pillar One’s broader scope has over the Article 12B scope is the former’s implicit
inclusion of so-called Consumer Facing Businesses (CFBs). The OECD defines CFBs as “those
businesses that generate revenue from the sale of goods and services of a type commonly sold
to consumers, including those selling indirectly through intermediaries and by way of franchising
and licensing”625 Article 12B, in its definition of “online intermediation platform services”,
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reveals that “the online sale of goods and services of the platform’s own inventory”, which is a
form of CFB, is outside the scope of the framework. 626
The exclusion of CFBs from the scope of Article 12B may be especially problematic. At an
earlier stage of development, the OECD grappled with the issue of whether Pillar One should
apply mainly to digitalized business models, i.e., to business providing ADS, as well as to
CFBs.627 ADS focuses on a narrower group of digital business models, i.e., “highly digitalized
businesses”, while CFB merely reflects the sale of goods and services that are commonly sold
to consumers, albeit in a manner that is facilitated by digitalization. 628 A focus on ADS
ringfences the digital economy and defies the reality that in the era of globalization and
digitalization, all businesses can – local physical presence notwithstanding – participate in the
economic life of a market jurisdiction in an active and sustained manner.629 The question of what
business models would fall into either category and the potential non-neutrality and unfairness
of excluding CFBs were niggling issues and, apparently, contributed to the stalling of a political
agreement on Pillar One.630 At some point, some members of the Inclusive Framework advocated
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a phased implementation, starting with ADS and subsequently including CFB. 631 These scoping
challenges were eventually resolved with the intervention of the new U.S. government in mid2021, which proposed the removal of these uncertain and potentially “discriminatory”
classifications, in favor of a simpler scoping design that targets all MNEs regardless of sector. 632
As I discuss in section 3.5, that U.S. intervention was key to the consensus on Pillar One.
The exclusion of CFBs from Article 12B limits the scope of businesses that LIDCs, as market
states, can tax, as well as leaves the hanging question of discrimination. From an administrative
perspective, Pillar One is also considered preferable because it significantly limits controversy
as to whether a particular business model falls within the scope of the regime.
The other major scoping difference between Pillar One and Article 12B is in the revenue
threshold of Pillar One. As earlier stated, Article 12B does not contain a revenue threshold for
the purpose of determining the entities that fall within its scope. This means that a state utilizing
Article 12B can tax the income of any non-resident entity derived from ADS provided to a payor
in that state. Pillar One toes a different path. A combination of the €20 billion global turnover
threshold and the above 10% profitability ratio significantly diminishes the number of entities
that may be subject to tax. As mentioned in section 3.4.3.1, less than 100 of the most profitable
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MNEs fall within this scope.633 It is notable that prior to the 2021 U.S. intervention, the Inclusive
Framework was considering a global turnover threshold of €750 million.634 The reasoning was
that setting a threshold below that amount would “lead to substantial compliance burdens without
commensurate benefits in terms of the available reallocation for market jurisdictions.” 635
The sensational jump from a €750 million global turnover threshold to €20 billion turnover
threshold seems remarkably unattractive, especially from the perspective of LIDCs, and does
not appear to be grounded in a defensible rationale of administrability. On the other hand, the
global turnover threshold has the potential to greatly impair the tax jurisdiction of som e LIDCs
who may be forced to forgo significant revenue by not taxing non-resident entities that do not
meet that fantastically high threshold even when such entities have significant market activities
in the LIDC. I again refer to the example of Kenya which may see the number of in-scope entities
fall drastically from 89 to 11.636
Scholars have outright questioned the necessity of a global turnover threshold. For instance,
Harpaz argues that a global turnover threshold is entirely unnecessary and should be abandoned
in favour of a country-specific threshold which better reflects the level of engagement of an
MNE with the taxing country.637 A global turnover threshold ignores the reality that a “small”
global MNE may, nonetheless, have a heavy market presence in a particular state. It does not
seem reasonable to deprive such a state the right to tax simply because the MNE’s global
turnover may not be large enough in the eyes of other (wealthier) states.

633

Michael Devereux & Martin Simmler, “Who Will Pay Amount A” (2021) EconPol Policy Brief 36/2021.
OECD Pillar One Blueprint supra note 443 at 22, paragraph 37.
635
Ibid.
636
Ndajiwo & Nyamudzanga supra note 470; Goni & Miyandazi supra note 590.
637
Assaf Harpaz, “The OECD’s Unified Approach: Nexus, Scope, and Coexisting with DSTs” (2019) 96:10 Tax
Notes Int’l 909 at 910.
634

182

It is arguable that the absence of a global turnover is more consistent with the idea of wealth
creation since it is tailored to ensure that an MNE is taxed in the state where it derives substantial
revenue. Perhaps a better approach would be to make the two forms of turnover threshold
applicable in the alternative. This means having a general global turnover rule that captures only
the largest MNEs, but, at the same time, a market state would retain the right to tax an MNE that
is outside the global turnover scope if that MNE has a required market presence in that state.
This differentia may be limited to LIDCs, in order not to render the general rule irrelevant.
Following from the above, the absence of a global threshold in Article 12B means that an MNE
with less global turnover, but with significant market activities in an LIDCs, would not be
excluded from the LIDC’s tax base. It is not surprising that the unilateral measures that some
LIDCs have initiated lean closer to the UN framework than the OECD framework. Nigeria and
Kenya, two of the countries that have been reluctant to embrace the Pillar One compromise, do
not stipulate a global turnover threshold in their domestic legislation. Even those OECD
countries, e.g., Canada, France, and Spain, that specify a global turnover threshold, tend to pick
the €750 million that was earlier considered by the Inclusive Framework. 638
The absence of a global turnover and profitability threshold in Article 12B means that no entity
providing ADS in a state is exempt from taxation on those grounds. It could also mean that the tax
authority has substantially more non-resident taxpayers to assess. While this structure might pose
compliance burdens for taxpayers and tax administrators,639 I am not convinced that the solution
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is to insert a global turnover threshold. Rather, I am of the view that the appropriate test should be
how much turnover or economic involvement the entity has in the taxing market state. To this end,
I am more concerned about the restrictive impact of the €20 billion global turnover in Pillar One
than the lack of a global turnover threshold in Article 12B. The former imposes unnecessary and,
perhaps, distortive, impairment on the tax jurisdiction of market states where significant
economic activities take place, while the latter can be solved by inserting a nexus threshold. 640
The scope of Pillar One simply does not seem broad enough. A deal that covers fewer than the top
100 MNEs in the world means that a clear majority of entities will continue to be taxed under the
old rules (permanent establishment). As previously stated, those rules tilt the allocation of taxing
rights mainly in favour of HIDCs where highly digitalised MNEs reside.641 Pillar One ensures that
most of these MNEs who operate in the markets of LIDCs are exempt from source state taxation.642
Such MNEs can exploit the markets of LIDCs without meeting the required presence to contribute
to the tax revenue of LIDCs.
On scoping, I think that Article 12B is slightly better than Pillar One, for LIDCs. Both approaches
impose limits on the exercise of taxing rights: Article 12B in terms of business models (qualitative
limits) and Pillar One in terms of revenue thresholds (quantitative limits). Pillar One appears to be
significantly more restrictive. Although Article 12B does not cover CFBs, the broad spectrum of
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in-scope ADS business types means that it could still reach most of the (tech) companies that are
the focus of the taxation and digital economy reform.
(b)

Nexus

Pillar One and Article 12B are both deviations from the traditional permanent establishment rule
of business profits taxation. But that is, perhaps, as far as it goes in terms of their nexus similarity.
For Pillar One, nexus is established when an in-scope MNE derives revenue amounting to at least
€1 million from the source jurisdiction. Of course, this threshold drops to €250,000 if the source
country is deemed a “smaller jurisdiction”. The reasoning in Pillar One is that the threshold is
necessary to limit compliance costs for MNEs as well as administrative costs for tax
authorities.643 The inclusion of de minimis thresholds seems quite reasonable, in principle, as a
cost saver for taxpayers, as well as tax authorities. However, it is to be expected that some of the
LIDCs that qualify as smaller jurisdictions may consider a €250,000 threshold too high for them,
not to mention that some small market jurisdictions fall into the €1 million cohort. It is notable
that the nexus threshold in Nigeria’s domestic legislation, for instance, is a much lower figure
of ₦25 million, which translates to about €54,000. A country like Nigeria might be expected to
consider both Pillar One nexus thresholds unreasonable. The Pillar One thresholds may strip
many LIDCs of what they consider significant tax revenue. When this nexus restriction is
combined with the scope restrictions, we have a potentially more excruciating impairment of
LIDCs’ tax jurisdiction.
The alternative framework, Article 12B, does not impose any de minimis nexus thresholds. This
makes Article 12B a potentially more attractive proposition for LIDCs as it allows for greater
autonomy in the exercise of taxing rights by the market state. It also makes the ascertainment of
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the eligible market jurisdiction a more straightforward affair since there is no consideration for
GDP fluctuations.644 However, as I earlier posited, this deliberate omission does not preclude a
state from inserting a nexus threshold either in its domestic law or tax treaty. From an LIDC
perspective, a de minimis nexus threshold might be especially necessary to limit the burdens of
tax administration, as well as to even the playing field for small and medium-sized enterprises
who may not have sufficient resources, vis-à-vis larger MNEs, to meet the compliance
requirements.645 Therefore, I am of the view that the ideal structure, as far as nexus is concerned,
lies somewhere between Pillar One and Article 12B. Pillar One does the right thing by inserting a
nexus threshold, but, perhaps, falters by placing that threshold too high. For administrative reasons,
Article 12B should contain a nexus threshold; although that issue is, perhaps, better resolved under
the domestic legislation of each market state.
(c)

Profit Allocation

Although both regimes would allocate profit to the market jurisdiction, the profit allocation
mechanisms in Pillar One and Article 12B differ significantly. The first point of difference is that
while Pillar One offers a net basis method of profit allocation, Article 12B offers both gross basis
and net basis profit allocation options.
Pillar One (Amount A) allocates 25% of an MNE’s residual profit to its market jurisdictions.
Residual profit is defined as profit in excess of 10% of revenue.646 This is, however, an arbitrary
numerical definition that conveys neither the conceptual distinctiveness of residual profit nor the
rational for its unique allocation to market jurisdictions. Implicit in Pillar One’s profit allocation
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scheme is the potential existence of more than one category of profits earned by an MNE, i.e.,
constituting total profits. Indeed, there are two such categories recognized by economists: routine
and residual profits.647 In the context of Pillar One, an MNE’s total profits can be routine profits
alone (where it is within 10% of revenue) or both routine and residual profits (the latter designation
applicable only where and to the portion of profit that exceeds 10% of revenue). Of these two
categories, based on Amount A, it is only the residual profit that is carved out and allocated to all
market jurisdictions by the designated formula: sales.
Conceptually, routine profit is regarded as the profit that a third party would expect to earn for
performing a given set of functions or activities, as if on an outsourcing basis.648 Therefore, in the
context of profit allocation, the tax system treats the MNE member entity as an independent third
party or service provider performing a particular function or activity for the MNE group.649 The
supposed third party is deemed not to share in the overall risk of the multinational, and, therefore,
earns no return based on the overall success or failure of the business.650 It earns only an
appropriate share of routine profits.
Generally, the routine profit can be ascertained by use of transfer pricing techniques651 or by
formulary apportionment.652 With either approach, the objective is to reward the MNE member
entity for the functions and activities that it undertakes as part of the integrated business of the
MNE group. In other words, routine profit is deemed to emanate from the place where functions
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and activities take place, i.e., where the group’s observable economic activities occur.653 Such
functions and activities may include R&D, general and administrative activities (G&A),
manufacturing, marketing, and sales.654 It is, therefore, implicit that routine profits are allocated
for the supply side functions and activities in an MNE’s value chain and can be calculated as a
mark-up on the relevant entity’s costs – based on the availability of data from comparable
businesses.655 Once profit is so allocated it can be taxed in the state where the relevant functions
and activities are performed.656
The OECD’s policy preference with respect to Pillar One is to allocate routine profits by transfer
pricing – rather than formulary apportionment. This choice leaves the existing profit allocation
model for MNEs largely intact. In other words, it leaves in place a familiar system of profit
allocation (transfer pricing) where that system can be relatively effective (allocation of routine
profits) and limits the adoption of a formula-based profit allocation system (unitary taxation) to
situations where transfer pricing is less effective (residual profits).657 Some scholars would prefer
to apply formulary apportionment to both the routine and residual profits because they consider
transfer pricing/separate entity taxation too complex and inefficient.658
Residual profit is simply defined as profit earned by an MNE that is in excess of routine
earnings.659 It may also be defined as the portion of total profits that exceeds a threshold that,
usually, is designed to isolate a minimum level of profit from taxation.660 Residual profit allocation
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is a transfer pricing derived concept.661 In this respect, residual profit allocation draws from the
idea that an MNE’s profits are produced by a synergy of different production factors cutting across
the MNE’s members (collectively) in different jurisdictions.662 While some profits can be
attributed to functions carried out by individual entities in the MNE group (routine functions)
others go beyond the sum of what can be attributed to the contributions of individual entities in an
open-market situation.663 These non-routine, residual, or “excess profits” are difficult to pin down
and are susceptible to manipulation by way of locating them in a jurisdiction with low tax
exposure.664 This is especially so where hard-to-value intangibles are involved.
The response of the international tax regime to this problem has been to improvise transfer pricing
rules that streamline arm’s length pricing especially in the case of intangibles and highly integrated
group activities: transactional profit split method (TPSM).665 Due to the inadequacy of regular
transfer pricing methodologies, these rules leverage formulary elements to determine the
appropriate intra-group reward from intangibles (profit split) by ascertaining the functions, assets,
and risks deployed/contributed by each member.666 This analysis leads to a conclusion that all
jurisdictions where the contributing entities in the MNE are based contribute to the residual profit
and should be entitled to tax it.667
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Residual profit allocation in Pillar One adopts the formulary method enshrined in the TPSM,
although with some marked differences. First, TPSM applies to specific transactions, which may
be between some group members, not to the allocation of the unitary profit of an MNE group.668
By contrast, residual profit allocation aims to calculate the residual profit at the level of the MNE
group.669 Second, profit splits apply only to MNEs with certain features, such as high-integration
and core reliance on hard-to-value intangibles, while residual profit allocation applies to all MNE
types, i.e., regardless of business model.670 Third, a profit split would typically apply the full
transfer pricing methodology to ascertain the routine profit, but a residual profit allocation scheme
may not go so far. Some designs of residual profit allocation would instead set a fixed return on
an entity’s incurred expenditure regardless of the functions performed or risks assumed.671 Finally,
while the OECD profit split approach allocates taxing rights over residual profit based on the
location of an asset or function, residual profit allocation schemes allocate taxing rights over these
profits to market or destination countries.672
There are arguments to be made for why it is reasonable to limit Amount A profit allocation to
residual profits. The obvious one, as Devereux opines, is that it preserves the reign of the familiar
transfer pricing system with regard to the allocation of routine profits. 673 The distinction between
routine and non-routine profits might be considered consistent with the notion that allocation of
taxing rights to market jurisdictions is a “new” form of taxing rights, which, therefore, necessitates
special treatment. This “new” form of taxing right rewards activities that are not part of the core
chain of production, i.e., supply side activities.
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However, there are also pungent reasons to be skeptical about this dichotomy. First, there is no
clear discernment between routine and non-routine profits and the OECD’s attempted distinction
creates serious complexities and uncertainties in the ascertainment of respective profit
categories.674 Suffice it to state that the last thing LIDCs need is more complexity. Second, limiting
the allocation of taxing rights to residual profits may cause discontent because the challenges posed
by digitalization are by no means limited to residual profits.675 Such limitation may tempt some
market states to introduce unilateral levies on digital services in order to ensure a larger tax haul
on business profits attributable to their market jurisdiction.676 Third, implicit in the OECD’s
Amount A residual profit allocation approach is a supposition that a market state only contributes
to the earnings of an MNE when those earnings exceed 10% of turnover. Does it mean that when
an MNE’s total profit does not exceed 10% of turnover – regardless of the actual nominal value of
total profit – then none of that profit can be attributed to the demand side? I reason that attributing
a fraction of the total profits to the market jurisdiction – rather than waiting until there are “residual
profits” – is more consistent with the notion that the market is an integral component of an MNE’s
value chain and, therefore, always a source of total profit.
Finally, it seems entirely possible to allocate the total profit to both the demand and supply side –
as components of an MNE’s value chain – without the complex classification into routine and
residual profits. One scholar has demonstrated that the limitation of Amount A to residual profits
has no efficiency effect in itself, and that the same results can be attained by allocating a smaller
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percentage of total profits.677 Therefore, there seems to be no tangible justification for this
policy.678 Instead, the utilization of residual profit allocation increases the complexity of Pillar
One, “yields little or no net benefit”, and might be motivated by some cynical reason.679
The more agitating question, especially from the view of LIDCs, is whether allocable residual
profits should be limited and, if so, whether to a fraction of “only” 25%. Some scholars advocate
that the entire residual profit should be allocated to market states.680 Their reasoning has much to
do with efficiency. Residual profit allocation (especially by the sale formular) is appealing for its
presumed efficiency vis-à-vis the separate entity allocation that is inherent in the current system.
Allocation of residual profit by sale is less susceptible to tax avoidance.681 Destination-based
allocation of residual profit is considered a most suitable yardstick because the third party
purchasers or consumers are less mobile (especially in the case of individuals) which means that
the formula is less susceptible to manipulation for tax avoidance, compared to other allocation
formulas that rely on yardsticks like assets and employment.682 After all, it has been argued, even
in a high-tax state, companies have an incentive to maximize sales.683
The OECD compromise takes the path of allocating only a “small” fraction – 25% – of residual
profits to market states. Although this might be considered less efficient and, perhaps, less
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satisfactory to some market states, there are also equity justifications for not allocating the entire
residual profit to market states. Graetz rightly iterates that a wholly destination-based allocation of
non-routine profits is not justifiable because it would shortchange states that produce residual
profits through production intangibles, headquarters activities, and R&D – as against marketing
intangibles.684 This, perhaps, explains why Pillar One aims to isolate the part of residual profit that
is attributable to marketing intangibles – things like trademarks, customer lists, and user data –
which can then be split between all market states by the sales formula.685 It does seem a sensible
compromise to me between different contributing factors to residual profit. However, the greater
difficulty is agreeing on the right percentage of residual profit that should be taxed in the market
state(s).
There is scarce information on how much revenue individual market states can expect to retain by
virtue of Pillar One’s 25% residual profit allocation scheme. While the OECD has claimed that
Pillar One will realize revenues of up to $125 billion yearly,686 the OECD has not provided a
distributional chart for this aggregate revenue. Independent research by Devereux & Simmler puts
the aggregate distributable sum at U.S.$87 billion, which is significantly less than the OECD
estimate.687 The civil society organization (CSO) Oxfam reckons that, using GDP as an indicator
of market size, only about U.S.$0.6 billion of this estimated sum would be allocated to “lowincome countries,” while U.S.$31 billion would go to “middle-income countries”.688 If these
amounts are taxed at an average rate of 25%, the tax revenue that accrues to “low-income
countries” and “middle-income countries” is $140 million and $8 billion respectively (equivalent
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to 0.03% of their respective GDP).689 Apparently, these are quite generous estimates, in the case
of low- and middle-income countries, because a lot of the profits derive from information
technology MNEs, for most of whom low- and middle-income countries represent a smaller
consumption share.690 These are remarkably small amounts, especially when accepting the deal
means that LIDCs must give up digital taxes of their own, even on entities outside the scope of the
deal.691 African countries, through the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), proposed a tax
rate of 35%,692 while LIDCs under the G24 have stressed that anything short of a 30% allocation
to market jurisdictions will not yield any palpable benefits to them.693 These demands were not
acceded.694
In October 2021, Oxfam produced an independent impact assessment of the potential revenue
distribution of Pillar One for 52 developing countries.695 Oxfam compared three different profit
allocation rates under Pillar One with a 3% DST rate. A summary of Oxfam’s findings is
reproduced here:
•

With the low 20% reallocation percentage, the net impact for developing countries
could be negative. While the 52 developing countries for which we have data could
gain around $1.43 bn. from Pillar 1, this would be less than the $1.66 bn. that we
estimate a 3% DST could generate for these countries. The net effect could be an annual
loss of $230 million to developing countries.
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•

•

•

•

The net impact of Pillar 1 with the higher 30% reallocation percentage mentioned in
the OECD’s July statement would be positive, but insignificant for developing
countries. Comparing the revenue from Pillar 1 with a 30% reallocation percentage
($2.16bn.) with a 3% DST ($1.66 bn.) for developing countries shows that they could
experience a net gain of around $494 million. This would be less than $10 million on
average for each country, equivalent to just 0.007% of their GDP. Some countries
would raise less than $1 million a year from Pillar 1, which may not be worth the
administrative costs of implementation.
Should negotiators adopt ATAF’s proposal for a 35% reallocation percentage the net
gain for developing countries could be more meaningful. The revenue generated from
Pillar 1 with this reallocation rate ($2.54 bn.) would surpass the revenue from a 3%
DST ($1.66 bn.) and produce a net gain for developing countries of $857 million.
Although still low, this would be a significant improvement from the results using the
OECD’s suggested range of 20-30%.
More detailed analysis for Kenya, Nigeria, Argentina and Mexico shows that lowering
the revenue threshold from the current €20 bn. to €10 bn. could double the revenue for
the four countries.
Analysis for Kenya, Nigeria, Argentina and Mexico also shows that the single largest
improvement to Pillar 1 would be to abolish the distinction between routine and nonroutine profits, and instead apply the reallocation percentage to all profits and not just
profits above 10% as suggested by the OECD July statement. For the four countries the
removal of the 10% profitability threshold could increase the revenue by more than
four times if the 35% reallocation percentage was used.696

The document speaks for itself. The revenue implications for LIDCs based on different rates of
profit allocation is clear. The numbers are even more telling for countries like Kenya, Nigeria,
Argentina, and Mexico if the distinction between routine and residual profits were extinguished.
I cannot fail to highlight another important takeaway from the Oxfam assessment, which is that
while the negative revenue impact of Pillar One for most LIDCs does not seem too significant,
compared to DSTs, for countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Argentina, and Mexico, halving the global
turnover threshold would constitute a substantial amelioration of jurisdictional impairment. If
halving the global turnover threshold would double the revenue for these countries, one can only
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imagine what eliminating that threshold and keeping only a nexus threshold can do. But does any
of this information square with Article 12B?
I should highlight here that there is no equivalent impact assessment for Article 12B vis-à-vis the
ones discussed above. However, since Article 12B offers both gross and net basis profit allocation
options, I attempt to improvise a comparison, starting with the low hanging fruit: gross basis
taxation. The gross basis tax is similar to a DST. Therefore, I am going to try to substitute Article
12B for the DST that Oxfam compares Pillar One with. It is helpful that Article 12B contains a
withholding tax rate recommendation of 3% or 4%.697 Assuming that a 3% rate is adopted, it seems
that the only situation where a gross-based Article 12B beats Pillar One is if only 20% of residual
profits were allocated to market states. The results should be similar in the case of a 25% allocation.
This means that there is no clear advantage of Article 12B, at least in terms of the amount of
revenue that is available to tax in the market state. The main attraction of the Article 12B gross
basis approach, therefore, seems to be its relative administrative simplicity. LIDCs are generally
conversant with the withholding tax system.698 On this point, the commentary explains that:
Many developing countries have limited administrative capacity and need a simple,
reliable, and efficient method to enforce tax imposed on income from services derived nonresidents. Withholding tax imposed on the gross amount of payments made by residents of
a country, or non-residents with a permanent establishment or fixed base in the country, is
well established as an effective method of collecting tax imposed on non-residents. Such a
method of taxation may also simplify compliance for enterprises providing services in
another State since they would not be required to compute their net profits or file tax
returns, unless they themselves opt for net income basis taxation.699
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Its simplicity appeal notwithstanding, the policy of gross-basis taxation of business profits from
ADS must be considered fundamentally problematic. Because it does not account for substantial
expenses incurred by taxpayers, gross-based taxation is mostly considered a viable option for the
enforcement of passive income taxes, e.g., interest, dividend, and royalties.700 Article 12B’s
reliance on gross-based taxation for active business income may result in excessive taxation701 and
in some cases may be passed on to consumers.702 Mehboob observes that while some entities are
willing to pass on the tax cost to consumers, some others may be willing to avoid the same price
hike to retain their market share.703 The likelihood of passing on to consumers is lower in respect
of Pillar One because Pillar One is enforceable on a net basis and at the consolidated group level.
It is, therefore, comforting that Article 12B contains an inbuilt mechanism that enables an entity
that is at risk of double taxation to limit that risk. Paragraph 12B(3) provides for net basis taxation
of a non-resident entity, where that entity elects to be so taxed. This provision is a bit similar to
Pillar One because it allocates only a share of net profits – known as “qualified profits” – for
taxation in the market jurisdiction. The qualified profits rule would apportion 30% of an entity’s
income from ADS to the market countries. Some commentators contend that a net income election
can relieve unnecessary tax burdens on low margin or loss-making companies, but that relief can
only be obtained at significant administrative costs.704 I do not disagree with this assessment,
especially as it concerns smaller companies. Perhaps, the only way to cushion the effect is to limit
Article 12B to companies with a designated revenue-based nexus threshold. This would ensure
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that only entities with significant revenue are subject to the administrative cost. Based on the
current framework, non-resident entities with small sales in the market state may be forced to either
accept a gross based tax, push the tax to the customer, or exit the market. It is hard to imagine that
the tax raised from such small transactions justifies the administrative burden.
Further, Tripathi & Mehta argue, rightly, in my view, that the net basis tax option inserted in
Article 12B may turn out to be largely redundant because it might require an MNE operating in
multiple market jurisdictions to compute “qualified profits” in accordance with the laws of each
jurisdiction. This situation poses administrative obstacles and significant compliance costs, that
may force MNEs to opt for a less favorable gross based taxation.705
Without a revenue impact assessment of Article 12B net basis taxation, it is difficult to form a
clear opinion on its merits vis-à-vis Pillar One. However, my impression is that Article 12B’s profit
allocation more closely mirrors the more “generous” levels of allocation that Oxfam estimates with
respect to Pillar One. This is especially so because Article 12B allocates a direct share of total
profit (“qualified profits”), at a huge rate of 30%, which seems to be, potentially, much more
significant than the Pillar One’s allocation of residual profits only.706 Also, unlike Pillar One,
Article 12B does not require that an entity hit a certain threshold of profitability before it can be
taxed in the market jurisdiction. I sense that these profit allocation variables would bring things
closer to ATAF’s 35% reallocation proposal. Although still low, such allocation would be a
significant improvement on Pillar One’s 25%. The results might be even more remarkable for
countries like Kenya and Nigeria given that there is no global turnover threshold in Article 12B.
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The UN Committee asserts that the allocation is inspired by a desire for certainty and fairness. 707
The committee explains that:
The specific figure of thirty percent is adopted by the Committee to achieve certainty on
the one hand and to provide a fair and reasonable share to both jurisdictions on the other,
keeping in view the special role markets play in generation of profits from the activities
under the scope of the Article.708
The committee also outlined that the respective roles of assets, employees, and revenue in revenue
generation were assigned equal weight.709 I think that while an arbitrary numerical allocation can
be readily justified on grounds of certainty, the same cannot be said of fairness. Without an impact
assessment (whether from the UN or independent researchers), it is difficult to see a principled
justification for the market state 30% allocation.710 This, perhaps, explains the concerns, even
amongst “a large minority of members” of the committee, that 30% of qualified profit may be too
high.711 There is no stipulation of what percentage these minority members consider appropriate,
but it appears that their preference was for the rate to be negotiated on a bilateral basis.712
Adding to these concerns, Tripathi & Mehta demonstrate, with simulations, that the equation used
for the ascertainment of qualified profits is hugely distortive. In some cases, the equation produces
significant disparities and disproportionate mismatches between profitability ratio and tax liability
in each taxable jurisdiction.713 These concerns are impossible to ignore, both from perspectives of
equity and efficiency.
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Finally, Pillar One has an edge over Article 12B in terms of their respective segmentation policies.
Pillar One does not allow segmentation between business lines unless in exceptional cases. This is
consistent with the broad business line scoping of Pillar One. The implication is that where an
MNE is involved in different lines of business, its turnover would be computed on a consolidated
basis and taxability would be assessed on the group basis. Article 12B, on the other hand, focuses
on ADS and, perhaps, for this reason, requires segmentation of the ADS business from the MNE
or beneficial owner’s aggregate business. The requirement of segmentation poses serious
administrability challenges,714 which is, perhaps, why a number of LIDCs, including ATAF,
pushed for a no segmentation framework during Pillar One negotiations.715 It seems
counterintuitive that LIDCs would prefer the segmental complexity of Article 12B.
Article 12B represents an interesting alternative to Pillar One. In some respects, it might be
considered a preferable option for LIDCs, or at least for the likes of Kenya, Nigeria, Argentina,
and Mexico, who may be more disenchanted with some of the restrictions in Pillar One. Pillar
One’s scope, nexus, and profit allocation specifications all appear to be more restrictive than
Article 12B. From an administrative perspective, Article 12B also offers greater convenience for
LIDCs because of the availability of the withholding tax option. Its identified flaws
notwithstanding, the existence of an alternative that is, on the surface, noticeably less restrictive
(at least for some LIDCs), but which also provides an (imperfect) avenue for addressing the
attendant problem of double taxation, chips away at the logic of adopting a framework that is more
restrictive on tax jurisdiction and, potentially, reinforces the subsisting pro-residence country bias
of the international tax regime. However, Article 12B also comes with some potential neutrality
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and administrability baggage, which ought to be addressed before it can be deemed an alternative
that is worth supplanting a multilateral solution like Pillar One. An impact assessment – but
obviously not that alone – would go a long way to address the inherent concerns.
3.4.3.3 Potential for Non-Tax Benefits
One argument that has been made against unilateral digital taxes is that they might discourage
investment in the technology market of countries that impose them. 716 This is part of the
argument that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for instance, has advanced in opposition to
Canada’s DST proposal.717 Taxes should not distort efficient behaviour, especially in a sector
that is heavy on investment and innovation. After all, the incredible productivity that is brought
about by digitalization would be unimaginable without substantial investment in hardware,
software or digital platforms.718 This explains why DSTs, as a withholding tax on digital
transactions, may be frowned at for their potential to discourage innovation and investment,
especially for young and low-margin businesses who may be unable to absorb potential losses
from a tax on gross revenue. 719 Therefore, on the face of it, it seems that an international tax
compromise like Pillar One, which is meant to displace DSTs and any turnover taxes, limits
potential tax barriers to innovation and investment. Yet, even if we embrace these arguments, it
is one thing to conclude that unilateral measures like DSTs are distortive and counter-innovative,
and another thing to conclude that states should accept the restrictive Pillar One deal because it
is potentially more beneficial to them in non-tax respects. There are lots of questions to be
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answered in this regard. Will giving up taxing rights, to the extent contemplated in Pillar One,
stimulate, or enhance non-tax benefits for LIDCs? What kinds of non-tax benefits will ensue
from the deal and how will they flow to LIDCs? Do the anticipated non-tax benefits outweigh
or compensate for the cost of tax revenue losses? Would such non–tax benefits not ensue absent
the tax deal or if the tax deal were not as restrictive? Also, are there non-tax disadvantages that
may accompany the deal? These are pertinent questions that require answers that are based on
economic analyses. But even from an imprecise assessment, there seems to be a lot of weighing
and balancing.
Pillar One is all about taxation in market states. It limits the extent to which a market state can
tax income derived by non-resident businesses (mostly digitalized). Yet, it is difficult to fully
appreciate how the deal might benefit market states in a non-tax sense. Take investment, for
instance, does the deal enhance the prospects for digitalized and other remote business models
to increase their investment in digital assets or infrastructure in LIDCs, as market states? One
study suggests that because digital business models tend to be highly mobile, tax factors might
play an important role in their choice of where to invest. 720 However, this conclusion is based
on an assessment of where digital business models locate their pre-market (supply side) activities
and assets such as R&D, software and IT hardware.721 It finds that the tax treatment in the
location of these supply side factors is decisive of overall tax burdens, regardless of the tax
treatment in the market state.722 But, this is distinct from the question of how tax policy in a
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market state might influence the willingness of non-resident digitalized businesses to invest in,
say, the digital infrastructure of that state. If digitalized businesses invest in digital assets, e.g.,
broadband infrastructure, to enhance digital access/integration in lower-income market states,
then it becomes more sensible to draw links between a tax compromise that limits their market
state tax exposure and such investment decisions. Armed with such information, states like
Nigeria and Kenya, for instance, may be convinced to embrace a tax deal like Pillar One with
the prospect that digital streaming giants such as Netflix and Showmax would plough some of
their capital or revenue into the film industry in those countries 723 even if these companies do
not meet the €1 million nexus threshold. However, for Nigeria and Kenya to make that “revenue
sacrifice” they must be well apprised that the trade-off is both necessary for the investment to
take place and worth the revenue that is surrendered.
In October 2021, not long after a framework for the Pillar One deal became public knowledge,
digital business giant Google announced a plan to invest $1 billion in Africa over five years. 724
A substantial quantum of Google’s investment will go to digital infrastructure, including a
transnational subsea cable, to improve internet connectivity, while some will fund tech business
innovation.725 Google hopes that these investments will: (1) enable affordable internet access;
(2) help businesses with their digital transformation; (3) spur next generation technologies; and
(4) improve lives on the continent through support for non-profits.726 Google’s investment is
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expected to contribute to digital integration in Africa, as the company projects that over 300
million more people on the continent will “come online” over the following 5 years. 727 Google’s
investment can be deemed especially important because a significant chunk targets the demand
side, i.e., the market jurisdiction.
A similarly ambitious connection project is being undertaken by another digital giant, Facebook,
in consortium with a few other tech companies. 728 Having launched the project in 2020, in
September 2021, Facebook announced the extension of its planned 2Africa cable subsea cable
to connect 33 countries across three continents – Africa, Europe, and Asia.729 At 45,000
kilometers, 2Africa is expected to become the longest subsea cable in the world. 730 Facebook’s
investment has a common objective with Google’s – bring more people online, and that includes
Africa’s 1.2 billion people. 731 The cable is projected to triple the network capacity of the subsea
cables currently serving the African continent. 732 The project is estimated to be ready in 2023.733
Investment in digital infrastructure, such as subsea cables, can enhance access to digital services
for end users in the covered market states. It is worth stating that while most digitalized
businesses tend to invest mainly in supply side assets and activities, 734 investment in the demand
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side is also important because of the essentiality of demand side digital assets in maintaining and
expanding the market.735
The Pillar One deal is expected to cover the “top 100” most profitable MNEs in the world. 736
Google (Alphabet) and Facebook (now Meta) 737 are two of the in-scope MNEs, at least in terms
of their annual revenues. 738 Considering the timing announcement, African countries involved
in the OECD Inclusive Framework might be tempted to consider whether the investments by
Google and Facebook are signs of things to come, especially given that the continent lags behind
in digital transformation.739 It remains a fundamental question, however, as to whether there is
a concrete link between the deal and these MNEs investment decisions. In other words, how
much of an impact did the Pillar One compromise have on the MNEs’ investment decisions? It
is difficult to tell. Facebook’s project was first announced in May 2020, more than a year before
the OECD-led compromise.740 Perhaps, it is best to accept the obvious explanation: the projects
represent long-term investments for two rational businesses. A November 2020 report jointly
published by Google and the Word Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) finds that
Africa’s internet economy has the potential to reach 5.2% GDP by 2025, i.e., $180 billion ($750
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billion by 2050).741 The report identifies faster and better quality internet access, rapid
urbanization, a growing tech talent pool, a vibrant start-up environment, and a continental single
marker regime as some of the drivers of the growth. 742 Google also relies on an external study
that equates a 10% increase in mobile internet connectivity with a 2.5% GDP per capita increase
in Africa.743 These permutations indicate that Google’s investment is, at least in part, motivated
by perceived opportunities in the African digital economy; and Google is positioning itself to
exploit these opportunities. 744
Google does not cite the Pillar One tax deal or taxation, generally, as a factor in its decision to
invest in Africa. Thus, it is not clear, despite the timing, that tax was a substantial consideration.
Given how long, presumably, it takes to make decisions on such substantial investment, it seems
likely that the timing of announcement was coincidental. That notwithstanding, some critics
argue that Google’s $1 billion 5-year investment is not commensurate with the amount of tax
that the company avoids paying on the continent due to the subsisting international tax regime. 745
Carlos Lopes, a professor in the Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape
Town, South Africa, and former secretary general of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (UNECA) regards the investment as “peanuts”, remarking that: “Google does not pay
taxes in Africa. If it did it would be probably way above the $250 million a year offered here”.746
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There is no doubt that MNEs like Google and Facebook have tremendously benefited from a
global economic order that facilitates non-taxation of non-resident digitalized businesses; an
economic order that includes a WTO moratorium on tariffs for digital trade (in place since
1998).747 Considering the these MNEs’ enduring status as global players, it is conceivable that
if they were inundated with global taxes – especially turnover taxes – and transnational
administrative burdens (quite possible under Article 12B) during their formative or pre-profit
years, they would not have reached the status of profitability that enables them to make the kinds
of huge investments discussed here, including investments in LIDCs. Perhaps, this is where a
tax compromise like Pillar One is vital to the survival and expansion of out-of-scope MNEs.
It is not my intention to equate non-tax benefits with physical infrastructure or FDI, like the kind
expended by Google and Facebook. Sometimes, by their mere remote “presence” in a country,
digitalized businesses have the potential to confer positive impacts on that country’s economy
by, for instance, enabling reverse or outward market access expansions for local businesses and
providing avenues for economic integration between local businesses. Reverse market access
may take the form of Netflix facilitating the Nigerian movie industry’s penetration of global film
markets748 or music streaming businesses like Spotify providing Nigeria’s musical artists a
greater platform to disseminate their contents globally and to gain unprecedented levels of global
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recognition.749 These benefits accrue regardless of whether these companies pay Nigerian taxes,
and can stimulate positive socio-economic effects for Nigeria, including employment
opportunities.750
An example of the former is the social media enterprise Twitter. The company does not have a
physical location in Nigeria 751 and, historically, has not paid tax in Nigeria, 752 despite boasting
millions of users in the country. 753 In June 2021, following a dispute between the Nigerian
government and Twitter over a controversial tweet by Nigeria’s President, which Twitter
removed from its platform, the Nigerian government restricted access of Nigeria’s internet users
to Twitter.754 The restriction reportedly cost the Nigerian economy a whopping $26 billion (6%
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of GDP).755 Much of these losses fell on Nigeria’s online vendors, many of whom transact on
the platform, and many of whom pay taxes to the Nigerian government. 756
The Twitter example underscores the point that digitalized businesses can contribute
significantly to a country’s economic fortunes even when they neither reside nor pay tax in that
country. This perspective should, of course, not be viewed as a sweeping endorsement of the
non-taxation of such entities. It only contends that there may be instances where it makes
economic sense to tolerate the continued operation of a non-resident digitalized business even if
the business does not contribute directly to the market state’s treasury. This is especially so in
the case of entities that contribute to a country’s economy but are not themselves profitable. An
example, again, is Twitter, which did not turn profitable despite 12 years of existence and global
operations, until that situation changed in the first quarter of 2018.757 Other prominent examples
include the popular music and podcast streaming service, Spotify, which became profitable in
2018 after more than a decade of operation and substantial investment 758 and Uber Technologies,
the ride-sharing and food-delivery enterprise, which posted a quarterly profit for the first time in
2021.759 These enterprises provide important and transformational services to the global
economy even when they have not been profitable. 760
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The Twitter-Nigeria situation is just one example where a state might be justified in allowing a
non-resident entity to operate in its territory despite that entity not paying tax there. It remains a
lingering question whether there is strong justification for an international compromise that
excludes most entities from taxation of their foreign source income as a measure of encouraging
non-tax benefits such as innovation and investment. Put differently, even if the Pillar One tax
deal, with its implicit tax revenue sacrifice, comes with the attraction of greater FDI or other
non-tax benefits, should a state not be entitled to determine whether it prioritizes those non-tax
benefits and how it wants to channel tax incentives? For instance, Nigeria’s insistence that
Twitter open an office in Nigeria, appoint a Nigeria country representative, and pay tax in
Nigeria suggests that the country prioritizes tax revenue from Twitter as much as it may
appreciate the other contributions that Twitter makes to the Nigerian economy. 761 Declining an
international tax compromise that reinforces a system of wholesale source non-taxation might
seem more sensible for a state that wishes to achieve the dual objectives of tax revenue and nontax benefits because not every company invests in its foreign market or brings about other
substantial non-tax benefits the way that Facebook, Google, and Twitter do. A more nuanced
approach allows a state to provide tax relief to those companies that are willing to invest, while
simultaneously guarding against free riders who might take advantage of a universal system of
non-taxation. In a system of fiscal self-determination, where states can concede taxing rights on
a case-by-case basis – as is often the case with tax incentives – source states might be better
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placed to attract and streamline in-bound benefits. For instance, the African countries that stand
to benefit from Facebook and Google’s investment in digital infrastructure may choose to grant
those companies certain tax reliefs over a specified period, as a trade-off for the investment. The
current deal – which may not directly benefit Facebook and Google because of these companies’
status as in-scope MNEs – more likely benefits free riders who may be out-of-scope despite
having substantial economic involvement in certain market countries.
Perhaps, the best way to approach the non-tax benefits component with regard to Pillar One is
to view such benefits, not just in terms of what each state can directly gain in exchange for the
tax concession – given how undiscernible that might be – but in terms of its facilitation of the
overall growth of the digital ecosystem. The “interim” loss of tax revenue is compensated by
limited distortions to investment and innovation, which ultimately advances digitalization to the
benefit of all. Tax burdens tend to more negatively affect the investment choices of small firms
than highly profitable ones. 762 Therefore, the big firm focus of the deal has the potential to benefit
smaller tech enterprises from LIDCs who may want to expand their operations beyond their
national borders in an ever growing and integrated digital economy. 763 It is one thing for Kenya
and Nigeria to tax Spotify, a global streaming giant; but their policymakers should also consider
the potential economic implications of a more open system where Kenya and Nigeria can impose
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DSTs on each other’s tech start-ups. How might that impact the capacity of LIDC start-ups to
innovate, expand, and, perhaps, compete with the more established businesses? It could mean,
for instance, that Mdundo, a Kenya-based music streaming company that is often tagged the
“Spotify of Africa”,764 but which has a much revenue catch and smaller market reach, 765 finds
itself inundated with tax burdens from the countries where it operates. Needless to state that such
a tax framework could limit the growth prospects of the enterprise.
It has been observed that one of the concerns with DSTs and other turnover-based withholding
taxes is that they may be passed on to consumers or lead the business to exit the market.766
Passing on has happened often in recent years. 767 The OECD foresaw these problems during its
work on taxation of the digital economy and proposed then that withholding tax be used only as
a collection tool for net-basis taxes.768 As much as countries want to tax the income of nonresidents, no country wants to see that tax passed on to consumers. This is because passing on
DSTs, for instance, to consumers, not only eviscerates the purpose of an income tax, it may
produce the same regressive effects as customs duties and excise taxes on internet use, which is
to discourage users from accessing mobile services or encouraging them to explore back

764

Namita Datta & Medha M Nair, “Why Policymakers Should Support Africa’s Growing Music Industry”, World
Bank Blog (24 November 2021) online: https://perma.cc/SCP8-SZPJ.
765
The company was operative in 15 sub-Saharan African countries as of 2020 and was in loss at the time. David
Whitehouse, “Mdundo Music Platform Shareholders are Locked in to Losses”, The Africa Report (17 September 2020)
online: https://perma.cc/G8Q9-WWUA.
766
Larking supra note 719 at 22.
767
In response to DSTs imposed by European countries and India, companies like Apple, Amazon and Google hiked
the cost of their services to clients in those countries. See Isobel Asher Hamilton, “Apple, Amazon, and Google hike
their developer and ad client fees to pass on the costs of paying new digital taxes in Europe”, Business Insider (2
September 2020) online: https://perma.cc/NGV3-EQMK; Silvia Amaro, “Big Tech Finds A Way to Pass on the Cost
of Digital Taxes in Europe”, CNBC (3 September 2020) online: https://perma.cc/C9F5-TWRF. Google makes it
explicit that it is passing on DSTs as “Regulatory Operating Cost” to the users of its services. George Nguyen, “Google
passes on 2% “Regulatory Operating Cost” for ads served in India and Italy”, Search Engine Land (27 July 2021)
online: https://perma.cc/CAZ2-NTU8.
768
Larking supra note 719 at 22.

212

channels to avoid the charges. 769 Such a situation may ultimately inhibit internet connectivity
and lower domestic tax revenue. 770 Accordingly, a strictly net-basis tax framework like Pillar
One can help to sustain inclusivity in the digital economy.
When it comes to extolling the non-tax benefits of the Pillar One compromise, it seems the
OECD has found it more convenient to speak in generic terms of supporting global investment
and emphasizing the potential negatives of a no-deal situation, namely: a proliferation of
uncoordinated and unilateral tax measures, an increase in damaging tax and trade disputes, both
of which will undermine tax certainty and investment. 771 The two MNEs that have announced
substantial and concrete investments in LIDCs since the deal was announced are Facebook and
Google, all factors considered, it does not seem that the deal had any bearing on their respective
decisions. Individual countries would have to evaluate for themselves whether the non-tax
benefits that potentially accrue to them offset the revenue sacrifice that the deal requires. Such
consideration should include the prospects of increased digital integration for their economies,
the deal’s capacity to shield their own digitalized businesses – especially start-up ventures –
operating overseas from potentially inundating tax burdens and the likelihood that such shielding
enables their domestic enterprises to innovate and thrive. As I stated in chapter 2, this is not
intended to be a standalone factor, but rather a complementary factor that makes for a holistic
account of reasonableness. My broader conclusions on the reasonableness of the Pillar One
compromise are stated in paragraph 3.6. In the meantime, I make to address the political
considerations surrounding it.
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3.5

Political Landscape of the New Global Tax Deal

How is it that a multilateral tax deal that in some ways significantly impairs the tax jurisdiction
of LIDCs – some more than others – has achieved such wide endorsement, by nearly 140
countries? How has such a “lopsided” deal been designed, in the first place, despite the
overwhelming numerical participation of LIDCs? Pillar One is a highly political compromise. 772
Therefore, I think that a holistic appreciation of the compromise requires some extensive study
of its political backdrop and the place of LIDCs in that process. This examination is the focus of
this concluding section of the chapter. Here, I engage in an examination of the political aspects
of the Pillar One compromise from three angles: inclusivity, sovereignty, and pluralism. But
first, it is important to note that the new global tax deal is rooted in a chequered century old
history of international tax multilateralism that is shrouded in participatory skepticism.
Therefore, the ensuing perspectives on inclusivity, sovereignty, and pluralism, must be preceded
by a critical exploration of the historical aspects of international tax compromise, i.e., the histopolitical circumstances that produced the initial compromise and led to the present one.
3.5.3 Historical Dimensions
The regime governing the allocation of international tax rights is the outcome of a chain of
international compromises that crystalized during the period right after the First World War
(WW1) and the early 1970s.773 The cardinal aim of this regime is the relief/elimination of
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international double taxation, while managing to balance that objective with tax competition and
tax sovereignty.774
The emergence of double taxation as an impediment to international trade preceded WW1. Prior
to that period, taxpayers had occasionally complained about the double tax burdens imposed on
things like cross-border inheritance and governments provided some relief through domestic
legislation and tax treaties.775 The robust expansion of international trade and globalization shortly
after WW1 inspired policymakers of the time to seek solutions to various barriers to international
trade (including tax burdens) with the principal aim of facilitating trade between countries.776 The
war effort had driven participating states to increase their individual reliance on tax revenue, which
consequently heightened the tax burdens of taxpayers, especially those involved in international
trade.777 The war period also witnessed a fundamental shift in the tax structure of states. Prior to
that period, most states imposed easy-to-administer taxes on immobile economic assets and
activities (e.g., real estate taxes and tariffs). However, the emergence of income taxes as the main
source of tax revenue for most states increased the likelihood of international double taxation due
to the relative cross-border mobility of the tax base.778 The imperative to eliminate double taxation
and facilitate international trade grew more pressing after WW1 as policymakers began to see trade
liberalization as a mechanism to foster global peaceful coexistence. 779 The elimination of
economic barriers would ameliorate conflict by spreading wealth and promoting interdependence
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thereby making war anathema to the economic interests of leading states.780 Therefore, the
substantial work done by the League of Nations, as well as the early tax treaty models, reflects a
fundamental recognition that countries have a substantial interest, both for themselves and for their
nationals, to avoid impediments to trading relationships and commercial activity occasioned by
uncoordinated multiple taxation of the same income and the same taxpayers.781
In 1921, following persistent calls by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) for the
reduction of international double taxation and the recommendation of the 1920 International
Financial Conference at Brussels to that effect, the League of Nations, through its Financial
Committee, commissioned “four economists” (Professors Bruins, Einaudi and Seligman, and Sir
Joshua Stamp) to undertake a theoretical study of the issue of double taxation and to make
recommendations on how states could solve the problem. The four economists published a formal
report (1923 Report).782 The report concludes that the doctrine of economic allegiance constitutes
the most reasonable ground for a claim of tax jurisdiction and that the ‘modern’ tax system is based
on ability to pay, a conclusion that is regarded as a nudge towards residence country taxation.783
The report further explains double taxation as a consequence of double (or multiple) economic
allegiance, and outlines four alternative approaches to double taxation relief. 784 Each solution
requires states to give up taxing rights either at source or residence.785 The fundamental question

780

Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and
Social Advantage (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1911).
781
Lara Friedlander & Scott Wilkie, “Policy Forum: The History of Tax Treaty Provisions-And Why It Is Important
To Know About It” (2006) 54:4 Can Tax J 907 at 909.
782
1923 Report supra note 144.
783
Picciotto supra note 773 at 19.
784
Ibid.
785
Ibid at 41–42. The four options presented are: (1) the deduction method, requiring the state of residence to allow
deduction of all taxes paid at source; (2) the exemption method, requiring the source state to exempt the income of
non-residents from taxation; (3) the division method, requiring the source and residence states to split the tax relief
obligations; and (4) the apportionment of taxable items method, requiring the scheduling of income into different
classes and assignment of taxing rights over some classes to the resident state and others to source state.

216

for negotiation – the subject of compromise – was, “which Governments should give up revenue,
and to what extent?”786 The authors of the report were cognizant of the priority of source tax
jurisdiction and were keen to restrict it, out of concern over the potential of source taxation to
deplete residence taxation. As the 1923 report notes: “[it] might be desirable to impose some limit
upon the power of the country of origin to levy in [the] future specially heavy specific origin taxes
which would unduly deplete the exchequer of the country of residence”.787
The 1923 Report concludes, in alignment with its fourth option, that the right to tax different kinds
of wealth should be partitioned between residence and source countries. All kinds of corporeal
wealth, including immovables and tangible movable assets, should be taxed by the source country,
while all intangible wealth, except mortgages, should be taxed principally or wholly by the country
of residence.788
In 1922, prior to receiving the economists’ report, the Financial Committee of the League of
Nations also appointed a group of “Technical Experts”, comprising government tax officials from
seven European countries (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, Italy, The Netherlands and
Switzerland), to study the technical and practical aspects of the double taxation problem. The
resolutions of the Technical Experts, together with a general report, was submitted to the Financial
Committee in 1925 (1925 Report).789 The 1925 Report, which also drew from the theoretical work
of the 1923 Report, introduced two clusters of tax: schedular taxes (taxes levied on activities or
things) and general or personal taxes on income. For schedular taxes, the Technical Experts
stressed the importance of source taxation, while they also recognized the importance of residence
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country taxation for personal taxes. The 1925 Report is said to, overall, weigh in favour of
residence taxation.790 The report was submitted to the Financial Committee and became part of the
material for a series of multilateral negotiations between national governments of the major
industrialized countries, coordinated by the League of Nations.791
In 1927, an expanded Committee of Technical Experts, also commissioned by the League of
Nations,792 forged another report (the 1927 Report) which included a draft Model Convention
containing key principles that would serve as the framework for negotiation of a treaty between
states.793 The draft Model Convention, contained in the 1927 Report, divided all direct taxes into
personal and impersonal, but left it to the contracting states to decide which taxes to include in
each class.794 The draft Model Convention tilted towards source country taxation, with some
concessions granted to the country of residence.795 The country of source retained the right to levy
impersonal taxes, as well as personal taxes on income from immovable property and from
industrial, commercial and agricultural undertakings.796 The country of residence, on the other
hand, was restrained from levying impersonal taxes and was required to allow deductions from its
personal tax of that portion of the income already taxed in the source country.797
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The draft convention contained in the 1927 Report was subsequently made into three draft bilateral
conventions in 1928. These draft model conventions were submitted for consideration by a general
meeting of governmental experts called by the League, in Geneva in October 1928.798
Although these draft conventions did not significantly differ in terms of the general principles upon
which the jurisdiction to tax could be appropriated, as stipulated in the 1927 Report, the
development of these draft conventions witnessed an increased prioritization of the principle of
residence.799 Residence was made the basis of tax jurisdiction for an extensive range of taxable
items, including income from maritime shipping or air navigation, public loans, employment,
royalties, annuities, and independent services. Where tax is levied by the state of source, the
residence country would be required to provide relief by way of exemption or rebate.800 The same
increasing residence country bias can be ascribed to the subsequent draft plurilateral convention
of 1931801 and the 1933 draft bilateral convention (prepared mainly to deal with the problem of
allocation) which reinforced the preference for residence country taxation with provisions that
include a rather restrictive permanent establishment requirement for taxation of business profits at
source.802 The Technical Experts were, however, conscious of the fact that the pro-residence
principle was unlikely to gain widespread acceptance because, even beside the validity of the
economic arguments made in its favour, the imbalances of international investment flows were
hard to sell to capital-importing countries.803 The residence principle mostly benefited
creditor/capital-exporting countries while the source principle was more appealing to
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debtor/capital-importing countries.804 Debtor countries were mostly unwilling to give up
jurisdiction to tax foreign investors, especially the profits made by businesses owned or financed
from abroad.805 This divisive factor obstructed the march towards a compromise involving large
capital importers like France, Germany, and Italy and large capital exporters like the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.806 Indeed, due to the potential distributional disparity
between residence and source countries, countries could not form consensus on a binding
multilateral compromise and the initial intention to enter into a binding multilateral tax treaty was
abandoned altogether.807 The focus, thus, shifted towards the development of a bilateral treaty
framework. The three 1928 variants on direct taxes were to serve as models for bilateral
agreements.808 The main purpose of bilateral treaties was to settle conflicting claims of tax
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jurisdiction between states, while sovereign states retained the liberty to decide what taxes to
impose.809
The model for “good tax behaviour”810 in international taxation envisioned in the model tax treaties
continued to evolve during and after the Second World War (WW2), even though only about 60
general tax treaties were signed between 1920 and 1939.811 One of the important international
developments following the end of WW2 was the scrapping of the League of Nations and its
replacement by the United Nations. In the immediate aftermath of the war, attempts by the
successor to the League of Nations’ Financial Committee, the United Nations Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (UN Tax Committee) to continue the mandate
of shaping international tax policy were frustrated by a lack of consensus between capital exporting
and capital importing countries over how tax treaties should fundamentally apportion taxing rights.
Capital-exporting countries continued to favour greater emphasis on residence taxation vis-à-vis
source taxation, while capital importing countries clamoured for the opposite.812 Capitalizing on
the deadlock at the UN level and the push by the influential ICC for a tax treaty framework that
could be used by HIDCs, in 1954, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs assumed the task of
designing the framework for a model convention for agreement on double taxation between
member countries.813 The OECD published the OECD MTC in 1963 as a framework for the
negotiation of bilateral tax treaties. The OECD MTC was developed in response to the needs of
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HIDCs to have a “firm and solid” treaty base to use in negotiations814, but became the settled
standard for tax treaties globally.815 The Convention – largely a codification of the principles
developed in the League of Nations era – embodies the primary framework for the compromise of
tax jurisdiction between countries.816 It represents “the closest existing analogy to a global (though
partial) set of tax norms, and it widely influences the laws and treaties of OECD members as well
as nonmember states”.817 The OECD MTC serves an important purpose of fostering common
understanding of principles in actual tax treaties that adopt similar language and facilitates efficient
negotiation of tax treaties by providing a baseline that allows parties to focus on points of potential
disagreement.818
Beside designing the initial – and lasting – framework for international taxing rights allocation,
the OECD has reigned supreme as the principal institution that designs models for all forms of
international tax policy, leading some to regard the OECD as a de facto world tax body.819 This
may be so because “the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (of the OECD) has managed to settle on
standards that are neither hopelessly utopian, nor merely an endorsement of the status quo.”820 But,
it may also be so because of the sheer political influence that the OECD can muster.
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Kiser & Karceski observe that “most important political outcomes are the joint product of
structural conditions”.821 The rules governing international allocation of taxing rights – with their
distributional effects – are outcomes that cannot be divorced from their formative political
landscape. I have highlighted in this section how positions taken by certain countries – or groups
of countries – and, in some instances, a non-state actor: the ICC, shaped the developmental
trajectory of the double taxation compromise, including the displacement of the League of Nations
(effectively the UN) by the OECD as the principal forum for global tax policy development.
International tax regimes are generally products of negotiated compromise, and as with anything
that requires compromise or consensus amongst actors with divergent interests, there is scope for
political dealing, sometimes between those that do not deal from positions of equal economic or
political strength.822 There can, therefore, be no pretence that international tax rules are sewn from
linens of technical purity and political neutrality.823
Scholars have increasingly paid attention to the instrumentality of (economic and political) power
in shaping taxing rights allocation compromises and, consequently, the distribution of global tax
revenue.824 It is a part of the sentiment in critical international tax scholarship that LIDCs are
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trapped in an international tax regime that is framed by dominant HIDCs in a way that leaves them
(LIDCs) with little choice than to accept “unfair” bargains over tax sovereignty and tax
jurisdiction.825 The uneven power complex of the international tax regime is systematically
reflected in its distributional imbalance, which disproportionately favours residence countries –
i.e., the countries where the headquarters of TNCs are located – over source countries, where key
economic activities take place.826 It also reflects in the persistence with standards of profit
allocation rules that are innately too complex for LIDCs to administer and which, consequently,
robs LIDCs of tax revenue, often in favor of HIDCs where benefitting taxpayers reside and
repatriate tax revenue.827
It seems an indisputable reality of international relations that states are not and have never been
equal, and the international tax regime was birthed – and is maintained – in that state of structural
inequality.828 It is no surprise that barely a decade after the OECD MTC came into being, tax
scholars had begun to spotlight the power imbalances dictating the entrenchment of a pro-residence
tax regime. Charles Irish noted these imbalances in the following words:
There appear to be several reasons for the emphasis on residence in tax agreements between
developed countries. Probably the fundamental reason is that the emphasis on residence
represents the more favorable alternative for the country with the stronger bargaining
position. Frequently countries have an interest in capital, technology and services
possessed by the taxpayers of other countries. In such instances, the ‘interested’ country is
the potential source country and the other is the potential residence country. As between
825
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the two countries, the potential residence country thus has the stronger economic position
and the evidence indicates that it has used its superior position to ‘persuade’ the source
country to forgo tax revenues so as to insure availability of the desired capital, technology
and services. This apparently is what happened immediately after World War II between
the countries of Western Europe and the United States. At that time, the Western European
countries were very interested in attracting United States capital and technology to rebuild
and modernize their war-ravaged economies. In order to ensure the unfettered flow of such
capital and technology into their economies, these countries accepted tax agreements with
the United States with a heavy emphasis on the residence principle.829
International taxation deals with two main policy issues: international double taxation and
international tax competition.830 Yet the approach of the international tax regime towards
addressing these issues has often reflected the class parochialism that undermines system
inclusivity and legitimacy. First, with regard to containing international tax competition, or what
the OECD labels “harmful tax competition”,831 rich (OECD) countries have often gone to lengths
to name and shame small country tax havens and to use coercive force on such countries to adjust
their tax systems to conform with required standards of transparency and anti-abuse832 while
simultaneously meting out a milder treatment to their own members who are reported to be the
biggest facilitators of “harmful tax competition”.833 Some commentators view this “selective”
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assertion of coercive force as a micro reflection of the broader power distribution problem that
confronts international tax relations.834
On the classic politics of double taxation prevention, two important historical events elucidate the
stranglehold that HIDCs have on the basic structure of international taxing rights allocation. First,
during WW2 and the preoccupation of the world’s major powers with that armed conflict, LIDCs
from mostly the Latin American region, at the Fiscal Committee Conference of 1940,
masterminded an attempt to replace of the League of Nations’ 1928 Model Convention with the
draft 1943 Mexico Model.835 The Mexico draft was designed to promote the use of tax treaties
between HIDCs and LIDCs and was generally more consistent with the principle of taxing income
at source.836 However, upon their post-war return, HIDCs widely rejected this more pro-source
taxation arrangement; and, instantly, replaced it with the draft 1946 London Model. The London
draft reverted to the pro-residence country bias that preceded the Mexico Model.837 It is no surprise
that Latin American countries for a long time resisted the urge to sign tax treaties.838 According to
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Carroll, Latin American countries overwhelmingly favored source country taxation over residence
country taxation. Thus, these countries considered the European definition of a permanent
establishment too restrictive and unfit for the purpose of source country taxation.839
Second, around the 1970s, the emergence of tax scholarship that critically appraised the
distributional orientation of taxing rights allocation based on the OECD MTC led to a few
amelioratory developments. First, a Group of Experts of the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) published an alternative Model Convention (1976) that was more favorable
to source-based taxation vis-à-vis the OECD MTC and was meant for use between LAFTA
member states and states outside the region. The LAFTA Model Convention descended into
oblivion because OECD countries declined to sign tax treaties based on it.840 The demise of the
LAFTA Model Convention was shortly after succeeded by a response from the UN Tax
Committee, which released the UNMTC in 1980.841 The UNMTC is designed to be more
favourable to LIDCs by limiting the restrictions on source taxation.842 However, the UNMTC is
also a mere variation of the OECD MTC; and a major reason for its limited departure from the
OECD version is the insistence of HIDCs.843 Otherwise, it is predictable that the UNMTC would
have followed a similar path to oblivion as the LAFTA model.
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Ironically, decolonization and the consequent emergence of many non-Western LIDCs as new
frontiers of capital export for western HIDCs became a driving factor in the convergence of HIDCs
around the OECD MTC principles which HIDCs had previously found difficult to reach common
ground on. These newly independent, capital-importing countries allowed HIDCs viable
alternatives to export capital to and derive huge revenue under the subsisting pro-residence country
framework. As Genschel & Rixen explain:
With respect to non-Western states, all Western states were capital exporters. This
facilitated their eventual convergence on the OECD Convention’s heavily residence-based
rules for taxing cross-border (passive) income flows. Second, power asymmetry: The
Western countries dominated the world economy. They were the main global suppliers of
real, financial, and human capital. The rest of the world depended on Western investment
more than the West in turn depended on investment from the rest of the world. This gave
Western governments extensive power to dictate the terms under which cross-border flows
of investment income are taxed.844
The above spectrum of reality has led some scholars to excoriate the international tax regime as
an exclusionary, hegemonistic, imperialistic, and exploitative manifestation of global tax order
which systematically suppresses and deprioritizes the voices and interests of LIDCs, to the
advantage of HIDCs or their transnational corporations845, while other commentators highlight
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and, in some cases, question the incursion of the international tax regime on the tax sovereignty of
LIDCs.846 Tsilly Dagan, for instance, contends that tax treaties “serve much less heroic goals, such
as easing bureaucratic hassles and coordinating tax terms between the contracting countries, and
much more cynical goals, particularly redistributing tax revenues from the poorer to the richer
signatory countries.”847
Oladiji is convinced that “international law - especially as it relates to taxation - has been utilised
by some dominant western states to perpetuate their interests at the expense of other countries
categorised as developing or less developed.” 848 Accordingly, “although inclusiveness is said to
lie at the heart of legitimacy and effectiveness, the voices of developing countries have been
largely excluded from the formulation of global tax regulations.” 849
Similarly, for Rocha, the international tax regime is a theatre of imperialistic and exploitative
power which is exemplified by “the transformation of certain tax criteria that favor the interest of
developed economies into international tax standards that become considered as basic principles
of international taxation”.850 These international tax standards, according to Magalhães, are
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perennially determined by small, non-inclusive, clubs of experts, scientific committees and
working groups.851 The author particularly takes issue with the role of the highly influential
OECD – the so-called “rich countries club”852 – which strings global reaching tax policies despite
only representing the interests of a fraction of the world’s countries. 853 The emergence of the
OECD as, effectively, a world tax organization, despite its very limited membership and
participation, heralded “the creation of an exclusionary architecture that deprives the majority of
the world’s countries from meaningfully influencing legal-institutional choices vis-à-vis what
countries should tax cross-border transactions, a process that has clear global distributional
implications.”854 It is important to expose this structural exclusivism because “in its regulatory
solutions, the OECD tends to favor the interests of its rich country members and marginalize the
concerns of poor countries.”855
Because OECD countries, especially those in the G7, enjoyed a near-monopoly on the export of
capital, the OECD could virtually monopolize work on the rules of taxing rights allocation without
undermining global acceptance and effectiveness of those rules. If non-OECD countries refused
to play along, they could be effectively ostracized from the international tax regime, and any
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radically different alternative framework embraced by them could be rendered utterly redundant
as was the case with the LAFTA Convention.856
The OECD is adjudged to perpetuate inefficient, inequitable, and obsolete elements of the
international tax regime such as the permanent establishment and the separate entity/arm’s length
principles, allowing only piecemeal changes to international tax norms.857 The OECD has,
regardless, managed to maintain a monopoly as the forum for international tax reform, despite
persistent calls for the establishment of a more representative world tax body.858
The establishment of such a body featured prominently in academic and public discourse in the
period of transition to the 21st Century,859 which culminated in the UN floating the idea at the
Monterrey summit of 2002 as part of its International Financing for Development (FfD)
initiative.860 The UN’s effort to make taxation a part of the conference agenda and to table the idea
of an international tax organization was, however, frustrated because the rich countries showed
little appetite to build such a body “while the OECD was already engaged in a comprehensive tax
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agenda”.861 The OECD lobbied the G7 to truncate the idea862 and then followed up with the launch
of the merely deliberative International Tax Dialogue, a forum comprising the OECD, World
Bank, IMF and a few other organizations for voluntary exchange of ideas.863
The prolonged failure – or reluctance – of OECD member states, to address pertinent issues of
international tax reform, especially issues of base erosion and profit shifting, that were of utmost
concern to LIDCs, until a time of pressing strategic need for HIDCs further evidences the
monopolistic and, perhaps, detrimental control that HIDCs enjoy over international tax
governance.864
Certainly, not all international tax scholarship subscribes to the view that political influence has
held much sway in the formation or sustenance of the international tax regime. Thus, a less
deprecatory perspective on the subject is shared by scholars who opine that national interest, rather
than political influence, ultimately defines the limits on tax jurisdiction that countries are willing
to concede.
Diane Ring, for instance, conducts an extensive evaluation of the power subject in international
tax regime formation. She draws on conventional perspectives of international relations theory
to explain the structure of international tax regimes, specifically the double taxation regime. In
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her article entitled “International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications”, 865 the author asks
some pertinent questions regarding how the double taxation regime – which consists of domestic
rules and tax treaties – allocates taxing rights between states: “if (business) transactions cross
national borders, who taxes them? What rules apply? And perhaps most important, what happens
when countries disagree? Who ‘prevails’ and why?”. 866 The last question is particularly
important because, just as the author notes: “[i]f the goal is to understand and predict how nations
reach agreement, then a willingness to examine a "national" perspective on negotiations is
necessary.”867
Ring observes that the basic goals, other than revenue, of the international tax regime are the
same ones generally espoused for domestic tax policy: efficiency, equity and administrability;
and achievement of any of these goals would usually require cooperation or agreement with
other sovereign countries.868 Cooperation is necessary because enactment of domestic legislation
is often inadequate to achieve the intended tax policy. The tax rules and decisions of other
jurisdictions are crucial to the bottom line for taxpayers with cross border income and for
countries seeking to tax them. Thus, to effectively implement a desired tax policy it may be
necessary to persuade other countries to participate in a shared vision, at least to some degree. 869
The author, thus, primarily views a mutual interest foundation as the building of an international
tax regime.
Under what conditions are countries likely to agree? In responding to this question, the article
turns to international relations theory and analysis. 870 A subset of international relations theory
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– “international regime theory” – deals with how international regimes are formed. 871 Ring
identifies four evaluative perspectives of international relations theory analysis – neorealism,
neoliberalism, pluralism, and cognitivism – noting that that these perspectives form part of the
background for the formation of international regimes. 872 The author infers that each of these
major threads relies on a primary explanatory variable for behaviour and outcomes in the
international context.873 Neorealists view power as the driving force behind states’ decisions,
behaviour, and interactions on the world stage. 874 Central to a state’s engagement on the world
stage is its desire to achieve relative gains over other states; and the state, being a rational actor,
will exert its (economic and political) power to achieve preferred ends, regardless of the
distributional consequences for other states. 875
According to Ring, neoliberalists regard states’ self-interest, more than their power and craving
for relative gain, as the primary driver of states’ engagement on the international stage. They
view a state's pursuit of national self-interest within a market-oriented ecosystem as a dominant
factor in shaping international relations and in determining how successful international
institutions can be in directing and modifying international behaviors. 876 Here, the pursuit of
absolute gains (that is, both states are better off) is more important than the pursuit of relative
gains (measured in comparison to other states' success). 877
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The cognitivists – critics of the neorealism and neoliberalism – treat knowledge and information
as critical to the shaping of international regimes. Whomever has information, knowledge, and
ideas, and whomever determines what we value and think, de facto determines much of the
outcome.878 This is because states create their identities and determine their interests based on
the predominant beliefs held by state actors. Therefore, changes in knowledge and belief systems
can trigger changes in policy. We should, therefore, focus attention on how knowledge is
distributed and how it shapes the views of decision makers. 879
Ring also highlights the emergence of “pluralism”, a gap-filler framework which illuminates and
analyzes the role of non-state actors such as individuals, bureaucracies, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in decision making on the global level. 880

878

Ibid at 93.
Ibid at 92–93 & 112 [“Epistemic communities facilitate regime formation by first developing some consensus
among themselves on an issue (for example, ozone). Second, the epistemic community, which exists across the
relevant states, exerts influence to shape, direct, and change state views on the issue. This new knowledge and
learning can cause the states to redefine their conception of their national interest. To the extent the epistemic
community has been successful disseminating its information and causing decisionmakers to adopt its views, the
“widely shared ideas may facilitate cooperation in the absence of a unique equilibrium, [and serve] as focal points
which help define acceptable solutions to collective action problems”] referencing Peter M Haas, “Epistemic
Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Co-Operation” (1992) 46:1 Int’l Org 1.
880
Ibid 92. Although Ring does not pursue this perspective in her analysis of the double taxation regime, the initial
reference illuminates the salient point that states are not the only (major) players in international regime formation.
In a separate piece, Ring extensively explores the structure, modus operandi, and role of various transnational
organizations – comprising both state and non-state actor bodies and interest groups – in shaping the norms of
international taxation, including the so-called “soft norms”. The organizations surveyed include: Centre de
Rencontre et d'Etudes des Dirigeants des Administrations Fiscales (CREDAF), Commonwealth Association of Tax
Administrations (CATA), Inter-American Centre for Tax Administrations, International Tax and Investment
Organisation (ITIO), Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA), Leeds Castle Group, Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA), Seven
Country Working Group, United Nations (U.N.) (organizations with state membership) and Business and Industry
Advisory Committee (BIAC) Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP) Confederation Fiscale Europeenne (CFE)
European American Tax Institute (EATI) European Association of Tax Law Professors (EATLP) European
Taxpayers Association Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Institute for Professionals in Taxation (IPT), International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Federation of
Accountants (IFAC), International Fiscal Association, International Tax Dialogue (ITD), International Tax Planning
Association (ITPA), Tax Executive Institution (TEI), United States Council for International Business (USCIB) World
Taxpayers Associations (organizations with state membership). See Diane Ring, “Who is Making International Tax
Policy: International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World” (2010) 33:3 Fordham Int'l LJ 649 at
652 & 653:
“Although "hard" law, including international tax law, remains the formal province of the state, or two states
in the case of tax treaties, such unilateral or bilateral exercises of tax policy are inadequate. Some questions
879

235

This brief theoretical exposition evokes the fundamental question of whether formation and
settlement of the international tax regime was primarily driven by states’ power, states’ interest,
or the successful propagation of knowledge by “epistemic communities”. The answer would
seem to be “all of the above”. As Ring observes: “if regimes develop for different reasons, then
the different theories may each be valid and informative for some subset of cases”. 881
In terms of her specific views on the current subject, Ring expresses skepticism towards the
notion that power and distributional elements played a defining role in framing the double
taxation regime that emerged from the 1920s. To support this perspective, the author highlights
that the U.S. as one of the most powerful countries – from a creditor/debtor country classification
– was willing to endorse with a pro-source assignment of taxing rights favoured by mainly debtor
(capital importing) countries.882 Notably, the U.S.’s position largely contrasted with that of the
U.K., a similarly positioned major creditor (capital exporting) country after WW2. To buttresses
her stance on this point, Ring emphasizes that developing countries – who typically have a major
preference for source taxation – have often been the initiators of double tax treaties with
developed countries. She asks: “why do the developing countries continue, for the most part, to
participate in (and in fact often clamor for) bilateral treaties even on these general terms?” 883

can be settled through the bilateral treaty process, but many more benefit from the input and interaction of
more than two states. This interaction is often prompted, facilitated, or structured by at least one international
organization… Today, international organizations of varying size, scope, composition, and mission consider
questions of transfer pricing, electronic commerce, financial instruments, and business restructurings, just to
identify a few. In some cases, this work ultimately emerges in the form of a treaty, but the manifestation of
these efforts has expanded far beyond the treaty format to include guidelines, recommendations, and topical
reviews.”
Alisson Christians has more recently pursued a similar research project. See Allison Christians, “International Tax
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Ring concludes that “of the two dominant views of regime formation, the neoliberalist view more
accurately reflects the experience of the double taxation regime.” 884 The author argues that
although “the neorealist focus on power (including economic power) may be useful in explaining
why one distributive rule prevails over another in some treaty negotiations, the neoliberalist
model offers a more comprehensive understanding of the regime formation process”. 885 She
asserts that the core reason why countries continue to embrace tax treaties is that “the treaties
provide benefits that the market has failed to provide – coordination of the tax rules between
nations.”886 The author, however, acknowledges that a regime is more probable in respect of
coordination between two developed countries than between a developed and developing
country due to the likely skewed distributive consequences of a compromise in the latter case. 887
Yariv Brauner, likewise, attempts to dispel the notion that LIDCs are somehow pressured to accept
international tax standards that are detrimental to their revenue mobilization needs, pointing out,
in contrast, that LIDCs actively seek to conclude tax treaties with HIDCs and LIDCs tremendously
benefit from them.888 The author asserts that:
Developing countries have benefited from the current bilateral tax treaty practice
immensely, as their enthusiasm to conclude as many treaties as possible with developed
countries proves. They have never been forced, nor have they claimed to have been forced,
884
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into concluding a bilateral treaty with a developed country. In fact, in many cases the
developing countries wish to conclude treaties with the developed countries, which often
reject their overture.889
Patricia Brown acknowledges the importance of bargaining power in international tax regime
formation, but argues, at least with regard to bilateral tax treaties, that developing countries have
more bargaining power than is acknowledged in the literature. In support of her argument, the
author points to empirical studies that seem to show developing countries getting their way when
it comes to the terms of a tax treaty. 890 Summarising the analytical work of Wijnen & de Goede 891
on various provisions of the UNMTC that are contained in 1,811 tax treaties entered into between
1997 and 2013, the author narrates that:
Although some provisions occur more often than others, their research suggests that
developing countries have a fair amount of bargaining strength to achieve results that are
important to them. For example, of the 1,811 treaties studied, 1,579 (approximately 87%)
allowed the source State to tax royalties. Of the treaties between an OECD member and
non-OECD member, 85% allowed for taxation of royalties by the source State. As
between two non-OECD members, 94% of treaties provide for taxation of royalties by
the source State, while only 72% of treaties between two OECD members did so.
Moreover, 42% of the treaties included a rule expanding the definition of a permanent
establishment to include the furnishing of services in a source State for a specified period
(most often six months, but sometimes as low as one month). Again, the adoption rate
for this provision was highest (58%) among treaties between two non-OECD members,
but still significant (35%) in treaties between an OECD member and a non-OECD
member, and between two OECD members (17%). Although the percentage of treaties
adopting other provisions is frequently lower than for these examples, such alternative
provisions still occur in hundreds of treaties.892
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Brown observes that many of the tax treaties signed by developing countries with developed
countries (including OECD members) contain source taxation rules that are more favourable
than the prescriptions of the OECD MTC, and, sometimes, even the UNMTC. This leads the
author to conclude that these model conventions do not define tax treaty practice but are mere
frameworks for commencing negotiation. 893
Critics might respond that these positive perspectives do not sufficiently reflect the reality of
power relations in international tax regime formation, especially Ring’s stance on the
decisiveness of interest alignment vis-à-vis power play in the initial crystallization of the double
tax regime. It is important to note, however, that neither Brauner nor Brown dismisses nor
downplays the decisiveness of great power in the initial regime formation, as their contentions
respond specifically to contemporary notions of power play in tax treaties negotiation.894 But
even so, the observations made by Brauner and Brown respectively may not themselves reflect
a power shift between HIDCs and LIDCs but may instead be explained as outcomes that evidence
some of the shifting attitudes in international tax relations, which are best reflected in HIDCs’
increasing realization of the imperative of participating in more equitable compromises of taxing
rights with LIDCs (by less suppression of source taxation). Credit for some of that attitudinal
shift may be attributed to the provocative works of commentators within and outside the
academia who have consistently articulated the (potentially) detrimental effects of the initial tax
treaty structure on revenue mobilization in LIDCs. 895 The relative recency of the tax treaties
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surveyed by Wijnen & de Goede (1997–2013) – much of which draws from the more progressive
stipulations of the UNMTC – is not lost in that point.
Progress of the sort featured by Wijnen & de Goede, if anything, justify the continued
engagement of scholarship with the subject of power asymmetry in international tax relations.
Absent such critical engagement it may be more difficult to see the kinds of progressive changes
facilitated by the UNMTC, let alone something more radical. Moreover, the accommodation of
piecemeal changes to tax rules does not necessarily exorcise the gamut of power mismatch in
international tax relations, both in its subtle and brazen manifestations.
Vet, Cassimon, & de Vijver identify different facets of power in international tax governance.896
First, because “the conception of society that predominates is a hangover from an earlier s ocial
formation”, the continuing bias of the international tax regime towards residence country
taxation is merely a perpetuation of the colonial era distribution of power which surrounded the
birthing of the international tax regime. 897 Second, power disguises its true influence in its
invisibility. Thus, “the unpoliticization of the distributional impact, for instance, the technically
insulated discourse of international tax experts, gave the distributive decisions an unpolitical
aura, while these decisions did mold the regime further toward the interests of transnational
corporations”.898 In other words, because deliberations on international tax rules are typically
presented as a technical matter, the emphatic overlay of power over what considerations become
rules (and what considerations do not) is often disguised and underestimated. This appraisal
holds true even as far back as 1921 when the Financial Committee of the League of Nations
appointed the four economists as “technical experts” to design the double taxation framework.
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The Financial Committee framed the mandate as a technical matter rather than a political
exercise. However, as Allison Christians observes: “Far from being a technical or scientific
matter, the questions asked implicate not just economics but also politics, culture, society,
institutions, diplomacy, and above all, power”. 899 In their report, the four economists themselves
make a telling admission that the economic origin of an item of income could not be scientifically
ascertained.900
Third, power manifests in the capacity to “shield the policy agenda from certain discussions and
bring others to the fore of the debate.” 901 A truly inclusive international tax governance
framework that is devoid of power manipulation would look to put on the agenda issues that are
important to all participants or all countries that would be affected by it. 902 Yet, as the OECDG20 BEPS agenda revealed, more recently, HIDCs have the capacity – and willingness – to stay
off the discussion of issues that are not of priority to them, e.g., the rebalancing of taxing rights
between source and residence countries 903, or to limit the conversation to aspects of a broader
issue that are of paramount importance to them, e.g., taxation of the digital economy.904
Ultimately, matters of greater importance to LIDCs can be left off the menu. 905
Further, power is also effective in constraining the rational circumference of those who are
subject to work through the system which it perpetuates. 906 By presenting certain knowledge as
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the sole truth (“regimes of truth”) on a particular subject, e.g., transfer pricing, we are
conditioned to accept that the subject (tied to its economic nature) is inherently complex and
there are no rational alternatives by which we can displace its complex existence. 907 Instead, we
are compelled to sink further into that narrow corridor of maneuver, comforted occasionally by
the emergence of piecemeal “solutions” which, as the sophisticated tax planning machinations
of the chief beneficiaries of the status quo inevitably adapt, we are forced back to the same
drawing board for “better” solutions.908
Vet, Cassimon, & de Vijver’s focus on the “less visible expressions of power” 909 holds peculiar
promise when we relate it to some of the less visible aces that influence LIDCs to surrender their
tax jurisdiction. I have focused mainly on power in the context of tax treaty negotiation and
things of the sort, but the reality is that the circumstances under which countries assimilate a
‘culture of tax compromise’ transcend that narrow contextualization.910 There is a background to
such cultural gravitation that is driven, at least in part, by the convergence of persuasive epistemic
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orientations, and, perhaps less overtly by the ubiquitous institutional propagation of certain ideas.
Therefore, if we look beyond the initial formation of the double tax regime and dig further into
how “giving up” taxing rights became the universally acceptable “good tax behaviour”, the
influence that Global North institutions and experts have had on LIDCs’ willingness to give up
taxing rights becomes evident.911 In this sense, I argue that this so-called culture of tax
compromise that is rampant in LIDCs is partly a product of legal transplants, largely midwifed by
Global North institutions and experts.
The concept of “legal transplantation”, according to its acclaimed proponent Alan Watson,912 is
“the moving of a rule or system of law from one country to another, or from one people to
another”.913 There are contrasting views on the plausibility of legal transplants. Some scholars
opine that transplants are not possible because a true transplant must entail the same application
of the rules in the recipient country as they were in the source country914, while others are more
receptive to the notion of legal transplantation, albeit with altered perspectives on the realization
of the phenomenon.915 This thesis does not delve into that debate, but I am willing to accept, at
least at a minimal degree, the possibility that the laws and policies of one country or a few
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countries, become assimilated into another country’s corpus juris. I am also willing to accept that
position as a fact of international tax law.
The view that the international tax regime is a product of legal transplants is shared by Sunita
Jogarajan.916 According to Jogarajan, transplantation takes different forms: (1) the transplant of
tax laws from one country to another; (2) the imposition of tax laws by a multinational organization
such as the European Union Court of Justice; and (3) the transplantation of tax laws through the
international tax regime.917 The author uses the third category to analyze the international tax
regime, arguing that the tax laws or principles of one or a small number of countries were
transplanted to the League of Nations at the onset of the regime and from then these same laws or
principles were transplanted to a large number of countries,918 aided in large part by the cultural
non-specificity and universal applicability of the general features of international tax.919
Many of the countries that implement the initial international tax compromise had not attained
sovereign status when the compromise was structured and, for that reason, had zero direct
participation in its formation. Yet, many of these countries – like the former colonies of Western
European countries who only gained independence after WW2 – broadly incorporated this
compromise framework into their tax systems. Many have signed tax treaties with HIDCs in
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pursuit of deeper initiation into the international tax club. How do these countries come to be so
persuaded that it was wise to structure their tax systems to give up tax revenue? One rational
explanation is the influence of predominantly Global North economists, experts, and institutions
who, as quasi-successors to the League of Nations, played significant roles in convincing LIDCs
that it was in their best interest to structure their tax systems in certain ways, as a test for
participation in a rules-based international order.920
Experts from HIDCs – a so-called “cosmopolitan tax elite” – have had an enduring influence on
tax policy in developing and emerging economies, especially since the much-heralded Shoup
mission to Japan, which commenced in 1949.921 Since then, HIDCs and HIDC-controlled
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have significantly shaped tax policy development in
LIDCs, sometimes as a precondition for donor assistance.922 Western-style institutions led tax
policy missions to African countries in the 1960s – a period when many of these countries only
just gained independence – on the advice of leading economists that the new states should prioritize
the development of efficient tax systems.923 Some of those missions – for instance, one led by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to Tanganyika (now Tanzania)
in 1959/1960 – led to the adoption of a low corporate tax rate policy by the East African state.924
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The rationale was that greater revenue was better sought, not by imposing higher tax rates, but by
the expansion of economic activities, which could be facilitated by low taxes.925
Perhaps, at no time was this navigation towards lower-rate taxation more rapid than in the 1980s
and 1990s when, in keeping with the Western-engineered neoliberal trends of the times,926 LIDCs
were persuaded to embrace various structural adjustment and trade liberalization policies, e.g.,
relaxing trade barriers and cutting down or abolishing taxes,927 mostly instigated by HIDC
governments, Western tax experts and powerful transnational lending agencies like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.928 That period witnessed the proliferation
of “mass produced” tax reform in LIDCs without adequate deference to the suitability of those
reforms to specific local circumstances.929 These transpositions of policy norms epitomize the
external tax policy constraints that alien institutions impose on LIDCs930 and deserves some credit
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for materializing a deep-rooted culture of taxing rights surrender – one that ultimately crystallizes
in a market failure of harmful international tax competition.931
When we take this totality of “histo-political” factors into consideration we can better appreciate
the systematic architecture of the taxing rights allocation compromises that stacked the
distributional balance of international economic integration against LIDCs. These political factors
remain relevant players in the distributional dimensions that now entangle the emerging Pillar One
framework. Political and economic power continues to play an important role in shaping the
important subject of who gets what and how is that decided? How inclusive is the OECD BEPS
Inclusive Framework? To what extent is the tax sovereignty of countries at stake? Who is else is
involved in the tax policies that are being churned out? These are the questions that I engage with
for the rest of this chapter.
3.5.2 Inclusivity: To the Dance Tune of Great Power
The OECD has enjoyed the mandate to manage the most extensive multilateral effort to reform
international tax rules in a century. Perhaps in a bid to confront some of the skepticism
surrounding its own legitimacy as a global tax body, the OECD has, since the commissioning of
the “Inclusive Framework” in July 2016, been keen to emphasize that states involved in the
Inclusive Framework have been doing so “on an equal footing”. 932 To what extent is this claim
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of inclusivity true? As I discussed in chapter 2, there are observers of the process who would
dispute the OECD’s claims of inclusivity – and legitimacy.933 In a piece that I co-authored with
my doctoral research counterpart, Lyla Latif, of the University of Warwick, U.K., I discussed
the subject of inclusivity in contemporary international tax governance. 934 In that piece, I
identified three distinct dimensions of inclusivity: procedural inclusivity, subject matter
inclusivity, and output inclusivity.935 The first entails that all interested states should have equal
opportunities of participation in all aspects of international tax regime formation. The second
entails that the international tax reform agenda should contain matters of importance to all states
– or class of states – regardless of status. In other words, “Action Plans” should not be limited
to the tax issues that are of elevated importance to certain states, to the exclusion of others. The
third dimension of inclusivity entails that the outcomes that are reached in regime formation
should adequately accommodate the perspectives of all invested states, again, regardless of status
or influence capital. That is the spirit of a compromise, after all. I am happy to adopt this
framework for my current analysis. However, I limit my analysis here to the first and third
aspects: procedural inclusivity and output inclusivity. I consider the question of subject
inclusivity to be redundant since this entire chapter focuses on one subject: addressing the tax
challenges of economic digitalization. I examine, mainly, whether the process that led to the
conclusion of the Pillar One tax compromise adequately includes LIDCs, i.e., “on an equal
footing”, and whether the output reflects an adequate measure of deference to the will of LIDCs.
It is important, first, to reiterate that the process that produced the Pillar One compromise is
being managed by the OECD, a body that is answerable to only its members, who, incidentally,
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make up less than a quarter of the world’s countries. 936 The reform process “commenced” in
2012 when the G20, another exclusive club, mandated the OECD to begin the process of
reforming a flawed international tax regime.937 It has been observed that global powers, through
the G20, only became keen to address BEPS problems after the 2008 global financial crisis which
devasted the economies of rich countries and forced them to dole out huge bailout funds.938 The
OECD operated in this largely exclusive regalia when it commenced the process of churning out
reform initiatives to the rest of the world, including the 2013 BEPS report and the 15 Action
Plans of 2015.939 The Action items, also endorsed by the G20, followed the “top-down” approach
that the G20 had used in other aspects of international economic law, including the fight against
tax evasion.940 However, following a trail of criticism about its lack of inclusivity, the OECD
BEPS initiative was expanded in 2016 to include all states and jurisdictions that were desirous
of participating in global tax policy reform especially in the next phase of the reform: BEPS
2.0.941 This expansion represents the broadest inclusion of states in international tax reform since
the post-war period when the OECD took control of the process from the League of Nations
Fiscal Committee and its successor, the UN Tax Committee. However, despite this noticeable
expansion, the Inclusive Framework continues to attract skepticism around its support of genuine
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inclusivity and equal participation.942 Michael Lennard, a former Chief of the International Tax
Cooperation Section in the Financing for Sustainable Development Office of the UN and Secretary
of the UN Tax Committee and a former tax treaty adviser in the OECD Tax Treaty Secretariat
once queried that:
Even in that body, non-OECD/G20 countries participate as “associates” on an “equal
footing” (another undefined term). In determining to what extent the associates have truly
become partners, an assessment would need to be done of the future drafting and interpreting
roles of the OECD Secretariat (overwhelmingly, especially in policy development, from
OECD country governments) and OECD Working Parties (such as WP 1 on treaties and WP
6 on transfer pricing), of which the non-OECD countries are only observers.943
Lennard’s skepticism is echoed by a consistent critic of the OECD’s role in international tax policy
development, Professor Allison Christians, who, while responding to one of the Inclusive
Framework’s policy publications, remarked that “countries from outside a core group of key
players have not really experienced inclusive participation.”944 This critic adds that “if anything,
what is unified in the OECD approach is its commitment to an exclusive process of consensus
building that replicates that of the founders of the international tax order, apparently unchanged
by developments like inclusive participation and equal footing.”945
Christians’ criticism was not well received by the OECD. In a response crafted by one of the
OECD Secretariat’s senior officials, Ben Dickinson, the OECD retorted that:
The 135 countries in the Inclusive Framework are working together on the new rules in a
participatory way… The Inclusive Framework Steering Group comprises 24 countries from
the OECD, G-20, and developing countries including in Africa from Ivory Coast, Nigeria,
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Senegal, and South Africa. In this body, ‘the great powers’ include China (vice chair) and
India.946
Dickinson went on to detail some of the internal workings of the Inclusive Framework and
concluded that “suggestions that there is no radical departure from the current rules on international
taxation are therefore very wide of the mark.”947
Christians’ criticism of inclusivity in the BEPS process was not expressly supported by empirical
evidence. Therefore, a fair observer might tend to ascribe the benefit of the doubt to the responses
of Dickinson who is, after all, unlike the professor, an insider with firsthand knowledge of the
workings of the Inclusive Framework. Perhaps, only LIDC participants are positioned to shed light
on the level of participation and input that they can muster in the process, in a manner that
effectively counters the assertions of Dickinson. This empirical substance was supplied in the form
of research conducted by a group of tax policy scholars for the International Centre for Taxation
and Development (ICTD) Christensen, Hearson & Randriamanalina, who find that:
The IF’s expansion has made little difference to the number of lower-income countries
attending meetings at which the practical technical policy work is done, and that most
members are fairly silent participants. This is partly because of well-documented structural
obstacles not unique to the IF, but is exacerbated by some aspects of the OECD’s decisionmaking processes, such as the pace and intensity of discussions, the culture of policymaking,
the costs of attending regular meetings in Paris, and the absence of routine and timely
translation of documents and meetings. This can make the OECD a daunting environment
for member state delegates, but especially for those from lower-income countries. In
addition, many have joined with no intention of influencing standards, but rather in pursuit
of technical assistance or prestige, or under coercion from the European Union.948
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These findings highlight some of the structural barriers to inclusivity that confronts LIDCs and
infuse substance to the claims of scholars like Christians who attack the fairness of the Inclusive
Framework. African representative bodies like ATAF and the West African Tax Administration
Forum (WATAF) have echoed the alarm on their members’ inability to fully participate in the
process. In a 2020 statement, ATAF addressed both the technical and political intricacies of the
Inclusive Framework process and the rush to stampede its members into ill-informed
commitments:
[w]e are very concerned that the political and technical complexities of the Inclusive
Framework proposals and the timing of the process that aims for a global agreement by the
end of 2020 means it is extremely challenging for many of our members to fully participate
in the Inclusive Framework process and to ensure the new rules are fit for purpose for
African countries. We are concerned that these complexities may mean some countries
may commit to new rules without a full understanding of the revenue and investment
implications for them.949
While the OECD secretariat has been committed to helping LIDCs overcome these challenges, the
reality is that many countries simply cannot adapt to the pace of the process.950 More recently, in
2021, WATAF also cast a disillusioned assessment over the participation opportunities of its
members in the process that produced the Pillar One compromise:
While we commend the effort of the G20, OECD Secretariat and the Inclusive Framework
in securing this important deal, we are concerned however at the direction taken on some
of the building blocks of the final IF statement, which was essentially developed by only a
few members of the IF, which constitute the Steering Group of the Inclusive Framework
(SGIF), while all other IF members were only invited to endorse the solution as presented
by the Chair. We are more concerned that only one of our members participated in
developing the rules, with that member objecting to the rules and abstaining from endorsing
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the fairness of the rules final outcome. This has left us uncomfortable about the fairness of
the rules.951
Imaginably, the perceived lack of genuine inclusivity is not without consequence. In their 2019
piece, Christians & Magalhaes discuss how the “OECD Unified Approach” a policy framework
that was designed by the OECD Secretariat and metamorphosed into the Pillar One deal,
incorporated the nexus and profit allocation features of two proposals – user participation and
marketing intangibles – that were favoured by OECD countries but excluded the SEP method that
is favored by mostly developing countries.952 The implication, according to the authors, is the
reinforcement of an international tax regime that reserves most of the tax gains for HIDCs.953
Considering the skepticism trailing the inclusivity of the Inclusive Framework, it is not
surprising that when a consensus on Pillar One was reached, the OECD was keen to emphasize
that developing countries were major players in the entire BEPS 2.0 compromise. A recent
OECD statement in this respect is reproduced as follows:
Developing countries (particularly those in Africa, and with the support of the African
Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)) have had a significant influence on the agreement.
For example, on Pillar One, the agreement includes a commitment to reduce the scope
threshold in 7 years (provided the system is operating as intended), which will result in
a bigger pool of profits to be reallocated to markets; the nexus threshold – the point at
which developing countries would see an allocation under Pillar One from an in-scope
MNE – is set at a low level (EUR 1 million, reduced to EUR 250 000 for the smallest
countries) so as to maximise the number of countries that will see revenue benefits; an
951
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elective option on tax certainty which will help ensure that countries which have no or
only very small numbers of disputes do not get tied up in mandatory dispute resolution
processes; Pillar One also includes a commitment to develop simplified, streamlined
approaches, with a particular focus on the needs of low capacity countries, to the
application to transfer pricing rules to certain arrangements that are very often the subject
of tax disputes and, under Pillar Two, the guaranteed availability of the Subject to tax
rule (STTR). These elements contributed to a balanced agreement for all parties in the
negotiations.954
The foregoing statement reflects attempts at output inclusivity in both the Pillar One and Pillar
Two compromises. Yet, the historical context and “top-down” path to that consensus leaves little
doubt about the effect of power asymmetry in its formation. Perhaps, because an estimated more
than 63% of in-scope MNEs are U.S.-headquartered companies,955 the U.S. has been the single
biggest player in the Pillar One compromise. Without U.S. cooperation, the deal was probably
doomed.956 The U.S. singlehandedly held up consensus for a significant time.957 Exclusive deals
were cut between countries to stem the trend of DSTs.958 At some point the U.S. insisted on a
“safe harbor” rule that would have allowed MNEs to opt in or out of the proposed Pillar One tax
regime.959 A deal became feasible only after the inauguration of the Biden administration and the
willingness of that administration to compromise.960 One outcome of that compromise was a
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framework with a much narrower scope than previously contemplated.961 The Pillar One
compromise turned out as something that was first developed by the OECD Secretariat (knitted
together from three proposals),962 streamlined by the OECD Secretariat after receiving public
comments,963 reengineered by the U.S. government,964 and endorsed by G7 countries,965 before its
eventual adoption by individual Inclusive Framework member states,966 as well as G20 countries
distinctly.967 At the stage of inclusive adoption, the perception is that not much room is left for
meaningful change, except, perhaps, to accommodate the priorities of some OECD states who
insisted on alterations to the language of the Pillar Two deal. 968 Does a compromise that
embodies the engagement of all countries “on an equal footing” require these exclusive stages
of design and approval? A keen observer, Tove Maria Ryding comments that:
An approach where smaller clubs of rich and powerful countries steer the outcome of
Inclusive Framework negotiations raises some specific concerns. Especially for smaller
and less rich and powerful countries that are members of the Inclusive Framework, but
not of the powerful decision-making clubs, it brings the risk that they will be pressured
into agreements that do not reflect their views and interests. It also brings the risk of
generating outcomes of the Inclusive Framework negotiations that are biased in favor of
a particular group of countries. 969
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I can agree with this summation. I imagine that no close observer would be innately surprised
by the lack of “equal footing” on which countries “negotiate”. Even the OECD has found cause
to lose guard on its own pretense of inclusivity and equality. The remarks of the Director, OECD
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Pascal Saint-Amans, captured in 2019, bears as much:
Now, we are pragmatic. If you have all the big guys and a significant chunk of the small
guys saying ‘yes we [should] do it,’ then the thing happens. Everyone must be involved,
though.970
It seems that Mr. Saint-Amans was more forthcoming than Mr. Dickinson, whom I quoted
earlier, in his appraisal of the disparity between rule makers and rule takers. It might well be that
inclusivity is understood to mean that “the small guys” can be heard but not appeased – at least
not in terms of their core demands. After all, non-OECD countries have also engaged with the
Inclusive Framework at group level, as a way to combine strengths to extract more equitable
outcomes.971
The Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four (G24), a group of developing countries from
Africa, Asia and the Americas, has served as a collective voice for its members, making various
representations on their behalf. 972 From the onset of the Inclusive Framework process, the G24
was a main backer of the SEP proposal as a framework for the allocation of taxing rights to
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market states.973 When the OECD Secretariat combined three different proposals – SEP, user
participation, and marketing intangibles – into a single proposal (the Unified Approach), the G24
advocated the introduction of a fractional apportionment type profit allocation methodology into
the taxation of MNEs under Pillar One, with withholding taxes as a collecting mechanism. 974
Mainly for reasons of administrative convenience, the G24 strongly opposed the split of MNEs’
global profits into “routine” and “residual” and advocated that the total profits be allocated by
fractional apportionment (based on agreed metrics such as global sales, assets, payroll and
users).975 The G24 also opposes the linkage of a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism (tax
certainty) with Amount A, and advocates dispute prevention instead. 976
In its more recent representations to the Inclusive Framework, the G24 recommended that Pillar
One (Amount A) should contain a reallocation of not less than 30% of an MNE’s residual profits.
The G24 argues that because of the small number of companies and the nature of the business
scope any share of residual profits that is lower than 30% would not ensure “any meaningful
revenue for developing countries – particularly small and emerging economies”.977 The G24’s
recommendations were mostly ignored, even though important concessions were made for
OECD countries like the UK and Ireland, prompting some observers to highlight the damaging
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effects of the compromise and to implore its rejection by LIDCs. 978 The G24 cited a recent IMF
study showing that LIDCs could lose revenue under Pillar One, while countries with large
markets would most likely gain revenue. 979
ATAF has channeled the collective views of LIDCs on the African continent throughout the
Inclusive Framework project. ATAF has echoed similarly strong concerns that the Amount A
rules were extremely complex for African countries, that the complexity outweighed the revenue
benefits that would accrue to market states, especially smaller market jurisdictions, and that the
split between residual and routine profits would undermine inter-taxpayer equity:
Where a business has a taxable presence in the market jurisdiction such as through a
distribution activity, that jurisdiction will have taxing rights under the arm’s length
principle resulting in many cases in part of the routine profit of the MNE being taxed in
that jurisdiction and in some cases some of the MNE’s residual profit. 980
Accordingly, ATAF rated the Pillar One (Amount A) proposal initiated by the U.S. as inadequate
in terms of the amount of the profits to be reallocated to market states and advocated the
reallocation of a portion of the MNE’s total profits rather than only residual profit.981 ATAF
endorsed the inclusion of a global turnover threshold in Pillar One but strongly recommended
that the threshold be lowered to €250 million, to expand the range of in-scope entities.982 ATAF
was able to claim victory points in some respects. The forum has expressed satisfaction with the
broadening of Pillar One to include all sectors rather than the narrower scope proposed in the
OECD Pillar One Blueprint.983 The expansion of Pillar One to all sectors, rather than the narrow
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scoping previously contemplated in the Pillar One Blueprint; the exemption of the extractives
sector;984 a reduction of the nexus threshold from €5 million to €1 million and €250,000 (smaller
jurisdictions) respectively; and the confined applicability of business line segmentation to very
limited circumstances, which simplifies administration. 985 ATAF also claims victory in the
toned-down application of mandatory arbitration, which it otherwise considers problematic for
African countries:
Together with the AUC, ATAF strongly opposed this as it would impose a costly and
resource intensive process on many African countries which have limited capacity and
where there is little risk of double taxation. ATAF has succeeded in obtaining agreement
that for many African and other developing countries they will not have the mandatory
dispute resolution mechanism imposed upon them, and instead an elective binding
dispute resolution mechanism will be available for issues related to Amount A for
developing countries that are eligible for deferral of their BEPS Action 14 [peer] review
and have no or low levels of MAP disputes. The eligibility of a jurisdiction for this
elective mechanism will be reviewed regularly; jurisdictions found ineligible by a review
will remain ineligible in all subsequent years. This is a major achievement for Africa. 986
ATAF, nonetheless, expressed regret that some vital concerns remain unresolved: the restriction
of taxable profits to residual profits and the persistence with a 25% residual profit reallocation
when, in the forum’s view, at least 35% was required to fulfill meaningful reallocation. 987 ATAF,
however, concludes with optimism that the deal would yield additional tax revenue for African
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countries even though it does not address the broader issues of taxing rights distribution between
residence and source countries that remain of priority to LIDCs.988
Despite the more favourable outcomes that ATAF was able to secure, it seems that the Inclusive
Framework leaves a scar of resentment in the thoughts of LIDCs who remain unfulfilled with
their level of participation in the OECD-led process. Perhaps, these states blame the process
capture by more powerful countries for their inability to secure more favourable distributional
outcomes, which may have led to the reluctance of Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to
sign-up. An immediate consequence of this state of discontent was a move by another active
group of over 130 developing countries, the G77, to “rebel” against the skewed political process
in the Inclusive Framework. In October 2021, shortly after the OECD released the text of the
Two-Pillar compromise, the G77 and China initiated a resolution before the UN General
Assembly to, inter alia, elevate the UN Tax Committee to the status of an intergovernmental UN
tax body that would steer the ship of international tax reform. 989
In support of this draft resolution, it has been noted that over one-third of the world’s countries
never took part in the Inclusive Framework negotiations:
The fact that over 130 developing countries have now tabled a proposal to have an
intergovernmental UN tax negotiation is a strong sign that they do not consider the
discussion about global tax rules to be over”; and “the United Nations is the only forum
where countries can participate on a truly equal footing. 990
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Chowdhary & Picciotto also lend support to the renewed calls for a world tax body under the
UN, arguing that such a body would end institutional proliferation in international tax policy
making and address and the inclusivity and legitimacy concerns surrounding the OECD Inclusive
Framework.991 Thus far, no concrete progress has been reported on the proposed resolution, but
few would bet against it failing like all previous attempts to install an inclusive global tax body.
3.5.3 Sovereignty: Whipping Them In Line
Sovereignty is another important dimension of the Pillar One compromise. As I contend in chapter
2, the desire to reassert tax sovereignty and fiscal self-determination is central to the push by states
in this century to reshape some of the fundamental principles of international taxation, particularly
the principles allocating taxing rights between residence and source countries. The unwillingness
of countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan to accept the Pillar One compromise
does not seem unrelated to their dissatisfaction with the deal’s impairment of their tax jurisdiction.
Countries in that mold of discontent with multilateral cooperation in the international tax regime
seem to be left with three choices: remain loyal, exit, or remain and push for better. 992 However,
none of these choices is particularly straightforward. If it were feasible, dissenting states would
press for a broader scope of Pillar One, for instance, just as the UK secured a carveout for
“regulated financial institutions”993 and Ireland successfully insisted on altering the language of
Pillar Two to suit its own tax competition policies.994 Unfortunately, as Hearson observes, LIDCs
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lack the power to coerce international tax reforms out of other states and must make do with the
piece that the G20 and the OECD avails them.995
Exiting would be an especially delicate option for LIDCs. It would require an exiting state to break
rank with the OECD compromise and to legislate as it deems within its jurisdiction. That is, after
all, what sovereign states are entitled to do. Such a state would be neither perturbed nor daunted
by external influences as it asserts its tax sovereignty. Incidentally, that kind of autonomy does not
exist in a post-Westphalian world.996 If it does exist, I doubt that LIDCs are in a strong position to
wield it.997
As I discuss in section 2.3.3.4, the threat of sanctions and trade counter-measures played an
important role in the U.S.’s decision to reverse its attempts to impose source-based tax on
international shipping in the early 20th century.998 Eventually, countries agreed to reserve taxation
of international shipping and air traffic to countries of residence, resulting in the current Article
8.999 The path to the Pillar One tax deal, in some respects, mirrors the path to Article 8.
History does repeat itself. Due partly to frustration with the slow pace of BEPS 2.0 and the lack of
consensus on Pillar One, many countries have experimented with different forms of unilateral
digital tax measures.1000 Some of the unilateral measures seek to adapt existing tax treaty principles
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to the peculiarities of the digital economy1001 while others attempt to impose DSTs and similar
taxes.1002 There has been one huge roadblock to these attempted reassertions of state sovereignty:
the U.S. The U.S. has maintained strong opposition to any unilateral digital tax measure and
contends that the burdens of these “discriminatory” taxes would fall disproportionately on U.S.
MNEs, the tech giants.1003 Given the bullish and sometimes unconventional manner in which the
U.S. has been known to assert its own tax sovereignty, it would seem justifiable for other states to
dismiss the U.S.’s protests as hypocritical.1004 The problem, however, lies in power asymmetry, as
reflected in the risk of U.S. sanctions and trade wars which may be potentially devastating on
international trade.1005 The U.S. has signalled its willingness to sanction any country that imposes
digital tax on its tech companies1006 and insists that it is the only country that is entitled to tax
them, despite showing no willingness, currently, to tax those companies.1007 As a consequence of
this potential hostility, few countries have shown resolve to sidestep the search for global
consensus in favour of asserting their own tax sovereignty. Countries that have experimented with
a DST have mostly done so on an interim or tentative basis and shown a willingness to retract once
a compromise can be reached.1008 In the end, the 2021 compromise driven by the U.S. ensured that
the number of in-scope U.S. companies was very limited compared to what would have obtained
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under a compromise with a much smaller global turnover and profitability threshold. The U.S.
ensured that the arrangement would, in principle, spread beyond highly digitalized businesses, put
a stop to unilateral DSTs and secured a global minimum tax rate under the co-joined Pillar Two.1009
Still, there are voices who feel that the U.S. has shortchanged itself by signing a deal that would
mostly affect U.S. companies and render them globally less competitive.1010
States that are dissatisfied with the deal are left to weigh, very carefully, whether to play along or
go their own way, in which case they may risk potential backlash from the great powers – perhaps,
one great power. Thus far, Nigeria is one country that has starkly repudiated the party line. In
April 2022, Nigeria reportedly opted out of the Two-Pillar deal, citing the reasons outlined in
the preceding segment.1011 Whatever the geopolitical implications, Nigeria’s decision to exit the
stage cannot be deemed unreasonable in view of reports like Oxfam’s which demonstrate that
Nigeria would be one of the countries to suffer a significant revenue hit from the deal’s
impairment of taxing rights.1012 Presumably, Nigeria will forge ahead with its already established
unilateral digital tax regime. Protagonists of multilateralism can only hope that other disgruntled
countries do not follow Nigeria’s exit course, otherwise the deal might unravel. As I highlight
in the next segment, countries like Canada already have a stand-by unilateral legal framework
for taxation of non-resident digitalized businesses that would become active if the Pillar One
deal fails to reach implementation. While such unravelling remains a remote possibility, the
current compliance figures demonstrate that most Inclusive Framework member states are “happy”
to play along. This broad loyalty, on the one hand, suggests that countries, generally, prefer an
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“imperfect” deal to the potential chaos of unilateralism but, on the other hand, evidences a triumph
of great power over national sovereignty and national interest. This capacity to keep countries in
check is why some LIDCs may feel stuck in a tax deal that does not come close enough to
meeting their perceptions of fairness.
3.5.4 Pluralism: Big Business and Civil Society
Diane Ring’s contribution on international tax relations remains immensely valuable for not only
highlighting the permeative influence of politics on the framing of international tax rules, but
also for amplifying the point that these influences do not only emanate from sovereign states,
but also from other invested parties looking to secure an ideal economic outcome for
themselves.1013 I am minded to conclude this section by reflecting on the discernible, often
subtle, roles of non-state actors in the formation of the Pillar One deal. This perspective is
relevant because the new tax deal, when implemented, will impact the tax obligations of in-scope
businesses, and it is important to accommodate the viewpoints of these stakeholders on the
potential economic ramifications of such a transformational global tax policy; and this is
notwithstanding any perception that large digitalized business entities are chief beneficiaries of
the legal order that countries aim to restructure and may seek to, as closely as possible, maintain
the status quo.
Non-state actors, especially business stakeholders, have both historically and contemporarily
tried to influence international tax policy. Taxpayers and tax professionals “actively seek to
understand, influence and shape international tax law and policy”. 1014 Their fingerprints can be
1013
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spotted on the double taxation regime, tracing back as the early 1920s when the ICC initiated
the League of Nations project to eliminate international double. 1015 The ICC’s influence was also
crucial to the establishment of the OECD as the main norm setting institution of international
taxation. The ICC’s disenchantment with the lack of multilateral consensus between capital
importing and capital exporting countries on a double taxation relief model led it to push the
newly formed OEEC to succeed the League of Nations’ Fiscal Committee as the body with
responsibility to frame such a model.1016
Although it is difficult to attribute such a high magnitude of influence to a single non-state actor
in the present era, one cannot fail to acknowledge “smaller” bits of influence.1017 In the current
dispensation, the role of big business has been largely two-fold: technical contributions and
political influence. One is to make “technical” suggestions to the OECD that may help to ensure
that the new tax deal is sensitive to business. The OECD has taken representations from many
businesses and business groups during its attempts to craft the new tax regime. 1018 The ICC is
one of the business groups that have made representations at various stages of the deal 1019 and,
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understandably, has been keen to emphasize the importance of a compromise that is efficient
and administrable.1020
Another important business body, Business at OECD (BIAC), has actively participated in the
rules making process.1021 BIAC has a permanent consultancy status at the OECD since its
founding in 1962. BIAC emphasizes certainty and administrative feasibility in its
representations.1022 One of BIAC’s core demands as regards Pillar One is that unilateral digital
tax measures “must be definitely removed by all participating countries”. 1023 This demand, which
is not solely attributable to BIAC, is reflected as a core component of the Pillar One
compromise.1024 However, BIAC has also had cause to decry a lack of inclusion in the decision
making process of the Inclusive Framework, noting that this lack of inclusion “will not lead to
administrable outcomes”. 1025
Additionally, the business community exerts political pressure on decision makers to ensure that
states do not act either unilaterally or multilaterally to impose taxes that undermine the
commercial interests of the business community. For instance, in 2019, more than a dozen U.S.
trade groups and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged the U.S. government to intervene to
“block” a digital services tax touted by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during that
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year’s general elections campaign. 1026 The groups claimed that the tax would undermine U.S.
investment in Canada's technology market and threaten Canada's compliance with commitments
under various trade agreements: the WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). They urged the U.S.
government to rapidly engage with its Canadian counterpart to put the brakes on the proposed
legislation.1027 Whatever considerations prevailed, the Trudeau proposal stalled, as the country
opted instead to focus on a multilateral compromise. 1028 In early 2022 when Canada again
showed intent to move forward with the DST proposal, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
issued a statement urging the USTR to take retaliatory action if Canada went ahead. 1029 In
February 2022, the USTR filed a formal complaint with the government of Canada, urging it to
not proceed with the proposed DST law. 1030
The cloud of rampant international tax abuse and structural obsolescence that overshadows the
international tax regime has expanded the coast for political engagement by non-state actors to
include civil society organisations (CSOs) who are primarily on the side of “tax justice”.
Organizations like Action Aid, Christian Aid, Oxfam, the BEPS Monitoring Group, and Tax
Justice Network have emerged as frontline warriors for domestic and international tax justice,
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mostly carrying the voice of LIDCs. 1031 CSOs have in some cases taken legal steps to void tax
treaties that they deem erosive to the tax base of LIDCs. 1032 While scholars have previously
decried the limited access of CSOs to international organizations like the OECD,1033 scholars
like Cees Peters, recognizing the important role that CSOs play in providing a moral balance to
global tax governance, advocate that they be given a seat at the table.1034 CSOs, like business
stakeholders, may be viewed as wielders of soft power, and if for no other reason, the
involvement of CSOs can help to counterbalance the influence of MNEs and business groups, to
ensure that tax rules and compromises are forged with sufficient latitude for equity, as much as
commercial efficiency. A global coalition of CSOs was quickly on hand to denounce the TwoPillar compromise as a “deal of the rich” that “will not benefit developing countries. 1035
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3.6

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter is designated as the main case study of this thesis. My task here has been to evaluate
the OECD Pillar One tax compromise from an equity perspective using the RIC framework
developed in the preceding chapter. I have undertaken this task, relying on three of the five
reasonableness yardsticks hitherto discussed: disparity of means, alternativity, and the potential
for non-tax benefits. I found it relatively straightforward to reach a positive conclusion on
whether the Pillar One compromise impairs the exercise of tax jurisdiction by LIDCs, as market
states. The reasonableness analysis was, expectedly, more complex. There are no simple
answers. We must view things on a country-by-country basis and also analyze rule-by-rule. One
rule may be highly restrictive for a country while being mostly revenue neutral for another.
Regarding the first test, I conclude that even though the Pillar One compromise attempts to
incorporate a disparity of means test into the nexus requirements, that attempt does not go far
enough as it is designed in such a way that only the smallest jurisdictions – based only on GDP
– are qualified. There is no consideration of the market size/power of countries. This,
consequently, leads a large number of LIDCs, including Nigeria and Kenya – who appear to
have justifiable revenue grounds for doing so – to consider the deal excessively and unreasonably
restrictive on their tax jurisdiction. I conclude that the scoping of Pillar One, streamlined with a
global turnover and profitability threshold, might be considered a reasonable policy to the extent
that it aims to ensure that only profitable firms can be taxed. However, a global threshold might
be considered unreasonable for some countries if it means that an MNE that has nexus there and
derives significant revenue there is excluded from taxation because of the global turnover
threshold. The rule does not fairly account for the fact that even a globally “small” MNE might
have significant economic presence in a country. This factor is especially important for LIDCs
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when we consider that many of the big MNEs that Pillar One focuses on may not have much
involvement in LIDCs. This nexus rule – coupled with the high global turnover threshold –
makes even less sense when one considers that such limitation does not apply with respect to
MNEs that operate through a permanent establishment. I mean, no international tax rule requires
that an entity of one state that operates in/derives income from another state through a permanent
establishment should not be subject to tax in that other state unless the entity’s global operations
yield a certain turnover and/or profitability. So, there are both neutrality and inter-taxpayer
equity concerns here.
On alternativity, I argue that the UN’s Article 12B proposal, on many fronts, appears to
constitute a more reasonable alternative for LIDCs. The scoping, nexus, and profit allocation
rules of Article 12B do not, overall, come close to the OECD Pillar One in restricting the taxing
rights of LIDCs; and, importantly, the UN proposal contains inbuilt mechanisms for the
elimination of double taxation. I am especially concerned by the lack of proper justification for
the arbitrary 25% residual profit allocation. Although economists are split on whether residual
profits should be entirely allocated to the market jurisdiction, there are practical implications
when they are not. The decision to allocate only 25%, despite the numbers showing that a below
30% allocation would shortchange LIDCs, seems unreasonable, especially when residual profit
is itself only a fraction of total profits. It also erodes the efficiency aspect of residual profit
allocation which strongly supports market jurisdiction allocation. However, Article 12B is also
replete with substantial problems of its own. The want of impact assessment on Article 12B also
leaves me unable to conclude that an Article 12B-based regime would significantly improve the
tax positions of LIDCs (as mostly small market states). Even then, the potential distortions of a
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predominantly gross-based tax on active business income are difficult to ignore. Of course, this
assessment should not imply that there can be no suitable alternatives. I offer none here.
Regarding the subject of non-tax benefits, while I am willing to accept, based on available
information, that restricted taxation can help digital business models to invest and innovate on
the supply side, I have struggled to trace a direct link between restricted market state taxation
and increased investment in market states, which would justify the revenue sacrifice that a
compromise entails. Nevertheless, I am willing to accept that spillover effects from supply side
investment and innovation can accrue to the benefit of market states. Also, the Pillar One
thresholds can protect young and, perhaps, not-so-profitable tech-centric enterprises, including
those in LIDCs, from problematic cross-border taxation, as they strive to compete overseas. This
can overall also mean residence-based taxes for LIDCs.
Despite my various misgivings, including vivid concerns about the political process that
produced the Pillar One compromise, I am unable to form a general conclusion that the deal, as
a whole, is an unreasonable compromise for LIDC. Important improvements can, of course, be
made, as I have highlighted here. However, for specific countries – e.g., Nigeria and Kenya –
such a conclusion is reachable, based on the vital economic evaluation provided by Oxfam. As
for my general position, I am conscious that Pillar One is a complex political compromise, which
means that nobody gets all they want – not even the sometimes parallel-sided rich OECD
countries, who, in some cases, had to trade-off something in Pillar One to gain something in
Pillar Two, and vice versa. I have laid an evaluative framework. Every sovereign must decide
for itself, by reason – not duress – I hope.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
International taxation is a complex entanglement of law, economics, and politics. The subject is
deeply political, especially when it comes to the subset of norm making. This is because a
substantial portion of the rules that govern international taxation are established by consensus
amongst sovereign states. Existing conceptualization of international (tax) relations theory
demonstrates that during negotiation, states are largely driven by their individual interests. They
are also preoccupied with the motive of balancing different – sometimes conflicting – policy
objectives: neutrality, equity, and administrability. As a result, consensus making tends to be
bogged down in intricacy and arduousness. Historically, states with more economic-political
power tend to dominate both the process and outcome, while non-state actors have been known
to project their (usually) commercial interests into the equation. These imperfect alignments
sometimes produce outcomes that mismatch different but important policy objectives. Often
time, efficiency is prioritized at the expense of equity. The negative distributional effects of such
an entrenched rules-based system can be disproportionately felt by states that fall into the lowincome, developing, or capital-importing classifications (LIDCs, for convenience).
The negative distributional consequences of our international tax regime agitate the disparate
conscience of tax justice advocates and commentators. As a result, there is a rich and robust
literature of commentary evaluating the soundness, in inter-national equity terms, of our
international tax regime. The work in this field is largely commendable. In many respects it has
helped to shore-up inclusivity and equity in the system. Many tax treaties between HIDCs and
LIDCs reflect more positive distributional outcomes for the latter and LIDCs can claim to be
better seen and heard in contemporary international tax reform endeavors. However, embedded
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in that endowed repertoire of equity-centric literature is a troubling narrative that, perhaps,
inadvertently casts the case for LIDCs in the mold of aid or charity.
There can be two tracks up the same mountain. This thesis is a modest epistemic attempt at
course correction. I demonstrate how the “tax aid” or “charity” narrative can derail/undermine –
rather than enhance – the inter-national tax equity agenda for LIDCs. I offer an alternative
narrative that is built on a foundation of normative entitlement (tax sovereignty) but that is
simultaneously adjustable to inter-national differentiation. This narrative – RIC – emphasizes
fiscal self-determination as a pillar of international taxing rights assertion. It builds on the settled
notion that sovereign states have an inherent right to tax all taxable factors within their territory.
The international tax regime does not grant this entitlement, but can restrict its exercise, for
various important reasons: principally, the avoidance of double taxation. Ideally, restriction is
attained, not by imposition, but by consensus – compromise. However, a state should not be
expected to yield to a compromise that restricts the exercise of its tax jurisdiction to an extent
that may be adjudged unreasonable, considering that state’s peculiar circumstances. A
compromise that makes sense, i.e., that is reasonable, for Canada – a country of under 40 million
people, GDP of $1.7 trillion and tax-to-GDP ratio of 34% – might not make sense for Nigeria –
a country of 200 million people, GDP of $440 billion and tax-to-GDP ratio of under 10%.
Nigeria, as a rational state might not be inclined to embrace such a compromise.
While there are no tools to paint an ironclad picture of reasonableness, this thesis offers some
useful guidance that can help to make such assessments. My aim is not to offer an evaluative
framework that is set in intractable abstraction or “metaphysical speculation”. Instead, as I
demonstrate, there are many practical examples – some of them familiar – where this framework
can be used to evaluate the fairness of international tax regimes, both in respect of our existing
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tax treaty framework and in respect of the contemporary compromises that are forging.
Therefore, if inter-national tax equity is a high-voltage wire, RIC can help to step it down.
To be clear, international taxation is not without (proposed) schemes that are designed to channel
tax aid to LIDCs. However, the narrative around charity-based international tax schemes should
neither emasculate nor obfuscate the distinctive portrayal of international tax claims that seek
equity by protecting the entitlement of LIDCs to tax their (shared) tax base.
The choice of narratives is not without consequence. As I piece in section 1.3, it obfuscates the
distinctiveness of international tax aid and inter-national tax equity, as a discourse. It obscures
the conversation around the policy objectives of international tax reform: to make the regime
fairer or to distribute aid. It triggers, perhaps, pointless debates about whether there is a
cosmopolitan duty of assistance from rich to poor countries and whether the tax system is the
avenue to deliver such assistance. It systematically entrenches a “handout” mindset and affords
HIDCs a pretext to resist meaningful reform of international tax rules, based on extraneous
considerations like corruption and mismanagement in LIDCs and the perceived superior efficacy
of their own charitable dispositions. The, sometimes, somewhat red herring infusion of tax aid
themes into international tax reform discourse potentially dilutes a more robust articulation of
reform that is founded on fiscal entitlement, self-determination, and preservation, as
cornerstones of equity; and this can impact negotiating positions. Bringing about conceptual
clarity, disambiguation, and evaluative redirection – as I strive to do here – can facilitate an
explicit focus on actual tax aid, as reflected in some of the scholarship that truly reflect taxation
as a scheme for delivering ODA to LIDCs. It is for these reasons that I am keen to emphasize
the imperative for clear articulation of what LIDCs want – or really want – from any engagement
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with international tax reform. If it is charity, then we can say so. If it is equitable distribution,
there must be some expressive way to draw the line.
Again, I must highlight an aspect of the framing/phrasing of international tax discourse that, I
think, perhaps inadvertently, feeds into the charity narrative. It is the notion that the international
tax regime – or, more specifically, tax treaties – allocates, distributes, appropriates, or apportions
taxing rights. This kind of phrasing – which is most common – entrenches a top-down perception
about the origin of taxing rights. In other words, when we use these terms, as we constantly do,
we paint the mental picture of a central authority (like in a unitary system of governance) – that
devolves taxing rights to states. While such phrasing might be diction convenient, the reality, I
must reiterate, is that international tax regimes – as products of compromise, are rather forums
for sovereign states – as embodiments of inherent tax jurisdiction – to assume defined obligations
to surrender the exercise of taxing rights. The making of such a regime is bottom-up, not topdown. As such, no one allocates, appropriates, or gives taxing rights to LIDCs. It is LIDCs who
assume – albeit sometimes in politically compelling circumstances – obligations to give up or
surrender their taxing rights.
In conclusion, I should stress that this thesis is not without limitations and imperfections. The orbit
of international tax reform is circulated by numerous proposals by tax scholars and institutions,
e.g., the OECD and the UN, that aim to design a more satisfactory international tax regime. The
OECD’s Pillar One and the UN’s Article 12B – both of which are discussed in the preceding
chapter – are some contemporary examples. Such proposals have technical elements, distributional
implications and, of course, command varying levels of political acceptability. This thesis, unlike
many scholarly attempts in the tax literature, does not propose technical designs for the tax system.
Rather, it lays down an underlying normative framework – RIC – for evaluating whether any
276

technical proposals are equitable, in terms of how they limit the taxing rights of competing
jurisdictions. RIC is not itself a technical proposal, in the sense that it does not seek to allocate
taxing rights. It is important to highlight this limitation because the thesis does not stop at laying
down a normative framework, but also uses that framework to evaluate some of the technical
proposals that are in play. Further, I have limited my RIC evaluation to the impairment of source
tax jurisdiction. My reason is that source taxation is of greater priority to LIDCs. I have not quite
explored how RIC can function in respect of residence-based taxation. I believe that there is scope
for further work here.
In the big picture, I may not be the individual best placed to operationalize the framework that I
have set out in this work, but I am hopeful that this framework, whatever its limitations, assists
in charting a better narrative for LIDCs whenever inter-national tax equity is the subject of
conversation. In the end, I do not have all the answers nor command the uncommon sagacity of
King Solomon. Yet, like him, I am well sold on leaving every claimant its due.
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